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A B S T R A C T
This thesis deals with outside options and centrality in cooperative
games. First, the question whether outside options actually matter is
investigated by a pilot experiment using glove games to model simple
negotiation situations. The finding that outside options do matter is
followed by the question of whether cooperative allocation rules can
be supported by the data. Motivated by this experimental finding, a
probabilistic cooperative forecasting model is used in theoretical sup-
port of the importance of outside options. Outside options are for-
malized and suitable axioms for a categorization into outside-option-
sensitive and -insensitive allocation rules are suggested and applied.
During this categorization it turns out that there is only one outsi-
de-option-sensitive allocation rule within the framework of networks.
This and further issues arising from the analysis of the forecasting
model lead to a deeper anaylsis of networks, especially the issue of
centrality and power indices. A new approach for centrality measures
and power indices is suggested which is based on the idea that not
only the failure of a whole node is of interest, but rather the failure
of a certain link. Axiomatic characterizations, a political application
analyzing the performance for forecasting government formation and
an application on centrality analyzing identification of top key nodes
are provided. While existing cooperative allocation rules either lack
sensitivity to outside options or ignore the difference in centralities
of agents, a combination possibility of the previously analyzed issues
follows. A new (axiomatically characterized) allocation rule for net-
work structures accounting for both outside options and centrality is
provided, enriched with an (axiomatically characterized) alternative
variant being more suitable for applications in political networks due
to moderate relative proportions and applicability in presence of in-
compatibilities. By the analysis of the explicit effect of outside options
on these new allocation rules it is found that this effect is more com-
plex for link-based allocation than for player-based allocation which
finally provides a deep and detailed understanding of outside options
and their effects.
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Part I
I N T R O D U C T I O N

1
T H E G O L D E N T H R E A D
The theoretical models and approaches used throughout this thesis
are embedded in the theory of cooperative games. Therefore, it seems
to be important to mention right at the outset that cooperative game
theory is entirely different from non-cooperative game theory. While
the latter focuses on the actors with their individual preferences and
strategies, the focus of the cooperative approach is more on the out-
come of a whole group of actors and its allocation. With the words of
Robert Aumann:
Yesterday we were talking about cooperative and nonco-
operative game theory and I said that perhaps a better
name for cooperative would be “outcome oriented” or
“coalitional” and for noncooperative “strategically oriented”.
[Robert Aumann in an Interview with Eric Damme (1998,
p. 196)]
One should have in mind this different direction/objective from which
problems, examples and motivations in this thesis are seen and ana-
lyzed. The focus of this thesis is on this coalitional/outcome oriented
perspective as this direction, especially in times of globalization, of-
fers new possibilities to model economic or monetary unions and its
outcomes, for example for applications as forecasting relative power
in political networks.
The outline of this thesis is as follows: An introduction to the ba-
sic frameworks, definitions and notations of cooperative games and
a first insight to outside options by the example of glove games com-
plete Part I. Part II experimentally and theoretically analyzes outside
options. First, Chapter 3 investigates the question “Do outside op-
tions matter?”. In the theoretical part of this chapter, formulas for dif-
ferent cooperative allocation rules for the special case of glove games
are provided.1 In the experimental part2, an experimental case study
1 This part is based on Belau [2013a].
2 This part is based on Belau and Garmann [2013], joint work with Sebastian Garmann.
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is provided which uses glove games to model simple negotiation sit-
uations in a double auction market. The finding that outside options
do matter, that is, do affect negotiation, is followed by the question
of a favorable allocation rule, that is, whether one of the theoretical
allocation rules can be supported by our data. Furthermore, we dis-
cuss the relation to the ultimatum game, learning effects and price
interdependency in the designed market.
Chapter 4 provides the formal, theoretical part of analyzing out-
side options: Motivated by arising differences in the generalization
of cooperative allocation rules in a probabilistic forecasting model3,
outside-option-sensitivity axioms are suggested which turn out to be
suitable for a formal, axiomatic categorization of all allocation rules
discussed in Chapter 2 into outside-option-sensitive and -insensitive
ones. During this categorization we shed some more light on the
structural effect arising by outside options. Motivated by the fact that
there is only one outside-option-sensitive allocation rule in the frame-
work of network structures, a more general discussion of networks
emphasizes the issues raised and analyzed in Part III: the analysis of
centrality and link-based allocation rules in combination with outside-
option-sensitivity.
As discussed in Chapter 4, network structures seem to be more
suitable to model economic (or social or political) situations than
coalitional models without an inner structure. Hence, before further
analyzing the outside-option-issue, the other main topic of this thesis
is addressed: centrality. Starting with having in mind political net-
works (i. e., small networks), Chapter 5 suggests a new cooperative
allocation rule which is especially applicable in use as a power in-
dex or centrality measure. This approach is based on the idea that,
in contrast to existing literature on centrality, not only consequences
of failure of a whole node are of interest but rather consequences of
failure of a certain link. Using cooperative allocation rules, link-based
centrality measures (i. e., accounting for relative importance of links)
are suggested. Accounting for failure consequences of connections is
of recent importance considering for example the current Euro crisis
and the resulting monetary flows. Axiomatic characterizations of the
new allocation rule, a political application of the new rule used as a
3 This part of Chapter 4 is based on Belau [2011].
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power index on the performance for forecasting government forma-
tion and an application of the new rule used as a centrality measure
on identification of top key nodes are provided. Beside discussions
on moderate relative proportions (“Banzhaf vs. Shapley”), the more
convincing and appropriate performance of the new approach in ap-
plications for measuring political power or centrality emphasizes the
general advantages of link-based values.
After the analysis of outside options and centrality with respect
to links seperately, Chapter 6 combines these issues. The analysis in
Chapter 5 was restricted to connected networks, that is, situations
where (from a coalitional point of view) no outside options exist.
In Chapter 6 it is shown that existing allocation rules for general
network structures (i. e., also unconnected ones) either lack outside-
option-sensitivity or bear other drawbacks, namely, the ignorance of
the differences in the position of an agent within the network, that
is, differences in centrality. A new link-based allocation rule for net-
work structures is provided and axiomatically characterized which
both accounts for outside options and centrality (i. e., accounts for
the position of an agent within the network in place). Herewith the
issues of the previous chapters are combined.4 An (axiomatically char-
acterized) alternative variant of this rule which is more moderate in
terms of relative proportions and applicable in presence of incompat-
ibilities is suggested and the effect of outside options on these new
allocation rules is discussed. It is found that this effect is actually
more complex than originally anticipated. This provides a detailed
understanding of the structural effect of outside options on alloca-
tion. Moreover, it reopens the disucssion on the axioms formalizing
outside-option-sensitivity from Chapter 4 and explains why the sug-
gested “weak” axiom in fact might not be that weak and the “normal”
axiom actually could be seen as sort of strong.
Chapter 7 concludes with a summary and discussion of open ques-
tions and an outlook on future work.
In order not to “lose the thread” on the way throughout this thesis,
consider “the Golden Thread” displayed in Figure 1 which will ap-
4 This part is based on Belau [2013b].
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pear again in the beginning of each chapter highlighting the specific
issue of the chapter.
Figure 1: The Golden Thread
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F R A M E W O R K S A N D A L L O C AT I O N R U L E S I N
C O O P E R AT I V E G A M E T H E O RY
This chapter provides definitions, notations, findings and motivations
of the three main approaches in cooperative game theory which will
be used throughout this thesis: games with transferable utility, the
pointwise allocation rules and the two partitative approaches of coop-
erative coalition structures and cooperative network structures. Nota-
tions of the first two approaches are mainly based on Wiese [2005],
notions of the third approach on Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] and
Myerson [1977].
Furthermore, this chapter introduces glove games (introduced by
Shapley and Shubik, 1969) which we use to discuss the performance
of some of the suggested allocation rules and differences between
them as well as an introductive motivation for the issue of outside
options.
Note that this chapter does not provide a complete overview of the
above-mentioned approaches or cooperative game theory in general.
First of all, we only analyze values as solution concepts for allocation,
that is, singleton-valued allocation rules assigning exactely one dis-
tribution of worth to each game by an allocation formula. We do not
analyze set-valued solutions as the core (Edgeworth, 1881 and Gillies,
1959) or the kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965), which may be empty
or correspondences assigning multiple possible distributions. Beside
the focus on values, we will for example not discuss games with
non-transferable utility, Pareto-optimality, the nucleolus (Schmeidler,
1969), the Solidarity solution or the Nash-Bargaining-solution. This
chapter is meant to provide notions and motivations of the aspects of
cooperative game theory which will be used in the following chapters
and can be reconsulted to facilitate recalling definitions and notations.
Furthermore, especially in the axiomatization parts, we discuss defi-
nitions in more detail than in the following chapters.
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8 frameworks and allocation rules in cooperative game theory
2.1 games with transferable utility (tu-games)
One of the main assumptions used in cooperative game theory is
that utility is transferable, that is, agents can interchange utility be-
tween each other without losses. This assumption has been widely
discussed in the literature, some works analyze conditions on this as-
sumption (cf. Kaneko, 1976) as well as testability (Chiappori, 2010)
or a revealed preference approach (Cherchye et al., 2011). With this
assumption in place we model economic, social or political situations
via a cooperative game. More precisely, we have a set of actors and
a function which assigns to each subset of actors a numerical out-
come based on the specific situation we like to model, the so-called
characteristic or coalition function. Here, the assumption of utility be-
ing transferable from the group to the agents is crucial as outcome
is assigned to a set of agents and not the agents individually. Popu-
lar coalition functions used to model various economic, political or
social situations are for example weighted voting games, assigning a
fixed worth whenever a coalition reaches a certain quorum (for ex-
ample winning coalitions after an election), simple market games as
the glove game where worth is obtained whenever a certain kind of
matching was successfull or cost allocation games. Note that cost allo-
cation differs from the other applications in the sense that here, “more
is worse” in contrast to “more is better”.
One of the main tasks in cooperative game theory is to answer the
question of the allocation of this commonly created outcome among
the individuals. Here, not only the definition of a certain allocation
rule is of interest but also its properties. Therefore, most allocation
rules come along with an axiomatization. These axiomatizations uniquely
characterize the allocation rules, hence, one could say “if you support
all of the following axioms, you have to use the corresponding alloca-
tion rule”.1
Definition 2.1 (Player set and coalition function). Let the set N =
{1, ...,n} be the nonempty and finite set of players. The set VN := {v :
2N −→ R|v(∅) = 0} is the set of all coalition functions, that is, a func-
tion v ∈ VN describes the underlying game and assigns to any coali-
tion K ⊆ N its worth v(K).
1 Note that this might imply other axioms that are also satisfied by the rule one might
not like to support.
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The value v(K) can be interpreted as representing the economic
possibilities of coalition K. Note that a coalition function is sometimes
also called characteristic function.
Definition 2.2 (Game with transferable utility (TU-game)). A game
with transferable utility (TU-game) is a tupel (N, v).
For notational convenience, we sometimes only provide the coali-
tion function v and refer to a game.
Definition 2.3 (Unanimity game). For T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅, the game (N,uT )
with
uT (K) =
1 , if T ⊆ K
0 , otherwise
,K ⊆ N
is called a unanimity game (or also T -unanimity game).
Since the unanimity games form a basis of VN (see Shapley, 1953),
we can write any v ∈ VN as
v(K) =
∑
T∈2N\{∅}
λT (v)uT (K) ,K ⊆ N
where the scalars λT (v) are called Harsanyi dividends (see Harsanyi,
1959 and 1963).
Definition 2.4 (Zero-Normalization). A coalition function is called
zero-normalized if v({i}) = 0 ∀ i ∈ N. Denote byV0N the set of all zero-
normalized coalition functions. Any v ∈ VN can be zero-normalized:
for any v ∈ VN define the corresponding v0 ∈ V0N as follows:
v0(K) := v(K) −
∑
i∈N
v({i})u{i}(K) = v(K) −
∑
i∈N
λ{i}(v)u{i}(K).
Definition 2.5 ((Feasible) Allocation Rule). An allocation rule Y : {N}×
VN −→ R|N| distributes the worth of any TU-game among the play-
ers. An allocation rule is called feasible if
∑
i∈N Yi(N, v) 6 v(N).
Remark 2.1 (Zero-Normalization and the Allocation Rule). If one
zero-normalized a coalition function v to v0, one has to adapt the allo-
cation rule. For this, set Yi(N, v) = Yi(N, v0) + v({i}) ∀ i ∈ N.
Definition 2.6 (Order of the Player set). An order of N is a bijection
σ : N −→ {1, ..., |N|} where σ(i) denotes player i’s position in order
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σ. We denote by Σ(N) the set of all orders of N and by Ki(σ) := {j ∈
N|σ(j) 6 σ(i)} the set of players that do not come after player i under
order σ.
Shapley [1953] introduced one of the most popular allocation rules:
Definition 2.7 (Shapley value). For any TU-game (N, v), the Shapley
value Sh is for all i ∈ N given by:
Shi(N, v) :=
1
|Σ(N)|
∑
σ∈Σ(N)
MCvi (σ)
where MCvi (σ) := v(Ki(σ)) − v(Ki(σ) \ {i}) is the marginal contribu-
tion of player i in σ. Alternatively, one can calculate the Shapley value
for all i ∈ N by
Shi(N, v) =
∑
K⊆N\{i}
|K|!(|N|− |K|− 1)!
|N|!
[v(K∪ {i}) − v(K)] .
Here, MCvi (K) := v(K∪ {i}) − v(K) is called the marginal contribution
of player i to coalition K in the TU-game (N, v), that is, the surplus
player i creates when entering the coalition K, given the game (N, v).
The Shapley value assigns to any player i the average marginal con-
tribution over all orders of N. Note that the original definition of the
Shapley value is based on sequences, that is, takes into account all
possible sequences in which the players can enter a coalition. We will
focus on the alternative formula which is sometimes called the prob-
abilistic method as this is more applicable in use when the number of
players increases. The two methods are equivalent in their outcome.
Axiom 2.1 (Additivity (A)). An allocation rule Y satisfies Additivity
A, if for any coalition functions v,w we have: Y(N, v+w) = Y(N, v) +
Y(N,w).
A is a standard axiom2 and satisfied by all allocation rules referred
to. Note that in presence of A we have for any v ∈ VN
Y(N, v) =
∑
T∈2N\{∅}
Y(N, λT (v)uT )
which means that allocation of worth can be decomposed in alloca-
tion of the worth corresponding to the basis elements.
2 For a motivation of A see Roth, 1977.
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Axiom 2.2 (Efficiency (E)). An allocation rule Y satisfies Efficiency E
if for any TU-game (N, v) we have
∑
i∈N
Yi(N, v) = v(N).
This axiom states that no worth should be wasted. Note that this
axiom implicitly assumes that the worth of the grand coalition v(N)
is actually produced. There are applications where this is not assured
which will be discussed in the following sections.
Axiom 2.3 (Symmetry (S)). Players i, j ∈ N are called symmetric in
(N, v) if v(K ∪ {i}) = v(K ∪ {j}) ∀K ⊆ N \ {i, j}. An allocation rule Y
satisfies Symmetry S, if Yi = Yj for all symmetric Players i, j ∈ N.
Symmetric players have the same productivity. One could argue
that players with equal productivity in a game should obtain the same
payoff from this game.
Axiom 2.4 (Null Player Axiom (N)). A player i ∈ N is called a Null
player in (N, v) if v(K ∪ {i}) = v(K) ∀K ⊆ N \ {i}. An allocation rule Y
satisfies the Null Player Axiom N if Yi = 0 for all Null players i ∈ N.
This axiom excludes solidarity with unproductive players. One could
argue that unproductive players should obtain some worth due to
solidarity issues. There are alternatives to the Shapley value address-
ing this fact as for example the Solidarity value (Nowak and Radzik,
1994b) or the outside option values which will be disussed in the
following sections.
Theorem 2.1 (Axiomatization of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953)).
The Shapley value is the unique allocation rule that satisfies A, N, E
and S.
As an alternative to the Shapley value, Banzhaf [1952] introduced
another popular allocation rule which was generalized by Owen [1975]:
Definition 2.8 (Banzhaf value). For any TU-game (N, v), the Banzhaf
value Ba is for all i ∈ N given by
Bai(N, v) :=
∑
K⊆N\{i}
1
2|N|−1
[v(K∪ {i}) − v(K)] .
12 frameworks and allocation rules in cooperative game theory
The idea of the Banzhaf value is based on simple games, that is, a
TU-game where v(K) ∈ {0, 1} for all K ⊆ N. For any simple game, a
coalition K ⊆ N \ {i} is called swing for player i ∈ N, if v(K ∪ {i}) −
v(K) = 1, that is, if player i is needed to create worth. Then, the
Banzhaf value counts the swings of player i proportional to the total
number of potential swings (2|N|−1): For any simple game v ∈ VN,
the Banzhaf value is given by
Bai(N, v) :=
# of swings for i
# of potential swings for i
.
The Banzhaf value does not satisfy E, but (in contrast to the Shapley
value) the following axiom:
Axiom 2.5 (Banzhaf Efficiency (BaE)). An allocation rule Y satisfies
Banzhaf Efficiency BaE if
∑
i∈N
Yi =
∑
i∈N
Bai.
The idea behind this axiom could be interpreted following the orig-
inal definition for simple games using the ratio of swings and poten-
tial swings. The number of potential swings is the same for any player
i ∈ N, therefore, BaE states that the total power of the grand coalition
should be proportional to the total number of all swings (which is
aimed to represent the sum of individual power). For general games,
swings are replaced by marginal contributions.
Theorem 2.2 (Axiomatization of the Banzhaf value (Owen, 1975)).
The Banzhaf value is the unique allocation rule that satisfies A, N, BaE
and S.
Note that the Banzhaf value may distribute more worth than actu-
ally available/produced (i. e., might not be a feasible allocation rule).
The Banzhaf value should rather be seen as a power measure and is,
in this sort of applications, sometimes also called Banzhaf power index.
We see the main difference between the Shapley and the Banzhaf
value in the answer to the question how marginal contributions (for
simple games: swings) should be weighted. While the Shapley value
weights a marginal contribution with respect to it’s “strength”, that
is, taking into account the cardinality which one could interpret as
robustness, the Banzhaf value weights each marginal contribution by
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the same factor. Depending on the application, each answer could be
more or less favorable than the other. We will discuss this issue in
more detail in Chapter 5.
2.2 coalition structures
A central problem in economics, political science or sociology is the
analysis of coalition formation of individuals. Economic, political or
social structures mostly contain more information than just about the
set of actors and the underlying game. Individuals do not have to
build the grand coalition, that is, all actors cooperate with each other,
they could also build several (disjoint) coalitions which leads to the
partition approach which we will call coalition structure approach. An-
other approach is that certain coalitions between individuals may a
priori be fixed which refers to the a priori unions approach. One could
argue that the actual constellation of the coalition (partition) or the a
priori unions matters; one could for example question the reasoning
of the efficiency axiom that implicitly assumes that the grand coali-
tion has formed (or at least the worth of the grand coalition has been
produced).
Coalition formation can be found in various economic, political or
social situations we also meet in daily life. Almost everyone experi-
ences coalition formation in one’s social life by group formation in
school classes, sport clubs, among collegues at work or joining online
communities. Here, the “worth” of cooperation is simply the positive
effect to one’s social environment. Customers form coalitions in order
to obtain group discounts, especially facilitated by electronic market
places (see for example Tsvetovat et al., 2000). As an illustrating exam-
ple consider the recent advertisement slogan of the German mobile
phone operator mobilcom-debitel “together we achieve more”, promot-
ing discounts for mobile phone contracts3. Another popular applica-
tion in economics and political science is the formation of coalitions
between political parties to build the government after an election
which is one of the main application of weighted voting games and
power indices.
3 Promotion “Gemeinsam geht mehr”, cf. http://www.mobilcom-debitel.de/
unser-prinzip/
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Note that there exist further approaches on coalition formation as
for example von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944]’s analysis of sta-
ble sets or Aumann and Maschler [1964]’s analysis of the bargaining
set which will not be part of this thesis.
Definition 2.9 (Coalition structure). A partition P ofN is called coali-
tion structure and we denote by P(i) the coalition P ∈ P such that
i ∈ P (i. e., the coalition which contains player i ∈ N) and by PN the
set of all coalition structures of N.
Definition 2.10 (Allocation rule for coalition structures). A TU-game
with a coalition structure is a tupel (N, v,P) and an allocation rule
for coalition structures is a function Y : {N} ×VN × PN −→ R|N|,
distributing worth of any TU-game with a coalition structure among
the players.
One of the most popular allocation rules for coalition structures is
the component-restricted Shapley value, introduced by Aumann and
Drèze [1974]:
Definition 2.11 (Aumann-Drèze value). For any TU-game with a coali-
tion structure (N, v,P), the component-restricted Shapley value, de-
noted by Aumann-Drèze value AD, is for all i ∈ N given by
ADi(N, v,P) := Shi(P(i), v|P(i)).
Here, the whole game (player set and coalition function) is re-
stricted to the coalition of a player. That is, once a coalition is formed,
the worth produced by the coalition is distributed among the players
within the coalition independently on the outside of the coalition.
Axiom 2.6 (Component Efficiency (CE)). An allocation rule for coali-
tion structures Y satisfies Component Efficiency CE, if
∑
j∈P(i)
Yj(N, v,P) = v(P(i)) ∀ i ∈ N.
The motivation of this axiom is that players within a component,
seen as a productive unit, cooperate to create the component’s worth.
CE stands in contrast to E, where the worth of the grand coalition is
distributed among all players without coalitional restrictions. On the
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one hand, the use of CE instead of E avoids the problem of poten-
tially distributing worth which is not actually produced while, on the
other hand, it excludes the possibility of transferring worth between
coalitions, that is, compensations or side payments.
Axiom 2.7 (Symmetry within Components (CS) for Coalition Struc-
tures). An allocation rule for coalition structures Y satisfies Symmetry
within Components CS, if for all P ∈ P(N) we have
Yi(N, v,P) = Yj(N, v,P) ∀ symmetric players i, j ∈ N, j ∈ P(i).
CS states that allocation rules should provide the same payoff for
players with equal productivity that are in the same component, since
there is nothing like an inner structure which could be responsible for
a different treatment of these players. CS is a relaxation of S, where
players with equal productivity are treated equally independently of
whether they are in coalitions with potentially different coalitional
productivity.
Theorem 2.3 (Original Axiomatization of the Aumann-Drèze value
(Aumann and Drèze, 1974). The AD-value is the unique allocation
rule for coalition structures that satisfies A, N, CE and CS.
This characterization shows the connection to the (unrestricted)
Shapley value. However, we will make use of another characteriza-
tion of the AD-value using the following elegant axiom, introduced
by Myerson [1977]:
Axiom 2.8 (Balanced Contributions (BC)). An allocation rule for coali-
tion structures Y satisfies Balanced Contributions BC, if
Yi(N, v,P) − Yi(N \ {j}, v|N\{j},P|N\{j})
= Yj(N, v,P) − Yj(N \ {i}, v|N\{i},P|N\{i})
for all i, j ∈ N.
The exit of a player j should hurt/benefit another player i by the
same amount as the exit of i hurts/benefits j. While Slikker [2000]
used a component restricted version of BC, we apply the axiom di-
rectly as this is more in line with our further analysis.
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Theorem 2.4 (Axiomatization of the Aumann-Drèze value (Slikker,
2000 & Belau, 2011)). The AD-value is the unique allocation rule for
coalition structures that satisfies CE and BC.
Proof. Slikker [2000] shows that the AD-value is characterized by CE
and the component-restricted version of BC. BC implies the component-
restricted version, hence, it is sufficient to show that the AD-value
satisfies BC: For i, j ∈ N we have
ADi(N \ {j}, v|N\{j},P|N\{j}) −ADj(N \ {i}, v|N\{i},P|N\{i})
= Shi(P|N\{j}(i), v|N\{j}|P|N\{j}(i)) − Shj(P|N\{i}(j), v|N\{i}|P|N\{i}(j))
= Shi(P(i) \ {j}, v|P(i)\{j}) − Shj(P(j) \ {i}, v|P(j)\{i})
(∗)
= Shi(P(i), v|P(i)) − Shj(P(j), v|P(j))
= ADi(N, v,P) −ADj(N, v,P)
(∗): If j ∈ P(i) use that Sh satisfies BC. If j /∈ P(i) one also has i /∈ P(j)
and therefore P(i) \ {j} = P(i) and P(j) \ {i} = P(j).
In contrast to the AD-value, one of the first allocation rules for a
priori unions (we use it for coalition structures) was defined by Owen
[1977]:
Definition 2.12 (Owen value). For any TU-game with a coalition struc-
ture (N, v,P), the Owen value Ow is for all i ∈ N given by
Owi(N, v,P) :=
1
|Σ(N,P)|
∑
σ∈Σ(N,P)
[v(Ki(σ)) − v(Ki(σ) \ {i})]
where Σ(N,P) is the set of all orders σ over the player set that are
compatible with the coalition structure P, that is, ∀ i, j ∈ P ∈ P we
have |σ(i) − σ(j)| < |P|).
As already mentioned, the original approach of Owen [1977] differs
from the (partitional) understanding of a coalition structure we use
here. Owen uses a priori unions, that is, players organize each other
in fixed a priori unions (or bargaining blocks) and then the game
is “played on the grand coalition” accounting for these unions. This
approach differs in the sense that we interpret coalitions as produc-
tive unions where players cooperate in order to produce worth within
their coalition and not within the grand coalition. However, the Owen
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value can still be seen as an allocation rule for coalition structures if
we interpret the fixed a priori unions as productive unions. Note that
the Owen value satisfies the efficiency axiom while the other alloca-
tion rules discussed in this section do not.
Axiom 2.9 (Symmetry of Components (SC)). An allocation rule for
coalition structures Y satisfies Symmetry of Components SC if
∑
i∈P
Yi(N, v,P) =
∑
i∈P ′
Yi(N, v,P)
for P,P ′ ∈ P being symmetric in the intermediate game vint : P −→ R
(the game in which the components of a partition are the players).
SC can be seen as S for the intermediate game. The combination of
CS, where players with the same productivity are treated equally if
they are in the same coalition, and SC, where coalitions with the same
coalitional productivity are treated equally, closes the gap arising if
one eleminates S.
Theorem 2.5 (Axiomatization of the Owen value (Owen, 1977)). The
Owen value is the unique allocation rule for coalition structures that
satisfies E, N, CS, SC and A.
More recently, among the first explicitly emphasizing outside op-
tions, Wiese [2007] defined an allocation rule that is sensitive to out-
side options:
Definition 2.13 (Wiese value). For any TU-game with a coalition struc-
ture (N, v,P), the Wiese valueW is for all i ∈ N given by
Wi(N, v,P) :=
∑
σ∈Σ(N,P)
1
|Σ(N)|

v(P(i)) −
∑
j∈P(i)\{i}
MCvj (σ), if σ ∈ Σi(N,P)
MCvi (σ) , if σ /∈ Σi(N,P)
where Σi(N,P) ⊆ Σ(N) is the set of all orders σ ofNwhere all players
from i’s component P(i) except i come before player i, that is, |Ki(σ)∩
P(i)| = |P(i)|.
We will not provide the characterization and will not analyze the
the Wiese value in detail as
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The Wiese value has some drawbacks. Most notably, it
lacks a “nice” axiomatization. In essence, there is a non-
intuitive ad-hoc specification of the payoffs for unanimity
games which is expanded by linearity to the whole class of
games. Further, it is not yet clear whether there are stable
coalition structures (in the sense of Hart and Kurz, 1983)
with respect to the Wiese value for all TU-games. [Casajus,
2009b, p. 50]
We will only briefly analyze the Wiese value in Chapter 4 where we
find that the structural effect of an outside option on allocation by
the Wiese value is equal to the effect on allocation by the Shapley
value, that is, there is no further insight in terms of structural effects
of outside options.
As an alternative, Casajus [2009b] (also explicitly emphasizing out-
side options) suggested an allocation rule for coalition structures that
is sensitive to outside options:
Definition 2.14 (χ-value). For any TU-game with a coalition structure
(N, v,P), the χ-value is for all i ∈ N given by
χi(N, v,P) := Shi(N, v) +
v(P(i)) − ShP(i)(N, v)
|P(i)|
,
where ShP(i)(N, v) =
∑
i∈P(i)
Shi(N, v).
The χ-value can be seen as “the Shapley value made component
efficient”. It values outside options by a redistribution of the differ-
ence between the worth actually created by the coalition to what the
coalition would obtain according to the Shapley value.
The essential characterizing axiom of the χ-value is the following:
Axiom 2.10 (Splittingaxiom (SP)). A partition P ′ ⊆ 2N is called finer
than P ⊆ 2N if P ′(i) ⊆ P(i) for all players i ∈ N. An allocation rule
for coalition structures Y satisfies the Splittingaxiom SP, if for P ′ be-
ing finer than P we have for all i ∈ N and j ∈ P ′(i): Yi(N, v,P) −
Yi(N, v,P ′) = Yj(N, v,P) − Yj(N, v,P ′).
One could argue that gains or losses of splitting a coalition struc-
ture should be distributed equally on players staying together in the
new coalition structure.
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Furthermore, to allow for solidarity, the following axiom is intro-
duced:
Axiom 2.11 (Grand Coalition Null Player (GN)). An allocation rule
for coalition structures Y satisfies the axiom of Grand Coalition Null
Player GN, if Yi(N, v, {N}) = 0 for all Null players i ∈ N.
GN is less restrictive than N. While N generally excludes solidarity
with unproductive players, GN only demands the exclusion of soli-
darity if all players cooperate with each other which could be seen as
the absence of a coalition structure. One could argue that, if one de-
cides to cooperate with an unproductive player while one could have
excluded him (which is not possible if no coalition structure exists),
the cooperating players should “pay” for this solidarity with a side
payment towards the Null player. This stands in contradiction with
N while it is possible when using GN.
Remark 2.2. Note that for P = {N}, the axioms GN, CE and CS be-
come N, E and S for TU-games without further structure.
Theorem 2.6 (Axiomatization of the χ-value (Casajus, 2009b)). The χ-
value is the unique allocation rule for coalition structures that satisfies
CE, CS, A, GN and SP.
2.3 network structures
The use of graph theory to model social structures already started
more than a century ago while the analysis of economic networks
only became more and more important during the last decades (cf.
Jackson, 2006). The key idea is the analysis of bilateral relations be-
tween the actors. This contains much more information than the coali-
tion structure approach. Also on the application point of view, alloca-
tion rules working on networks might be more suitable than others.
We model network structures based on the idea of Myerson [1977]
who interpreted networks as communication structures. Until now, we
did not assume any restrictions on how and/or if actors can cooper-
ate, that is, cooperation between any set of actors was allowed. Follow-
ing Myerson’s spirit, we interpret links/connections of a network as
(direct) communication channels and argue that cooperation is only
possible between actors that can directly or indirectly (i. e., via path)
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communicate with each other. One can interpret this approach as a
generalization of both the approaches we used before: we enrich the
underlying TU-game with a coalition structure where the coalitions
contain those actors who are able to communicate with each other.
This coalition structure is enriched with an inner structure, namely,
the bilateral communication channels between the actors. In contrast
to this approach which is based on a specific transformation of the
coalition function, Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] model network struc-
tures by network functions, not assuming this explicit transformation.
In the Jackson and Wolinsky model, the underlying function assigns
worth to every network, independently on assumptions on the coali-
tion function. We use the Myerson approach as we find it more in
line with our applications. As we find the notation used by Jackson
and Wolinsky [1996] more convenient than the (very abstract) one of
Myerson [1977], we use the Jackson and Wolinsky notation, but in
Myerson’s spirit of communication structures.
Definition 2.15 (Network structure). We model a network as an undi-
rected graph where the nodes represent the players and the edges
represent the (bilateral) links between the players. Let N = {1, ...,n},
non-empty and finite, be the player set. The complete network (in
which a link between any two players exists) is defined as gN := {ij :=
{i, j}|i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}. Given that, we can define the set of all possible net-
works on N: GN := {g|g ⊆ gN}. Given such a g ∈ GN, we call (N,g) a
network structure.
Remark 2.3 (Network vs. graph). Note that our definition of a net-
work differs from the definition of a graph in the graph theoretical
sense. In mathematical graph theory, a graph consists of edges and
nodes, that is, a network structure in our notation. Furthermore, links
in a network are bilateral connections ij, i 6= j, while a link ii is al-
lowed in a general graph.
Definition 2.16 (Allocation rule for network structures). A TU-game
with a network structure is a tupel (N, v,g) and an allocation rule for
network structures Y : {N}×VN×GN −→ R|N| distributes the arising
worth among the players, that is, assigns a payoff to each player.
Definition 2.17 (Network-induced Partition, Connected Components
and Connected Graph). We say that players i and j, i 6= j, are con-
nected to each other in the network g if there exists a path ii1, i1i2, ..., ikj ∈
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g, i1, ..., ik ∈ N. Sets of connected players are components of a network
g and these connected components build a partition on the player
set N. We denote this partition by C(N,g) where Ci := Ci(N,g) ∈
C(N,g) is the component of all players connected with player i ∈ N. If
C(N,g) = {N}, we call g a connected graph.
As mentioned before, Myerson [1977] introduced a transformation
of the coalition function which accounts for the restricted cooperation
possibilities arising due to the network structure:
Definition 2.18 (Graph-restricted game). Given a coalition function
v ∈ VN and a network structure (N,g), the corresponding graph-
restricted game (N, vg) is given by
vg(K) :=
∑
S∈C(K,g|K)
v(S) ∀K ⊆ N,
where g|K = {ij ∈ g|i, j ∈ K}.
If no confusion arises, we will denote the graph-restricted game sim-
ply by vg.
Myerson [1977] used this game to define and characterize one of
the first and most popular allocation rules for network structures:
Definition 2.19 (Myerson value). For any TU-game with a network
structure (N, v,g), the Myerson value µ is for all i ∈ N given by
µi(N, v,g) := Shi(N, vg).
To characterize the Myerson value, CE is generalized for network
structures and combined with an axiom which accounts for (what he
calls) fairness.
Axiom 2.12 (Component Efficiency (CE) for Network Structures). An
allocation rule for network structures Y satisfies Component Efficiency
CE, if ∑
i∈Ci
Yi(N, v,g) = v(Ci) ∀ i ∈ N.
Axiom 2.13 (Fairness (F)). An allocation rule for network structures Y
satisfies Fairness F, if for all ij ∈ g:
Yi(N, v,g) − Yj(N, v,g) = Yi(N, v,g− ij) − Yj(N, v,g− ij).
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F states that removing the link between two players should affect
these two players in the same way.
Theorem 2.7 (Axiomatization of the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977)).
The Myerson value is the unique allocation rule for network structures
that satisfies CE and F.
In contrast to Myerson’s transformation of restricted communica-
tion, Meessen [1988] and Borm et al. [1992] introduced an alternative
transformation emphasizing links:
Definition 2.20 (Link-game (arc game)). Given a coalition function
v ∈ VN and a network structure (N,g), the corresponding link-game
(or arc game) (g, vN) or simply vN, in which the links in the network
g are the players, is given by:
vN(g ′) := vg
′
(N) ∀g ′ ⊆ g.
Now we have to restrict ourselves to zero-normalized games, other-
wise vN might not be a coalition function because vN(∅) = v∅(N) 6= 0.
Originally introduced by Meessen [1988] and further analyzed by
Borm et al. [1992] and Slikker [2005], this arc game is used to define
the following allocation rule for network structures:
Definition 2.21 (Position value (for zero-normalized games only)).
For any zero-normalized TU-game with a network structure (N, v,g),
the Position value pi is for all i ∈ N given by
pii(N, v,g) :=
∑
λ∈gi
1
2
Shλ(g, vN),
where gi = set of links including player i and v ∈ V0N.
The Position value takes into account the role of links in which a
player is (directly) involved in which is the basic idea of one of the
most popular measures in the analysis of network centrality, the de-
gree measure (cf. Freeman, 1978). The Position value will be discussed
in more detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
While Borm et al. [1992] only provided a characterization of the
Position value on cycle-free graphs (which nevertheless provides nice
interpretations and properties which we will disuss in Chapter 5),
Slikker [2005] introduced the following axiom for a characterization
for general networks:
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Axiom 2.14 (Balanced Link Contributions (BLC)). An allocation rule
for network structures Y satisfies Balanced Link Contributions BLC if
for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j and v ∈ V0 we have∑
λ∈gj
[Yi(N, v,g) − Yi(N, v,g− λ)] =
∑
λ∈gi
[
Yj(N, v,g) − Yj(N, v,g− λ)
]
.
Slikker [2005] argues that BLC “deals with the loss players can in-
flict on each other. The total threat of a player towards another player
is defined as the sum over all links of the first player of the payoff dif-
ferences the second player experiences if such a link is broken.” BLC
states that the total threat of a player towards another player should
be equal to the reverse total threat.4
Theorem 2.8 (Axiomatization of the Position value (Slikker, 2005)).
The Position value is the unique allocation rule for network structures
that satisfies CE and BLC.
Following the basic structure of the χ-value, Casajus [2009a] intro-
duced an outside-option-sensitive allocation rule for network struc-
tures. To reflect all (productive) outside options, he defined a network
that captures the alternatives/outside options the players have:
Definition 2.22 (Lower Outside Option Graph (LOOG)). For every
network g, the corresponding lower outside option graph (LOOG) is
given by
g(i,N) := g|Ci ∪ {jk ∈ gN|j ∈ Ci,k ∈ N \ Ci}.
For notational convenience, if the player set is fixed, we will only write
g(i).
The LOOG reflects all alternative links a player and her coalitional
players might have outside their actual coalition (which stays fixed).
To provide these alternatives, links outside the own coalition are bro-
ken.
Using the LOOG, Casajus [2009a] defined an allocation rule for
network structures accounting for outside options.
4 It might be worth to mention that Slikker [2005] originally called this axiom “bal-
anced total threats”.
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Definition 2.23 (Graph-χ-value). For any TU-game with a network
structure (N, v,g), the graph-χ-value χ# is for all i ∈ N given by
χ#i(N, v,g) := µi(N, v,g(i)) +
v(Ci) − µCi(N, v,g(i))
|Ci|
,
where µCi =
∑
j∈Ci
µj
The graph-χ-value values outside options by adding/substracting
some share of the Myerson value of her component to the Myerson
value of the player (where the Myerson value is the Shapley value
of the graph-restricted game), taking into account the outside option
graph. This is, a redistribution of the difference between the worth
actually created by the coalition to what the coalition would have
obtained in the LOOG.
For the characterization, the axiom CS is generalized to network
structures, an axiom accounting for outside options is defined as well
as a weaker version of F.
Axiom 2.15 (Symmetry within Components (CS) for Network Struc-
tures). An allocation rule for network structures Y satisfies Symmetry
within Components CS, if
Yi(N, v,g) = Yj(N, v,g) ∀ symmetric players i, j ∈ N, j ∈ Ci.
Axiom 2.16 (Outside Option Consistency (OO)). An allocation rule
for network structures Y satisfies Outside Option Consistency OO if
for all i, j ∈ C ∈ C(N,g) we have
Yi(N, v,g) − Yj(N, v,g) = Yi(N, v,g(i)) − Yj(N, v,g(j)).
OO could be interpreted as follows: the gains or losses of materi-
alized outside options (difference between payoff in original network
and the LOOG) should be equal for all players that are in the same
coalition and hence obtain the same LOOG.
Axiom 2.17 (Weak Fairness 2 (WF2)). An allocation rule for network
structures Y satisfies Weak Fairness 2 WF2 if for all connected g and
all i, j ∈ N we have
Yi(N, v,g) − Yi(Ci(N,g− ij), v|Ci(N,g−ij),g|Ci(N,g−ij))
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= Yj(N, v,g) − Yj(Cj(N,g− ij), v|Cj(N,g−ij),g|Cj(N,g−ij))
WF2 restricts F to a special situation where outside options are
absent: the link ij is removed from a connected network and in a
connected network, there are no outside options.
Remark 2.4. Note that on connected graphs, the axioms CE and CS
become E and S, respectively.
Theorem 2.9 (Axiomatization of the graph-χ-value (Casajus, 2009a)).
The graph-χ-value is the unique allocation rule for network structures
that satisfies CE, OO and WF2.
2.4 glove games and outside options
There are various examples in which an allocation rule should take
into account outside options, that is, agreements outside the present
agreements (fixed by the coalition or network structure) that could
alternatively have been formed. Tutic et al. [2011] show in their ex-
perimental work about social interchange that outside options signif-
icantly affect negotiations. This connection has also been mentioned
by Maschler [1992] as
the need to let the players know what to expect from each
coalition structure so that they can then make up their
mind about the coalitions they want to join, and in what
configuration. (p. 595)
In a similar spirit, von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944] state that
any formed coalition between individuals “only describes one partic-
ular consideration”. The result of negotiation between the individuals
will be
decisively influenced by the other alliances which each
one might alternatively have entered. [...] Even if [...] one
particular alliance is actually formed, the others are present
in virtual existence: although they have not materialized,
they have contributed essentially to shaping and determin-
ing the actual reality. (p. 36)
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In the following we give a simple but in various ways applicaple
example which motivates outside options and will be recalled sev-
eral times throughout the following chapters: a glove game. In a glove
game, introduced by Shapley and Shubik [1969], we assume to have a
number of left and right gloves and a pair of gloves (one left and one
right glove) produces worth x per pair. The agents/players are the
glove holders, more precisely, the set of agents/players is split into
left- and right-glove holders. This game is not only simple but also
has a nice economic interpretation and it is used to analyze simple
markets (cf. Shapley and Shubik [1969]).
We now formally introduce glove games. The efficient formulas for
the Shapley value, the AD-value in general and the χ-value and the
Owen-value for efficient partitions are provided in Chapter 4 as well
as a discussion on the performance and differences of these solution
concepts in general.
Definition 2.24 (Glove Game). In a general glove game,N is split such
that N = L ∪ R with L ∩ R = ∅ where L is the set of left-glove holders
and R the set of right-glove holders. The characteristic function vgg
assigns a payoff of 1 to every pair, that is, the worth of a coalition
K ⊆ N is the number of matching pairs available in K. Formally, it is
given by
vgg(K) := min{|L|K| , |R|K|},
where |L|K| := |L∩K| and |R|K| := |R∩K|.
Remark 2.5 (Normalization in the Glove Game). Generally, a match-
ing pair could also generate an amount different to 1, but all analyzed
allocation rules are additive which ensures that Y(N, x· v) = x· Y(N, v)
for all x ∈ N. As all discussed allocation rules are also linear in the
coalition functions, this even holds for all x ∈ R.
As one of the most popular applications of the glove game is the
analysis of simple markets, we provide the following usefull defini-
tions:
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Definition 2.25 (Balanced/Imbalanced market). Let the glove game
be interpreted to model a simple market.5 The market is called bal-
anced if |R| = |L| and imbalanced otherwise.
Definition 2.26 (Strong and Weak Players). In an imbalanced mar-
ket, the players from the smaller set are called strong players (due to
their scarceness) and the players from the larger set weak players. For
notational reasons, denote by S := min(|L|, |R|) the number of strong
players in the market and by W := max(|L|, |R|) the number of weak
players in the market.
As a leading and motivating example (see Casajus, 2009b and Be-
lau, 2010), consider a glove game with two left-glove holders (L =
{l1, l2}) and four right-glove holders (R = {r1, r2, r3, r4}), that is, an
imbalanced market. Assume that l1 and r1 as well as l2 and r2 build
a matching pair and r3 as well as r4 stay alone, that is, we face the
(efficient) coalition structure
P = {{l1, r1}, {l2, r2}, {r3}, {r4}} .
Following the allocation formulas, worth is distributed according to
Table 1.
Table 1: Payoffs for the Glove Game
glove holder Shi Bai ADi Owi χi Wi
l1, l2 0.7333 0.8125 0.5 0.8333 0.8 0.7167
r1, r2 0.1333 0.1875 0.5 0.1667 0.2 0.2833
r3, r4 0.1333 0.1875 0 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations and Casajus [2009b].
The Shapley value and the Banzhaf value do not take into account
the coalition structure or, in other words, the unproductivity of the
weak players outside the pair-building coalitions: all weak players
obtain the same payoff. The AD-value does not take into account
the imbalancedness of the market (bargaining power of the strong
players against the weak players), that is, the outside options of the
5 For example, left- and right-glove holders are interpreted as sellers and buyers, re-
spectively.
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strong players: equal share of the worth among the pair-building play-
ers. The Owen value as well as the χ-value and the Wiese value take
into account both the actual coalition structure and the existence of
outside options in the imbalanced market.
Note that the Banzhaf value allocates more worth than actually
available, that is, is not feasible. One could normalize the payoffs
(which will lead to a distribution of 0.6842 and 0.1579 for the left-
and right-glove holders, respectively. However, the normalization is
problematic in axiomatization.
Remark 2.6 (Normalization, Justification by Properties and the Banz-
haf value). Note that normalizations do not change ranks and relative
distances of allocations and, hence, one can still use the original axiom-
atization for justification in terms of properties if one is not interested
in the absolute numbers of allocation themselves. Therefore, the nor-
malization of the Banzhaf value is unproblematic if one is mainly in-
terested in ranks and relative distances as for example in applications
for centrality measures or power indices as in Chapter 5. However, if
absolute numbers are of interest (as in Chapter 3), the normalization
of the Banzhaf value cannot be axiomatically justified.
We have just seen an example which provided a brief idea of a cer-
tain difference between the allocation rules: some account for what is
called outside options, some do not. In the next part of this thesis we
will go deeper into the analysis of this difference by an experimen-
tal investigation (due to the axiomatic drawbacks of the normalized
Banzhaf value and the Wiese value, these values are not analyzed
here) and the analysis of a probabilistic forecasting model. We will
find that outside options indeed affect bargaining processes and also
applicability in the forecasting model and, hence, seem worthwile to
be further analyzed and formalized. Beside that, we will also find ap-
plicability problems within the forecasting model for network struc-
tures which leads to the other main issue of this thesis: a deeper
analysis of networks.
Part II
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3.1 introduction
In the game theoretic literature one finds many examples for the anal-
ysis of the process of negotiation (cf. for example Riker, 1967, Spector,
1977 or Maschler, 1978). Some of these works go deeper into the role
of outside options and its influence on the solution of bargaining,
for example through the analysis of changes in the solutions. Most
bargaining models assume that the resulting outcome of an outside
option is independent of the strategies of the actors during the ne-
gotiation process. But what happens if the outside option is again a
negotiation?
To analyze the effect of outside options in a bargaining situation,
we run an experimental case study using a glove game (Shapley and
Shubik, 1969). In a glove game, the players are split into left-glove
and right-glove holders which have to form matching pairs (one left
1 This chapter is based on Belau and Garmann [2013], joint work with Sebstian Gar-
mann.
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and one right glove) to create a payoff. This game has a nice economic
interpretation as it is used to model markets in a simple way. Hence,
our experimental results are economically interpretable. We ask the
glove holders to form coalitions (i. e., matching pairs) by bargaining
about the distribution of the outcome per pair. To model an imbal-
anced market, we use a glove game with an unequal number of left
and right gloves.
Recall that we have many different approaches to predict how the
worth of a coalition should be allocated among the players of the
coalition: as one of the most popular approaches there is the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953) and as modifications there are the Owen value
(Owen, 1977) and the AD-value (Aumann and Drèze, 1974) as well as
the more recent χ-value (Casajus, 2009b).2
In our case study, we model the situation of the example from
Chapter 2.4: There are two left-glove holders (l1, l2), due to their
scarceness called strong players, and four right-glove holders (r1− r4),
called weak players. These players have to form matching pairs by
bargaining about the distribution of the payoff from a matching pair.
We take more than one left-glove holder to avoid monopoly and we
hold the level of scarceness (difference between number of left and
right gloves) fixed.
For the theoretical background, recall the distribution according to
the different allocation rules (in the case that the coalitions (l1, r1)
and (l2, r2) have been built and with the worth of a matching pair
normalized to 100), given in Table 2. Recall that the Shapley value
Table 2: Payoffs for the Glove Game with x = 100
glove
Shapley value AD-value χ-value Owen value
holder
l1, l2 73.33 50 80 83.33
r1, r2 13.33 50 20 16.67
r3, r4 13.33 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations and Casajus [2009b].
2 Alternatively, there are also the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf, 1952) and the Wiese value
(Wiese, 2007) which will not be analyzed in this chapter due to the feasibility issue of
the Banzhaf value and the axiomatic drawbacks of the Wiese value and the normal-
ized Banzhaf value (cf. Chapter 2). Furthermore, the Banzhaf value, as the Shapley
value, is an impossible outcome in our case study. This will be discussed later on.
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does not take into account the unproductivity of the weak players
outside the pair-building coalitions (coalition structure) and the AD-
value does not take into account the imbalancedness of the market
(outside options) while the Owen value as well as the χ-value take
into account both the actual coalition structure and the existence of
outside options in the imbalanced market.
In the theoretical part of this chapter, we give the differences be-
tween the allocation rules for the glove game by analyzing the allo-
cation formulas. For this, we derive the corresponding formulas in
the special case of glove games that already allow us to precise the
structural differences between the allocation rules in terms of outside
options. Then, in the experimental part, we use the data from our
case study first to test whether outside options influence bargaining
situations at all. For that, we test the hypothesis if players with out-
side options (the strong players in the glove game) obtain significantly
higher payoffs as the other players.
As we find that outside options affect negotiation, we further inves-
tigate which outside-option-sensitive allocation rule might be a favor-
able predictor for outcomes. As candidates we have the χ-value and
the Owen value (as the Shapley value as an ex ante expected payoff is
an impossible outcome in our case study). Both are characterized by
an additivity-axiom, efficiency-axioms, symmetry-axioms and Null-
player axioms3. While the characterization of the Owen value uses
two symmetry-axioms, the one of the χ-value uses the so-called Split-
tingaxiom: if a coalition is split, arising gains or losses are distributed
equally among the players that remain together. We implemented this
in the experiment in order to test for this equal sharing as a hypoth-
esis. Since all other axioms are widely accepted, the χ-value can be
suggested as a solution concept if the Splittingaxiom is valid. How-
ever, we find that our data does not support this axiom. To the best of
our knowledge there is no literature on this topic testing for axioms.
Existing studies about the effect of outside options on bargaining
(as for example Tutic et al., 2011) ignore the Owen value (which turns
out to be as consistent with our data as the χ-value and in fact is quite
close in outcome for our special case). Furthermore, the bargaining
situation is modeled by bilateral communication, that is, an offer is
3 cf. Owen [1977] and Casajus [2009b]
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only observed by the participant the offer is made to. In contrast to
that we model the bargaining process via multilateral communication
using a double auction market, that is, all offers made are observable
by all participants that are involved. Hereby, we are closer to the nec-
essary experimental conditions for coalition games given by Selten
[1972] (p. 142). Selten also suggests one-shot-plays; contrary to exist-
ing studies, we model the experiment in a way that we observe sort
of a one-shot-play.
Pope et al. [2009] illustrate in their work the impact of prominent
numbers (cf. Albers, 1998) in experimental research. They analyze
the “Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory” and find that the impact
of prominent numbers especially occurs in the stage of evaluating
the alternatives by the actor. While other studies ignore this fact, we
use a prominent number assigned to each glove-pair that has to be
distributed.
It is notable that the underlying game in our experiment could
be seen as an extension of the popular (non-cooperative) ulimatum
game: In the ultimatum game, two players must divide a positive
amount of money which is often referred to as a “cake” which the
two players can “eat”. The first player proposes an allocation of the
money which the second player can either accept or reject. If the sec-
ond player accepts the proposal, the money is allocated according to
the first player’s proposal, if the second player rejects, no player re-
ceives any payment. One could argue that our experiment studies an
“imbalanced-multiplayer-multiposition-multioffer ultimatum game”.
Our finding is in line with the finding of numerous experimental
studies on ultimatum games and various extensions of this game
that the experiments do not support the theoretical predicition (i. e.,
the subgameperfect Nash equilibrium predicition). To the best of our
knowledge there is no, or if only few, experimental literature on im-
balanced ultimatum games (different number of different positions)
and multiposition-multioffer ultimatum games (all players can pro-
pose and except offers and new offers can unconditionally be made).
Therefore, we contribute to the experimental literature on ultimatum
games under competition.
A further contribution to the literature is our finding on price inter-
dependency: We find evidence that, in contrast to existing literature,
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there is no interdependency between the outcomes within a market,
that is, no evidence for price signals.
This chapter is organized as follows: The next section provides the
theoretical background. We first shortly recall the cooperative frame-
work and allocation rules and provide corresponding formulas for
the case of glove games. We then use the explicit formulas to com-
pare these allocation rules with respect to our main patterns outsi-
de-option-sensitivity and sensitivity to the coalition structures and
describe the underlying game of our experiment and resulting theo-
retical predicions according to the analyzed rules. This is followed by
a discussion of the relation to the non-cooperative ultimatum game.
In Section 3, we explain our experiment and Section 4 provides the
results for outside-option-sensitivity, the Splittingaxiom, learning ef-
fects and price interdependency. Section 5 discusses the relation of
our results to the ultimatum game and, finally, Section 6 concludes.
3.2 theoretical background
3.2.1 Explicit Formulas for Glove Games
We recall the framework of cooperative coalition structures introduced
in Chapter 2: A TU-game is a tupel (N, v) where N = {1, ...,n} de-
notes the (nonempty and finite) set of players and v : 2N −→ R with
v(∅) = 0 denotes the characteristic function, allocating to each coali-
tion K ⊆ N its worth v(K). Then, an allocation rule Y : {N}×VN −→
R|N| distributes the worth of any TU-game among the players. Recall
that the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is for all i ∈ N given by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
K⊆N\{i}
|K|!(|N|− |K|− 1)!
|N|!
[v(K∪ {i}) − v(K)]
where MCvi (K) := v(K ∪ {i}) − v(K) is the marginal contribution of
player i to coalition K in the TU-game (N, v).
A partition P of N is called coalition structure and we denote by
P(i) the coalition which contains player i ∈ N and by PN the set of all
coalition structures of N. Then, a TU-game with a coalition structure is a
tupel (N, v,P) and an allocation rule for coalition structures is a function
Y : {N}×VN ×PN −→ R|N|. Aumann and Drèze [1974] defined the
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component restricted Shapley value (denoted by Aumann-Drèze value
AD) as follows:
∀ i ∈ N : ADi(N, v,P) := Shi(P(i), v|P(i)).
Casajus [2009b] defined an allocation rule that is sensitive to outside
options, the χ-value, by
∀ i ∈ N : χi(N, v,P) := Shi(N, v) +
v(P(i)) − ShP(i)(N, v)
|P(i)|
.
and in contrast, Owen [1977] defines the (also outside-option-sensitive)
Owen value by
∀ i ∈ N : Owi(N, v,P) := 1
|Σ(N,P)|
∑
σ∈Σ(N,P)
[v(Ki(σ)) − v(Ki(σ) \ {i})]
where Σ(N,P) is the set of all orders σ over the player set that are
compatible with the coalition structure P (i. e., ∀ i, j ∈ P ∈ P we have
|σ(i) − σ(j)| < |P|) and Ki(σ) is the set of players that come before
player i and including i under order σ.
In our experiment, the underlying TU-game is given by a glove game
(Shapley and Shubik, 1969): Recall that in glove game, N is split into
the left-glove holders L and the right-glove holders R (i. e., L∪ R = N
and L ∩ R = ∅) and the worth of a coalition K ⊆ N is the number of
possible simultaneous matchings in K times the worth per matching
pair x, that is, vgg(K) := x ·min(|R ∩ K|, |L ∩ K|). In the theoretical
analysis, we normalize the payoff per matching pair to x = 1 while
we use x = 100 in the experiment as this facilitates division.
The market is called balanced if |R| = |L| and imbalanced otherwise.
In an imbalanced market, the players from the smaller set are called
strong players and the players from the larger set weak players. For
notational reasons, denote by S := min(|L|, |R|) the number of strong
players in the market and by W := max(|L|, |R|) the number of weak
players in the market.
Now we compare the different allocation rules by comparing the
outcome for glove games. For Shapley-based values, computational
effort is generally high4 and Bachrach et al. [2010] state that calcu-
4 For example Deng and Papadimitriou [1994] show that already the computation for
weighted majority games is #P-complete while Prasad and Kelly [1990] show that
this is NP-hard.
3.2 theoretical background 37
lating the Shapley value in polynomial time (w. r. t. the number of
agents) is only possible “in very specific and restricted domains”. One
of these specific domains indeed is the glove game. To facilitate com-
putations, we first derive more applicable formulas for glove games
which, as a special case, are more efficient from an computational
point of view than the general ones (as this result is unsurprising we
only discuss the computational effort issue in the appendix). Further-
more, these formulas provide better insight in the differences between
the allocation rules.
Shapley and Shubik [1969] show that the Shapley value for glove
games is given by
Shi(N, vgg) =

1
2 +
W−S
2·S
S∑
k=1
W!S!
(W+k)!(S−k)! , if i is strong player
1
2 −
W−S
2·W
S∑
k=0
W!S!
(W+k)!(S−k)! , if i is weak player
(1)
Now we analyze the allocation rules for coalition structures. For all
i ∈ N, set Si := min(|L ∩ P(i)|, |R ∩ P(i)|) > 0 (i. e., Si denotes the
number of strong players in player i’s coalition) and Wi := max(|L ∩
P(i)|, |R ∩ P(i)|) > 1 (i. e., Wi denotes the number of weak players in
player i’s coalition).
Consider the interesting and economically important case of min-
imal winning coalitions, that is, the coalition structure consists of
matching pairs and singletons only. We call this case efficient and for-
mally define:
Definition 3.1 (Efficient coalition structure). We call a coalition struc-
ture P efficient, if only minimal winning coalitions are build and no
strong player stays alone: ∀ P ∈ P : P ⊆ {li, rj} and if for some li ∈ L
we have {li} ∈ P, then @ rj ∈ R such that {rj} ∈ P and if for some rj ∈ R
we have {rj} ∈ P, then @ li ∈ L such that {li} ∈ P.
Theorem 3.1 (Aumann-Drèze value for (efficient) glove games). For
all efficient coalition structures P, the AD-value for the glove game is
given by
ADi(N, vgg,P) =

1
2 , if i builds a pair
0 , if i stays alone
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Proof. Restrict the Shapley allocation to the coalition of a player i: If
Si = 0 (i. e., either i stays alone as a singleton or is joined by the same
type of gloves only), no matching pair exists in this coalition and the
player obtains a payoff of zero. For Si > 0 we have
ADi(N, vgg,P) =

1
2 +
Wi−Si
2·Si
Si∑
k=1
Wi!Si!
(Wi+k)!(Si−k)!
, if i is strongplayer in P(i)
1
2 −
Wi−Si
2·Wi
Si∑
k=0
Wi!Si!
(Wi+k)!(Si−k)!
, if i is weakplayer in P(i)
. (2)
Now let P be efficient, that is, P = {lj, rk} ∨ |P| = 1 ∀ P ∈ P, then we
have ADi(N, v,P) = 0 if |P(i)| = 1, that is, i does not build a matching
pair, and ADi(N, v,P) = 1/2 if P(i) = {lj, rk} as in this case we have
Wi = Si = 1.
Theorem 3.2 (χ-value for (efficient) glove games). For all efficient
coalition structures P, the χ-value for the glove game is given by
χi(N, vgg) =
Shi +
1
2
[1− Shstrong − Shweak] , if i builds amatching pair
0 , if i stays alone
(3)
where Shstrong denotes the Shapley value for the glove game of a
strong player and Shweak of a weak player, respectively.
Proof. Note that in every coalition of an efficient coalition structure
there is at most one left- and one right-glove holder, that is, within
a winning coalition, every glove holder only faces a complementary
glove holder.
Theorem 3.3 (Owen value for (efficient) glove games). For all efficient
coalition structures P, the Owen value for the glove game is given by
Owi(N, vgg,P) =

1−
(S−1)!
2·W!
S−1∑
k=0
(W−(k+1))!
(S−(k+1))! ,
if i is a
strong player
(S−1)!
2·W!
S−1∑
k=0
(W−(k+1))!
(S−(k+1))! ,
if i is a weak
matching-pair-player
0 , if istays alone
(4)
Proof. Due to the form of an efficient coalition structure, we have
for all P ∈ P: |P| 6 2 and Σ(N,P) only contains orders where pairs
(l, r) are next to each other (lr or rl). Hence, to analyze Σ(N,P), we
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only have to consider orders of the components of P, having in mind
that each matching-pair-component has two possibilities. Therefore,
|Σ(N,P)| is the number of possibilities to order the components of P
times the possibilities within each pair to be ordered, that is, times
2# of matching pairs (each pair has two possibilities to be ordered).
Due to the form of efficient coalition structures, the number of com-
ponents of P is equal to W and the number of matching pairs is equal
to S. Hence, we have |Σ(N,P)| =W!2S.
Since |P| 6 2 for all P ∈ P, we have
MC
vgg
i (σ) 6 1 ∀ i ∈ N.
Consider P ∈ P such that P = {i}. If there is any matching candidate
before i in order σ, the pair-partner of this candidate will be before i,
too. Therefore, we have MCvggi (σ) = 0 and
Owi(N, vgg,P) = 0 ∀ i such that {i} ∈ P.
For any weak player i who forms a matching pair we note: matching
pairs before i in order σ do not affect MCvggi (σ) since the worth cre-
ated by this pair is created independently of using Ki(σ) or Ki(σ) \ {i}.
As all strong players (= matching candidates) before i in order σ ap-
pear with their matching partner, we have MCvggi (σ) = 0 whenever
i is before his matching partner in order σ. If i’s matching partner
is before i in order σ and there is a singleton weak player before i’s
matching pair, we also have MCvggi (σ) = 0, because in Ki(σ) \ {i},
i’s matching partner already creates worth with this singleton weak
player. Hence,
MC
vgg
i (σ) = 1⇔

i’s matching partner is before i in order σ
and there are at most other matching pairs
before i’s matching partner.
This happens how many times? There can be k = 0, ...,S− 1 matching
pairs before i’s matching pair in σ. For each such k we have
(S− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
for 1st pair
· (S− 2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
for 2nd pair
· ...· (S− k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
for kth pair
· (|P|− (k+ 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
remaining pairs and singletons
· 2S−1
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possibilities, where the 2S−1 follows from the fact that all matching
pairs but i’s can occur with two orders. This can be rewritten as
(S− 1)!
(S− (k+ 1))!
· (W − (k+ 1))!· 2S−1.
Hence, MCvggi (σ) = 1 for
S−1∑
k=0
(
(S− 1)!(W − (k+ 1))!
(S− (k+ 1))!
· 2S−1
)
= (S− 1)!· 2S−1·
S−1∑
k=0
(W − (k+ 1))!
(S− (k+ 1))!
different σ ∈ Σ(N,P). Therefore,
Owi(N, vgg,P) =
(S− 1)!
2·W!
S−1∑
k=0
(W − (k+ 1))!
(S− (k+ 1))!
for all weak players i who form a matching pair.
Since the Owen value is efficient (i. e.,
∑
i∈N
Yi = v(N)), we have that
∑
i∈N
Owi = # of matching pairs = S.
Using this and that Owi(N, vgg,P) = 0 ∀ i such that {i} ∈ P, we have∑
i builds
matching pair
Owi = S
Furthermore, the Owen value assigns equal payoffs to symmetric
components. All components of the form P = {l, r} are symmetric
and hence, Owl +Owr = SS = 1 for each matching pair (l, r). Using
this, we get the Owen allocation for strong players: Owstrong player =
1−Owweak player in matching pair. And hence, finally,
Owi(N, vgg,P) =

1−
(S−1)!
2·W!
S−1∑
k=0
(W−(k+1))!
(S−(k+1))! ,
if i is a
strong player
(S−1)!
2·W!
S−1∑
k=0
(W−(k+1))!
(S−(k+1))! ,
if i is a weak
matching-pair-player
0 , if istays alone
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3.2.2 The Underlying Game and Theoretical Predicition
Now we compare the allocation rules using the explicit formulas for
glove games to motivate the game underlying our experiment and
explain their theoretical predictions.
Considering the formula given by Equation (1), we see that the
Shapley value does not distinguish whether a weak player actually
builds a matching pair (i. e., is productive or unproductive) as, beside
the total number of strong and weak players, it only matters which
kind of player one is, independently of whether one builds a match-
ing pair or not.
In Equation (2), we already see that the AD-value generally only ac-
counts for imbalancedness within a player’s own coalition. In the case
of minimal winning coalitions, the AD-value splits the worth equally
among the matching-pair-players, that is, as if we had a balanced
market.
In the formula given by Equation (3), we see that the χ-value dis-
tinguishes between pair-building and non-pair-bilding players. Fur-
thermore, due to the use of the Shapley value, imbalancedness of the
market is taken into account.
Finally, considering the formula in Equation (4), we see that also
the Owen value accounts for both the coalition structure (matching
vs. no matching) and the level of imbalancedness (S and W).
The theoretical comparison is summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Comparison of Allocation Rules for the Glove Game
Property
Accounting for Outside-Option-
Coalition Structure Sensitivity
Indicator
matching vs non-matching Strong vs weak
player player
Shapley value - X
AD-value X -
χ-value X X
Owen value X X
Now, in order to use these theoretical predictions, we have to de-
sign a game for our experiment with the theoretical interpretation of
42 evidence on outside options - a pilot experiment
a glove game. Furthermore, in order to be able to clearly distinguish
between sensitivity and insensitivity to outside options, we have to
take an unequal number of strong and weak players and have to en-
sure that only minimal winning coalitions will occur as in this case,
no alternatives inside a coalition can affect the outcome. The underly-
ing game in our experiment can be summarized as follows:5
As a basis, we take the glove game from the introduction where the
player set N consists of two left-glove holders l1 and l2 (the strong
players) and four right-glove holders r1− r4 (the weak players). These
players have to form matching pairs by bargaining about the distribu-
tion of the worth per matching pair which we set to x = 100 tokens.
The bargaining and matching process is designed by a double auc-
tion market: all players simultanously place their demand of the 100
tokens as an offer on a list and each offer from this list can then be
accepted by a matching player, that is, left-glove holders can accept
offers from right-glove holders and vice versa. Players are allowed
to make as many new offers as they like. As soon as an offer is ac-
cepted, the accepting player and the corresponding offering player
form a matching pair. All open offers are observable by all players
and accepted offers disappear from the list to indicate that a pair has
been formed (complete information). If either all strong players have
built a matching pair or 120 seconds have passed, the game ends and
matching pair players obtain payoffs according to the corresponding
offer (the offering player receives her demand, the accepting player
receives the residual) and non-matching pair players do not receive
any payoff (i. e., zero). Both cases imply that only minimal winning
coalitions occur and that unproductive players obtain a payoff of zero
by design.
Note that the first case implies an efficient coalition structure. As
the second case never occured during the entire experiment, we in-
deed observe an efficient glove game with S = 2 and W = 4 and
theoretical predictions are given by the formulas we derived before.
Recall that the Shapley value does not distinguish between produc-
tive and unproductive players and, hence, is an impossible outcome
in the framework of our experiment. Theoretical predictions for our
5 The actual experiment will be explained in detail in the next section.
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experiment according to the remaining three allocation rules for the
distribution within a matching pair are given in Table 4.6
Table 4: Theoretical Prediction for the Experiment
Type of Player AD-value χ-value Owen value
Strong player 50 80 83.33
Weak player 50 20 16.67
If we find that outside options matter, that is, if strong players ob-
tain a significantly higher payoff than weak players, only the χ-value
and the Owen value would be appropriate predictors from the set of
theoretical allocation rules. As our number of observations is rather
small and the theoretical predictions by these two rules are very simi-
lar, a direct test on distributions is fairly hard. Hence, we will further
test for axiomatic differences of the two remaining allocation rules.
Both the χ-value and the Owen value are characterized by an addi-
tivity-axiom, efficiency-axioms, symmetry-axioms and Null-player ax-
ioms7. While the characterization of the Owen value uses two symme-
try-axioms, the crucial axiom of the characterization of the χ-value is
the so-called splitting-axiom: A partition P ′ ⊆ 2N is called finer than
P ⊆ 2N if P ′(i) ⊆ P(i) for all players i ∈ N. An allocation rule Y
satisfies Splitting SP if for P ′ being finer than P we have for all i ∈ N,
j ∈ P ′(i):
Yi(N, v,P) − Yi(N, v,P ′) = Yj(N, v,P) − Yj(N, v,P ′).
The motivation of SP is the following: One could argue that gains or
losses of splitting a coalition structure should be distributed equally
on players staying together in the new coalition structure. Splitting a
given coalition structure should affect all players that remain together
in the new coalition structure by the same way.
We implemented a test for SP in our experiment to provide a po-
tential further indicator.
6 We obviously obtain the same distributions as in Table 2 from the introduction.
7 cf. Owen [1977] and Casajus [2009b]
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3.2.3 Relation to the Ulimatum Game
From the non-cooperative point of view, one could interpret the un-
derlying game of our experiment as sort of an ultimatum game. In
this section we will briefly present the definition, theoretical predici-
tion and experimental findings on this topic.8
Definition 3.2 (Ultimatum Game). In the ultimatum game two play-
ers P1 and P2 must divide a positive amount of money which we de-
note by x.9 P1, called the proposer, proposes a demand y, 0 6 y 6 x,
for herself and P2, called the responder, can either accept or reject. If
P2 accepts, P1 receives y and P2 receives x − y and if P2 rejects, no
player receives any payment (i. e., zero).
The (non-cooperative) theoretical predicition of the outcome of this
game (i. e., the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prediction) is quite
obvious: If both players are rational utility maximizers, P2 must ac-
cept all proposals y < x since she receives x − y > 0 in this case
and therefore, the best for P1 is to propose y∗ = x −  where  is
the smallest monetary unit available (which P2 will accept). Hence,
the theoretical prediction is a divison (x− , ). The first experiment
on the ultimatum game was conducted by Güth et al. [1982], followed
by numerous subsequent studies10. Güth [1995] summarizes the main
point as follows:
Imagine an ultimatum game with x = 120 EUR: Would
you really dare to demand EUR 119 for yourself? Very few
participants do and those who dare to do so fail nearly al-
ways, i.e. their proposal is rejected. [...] The main tenden-
cies observed were that responders are willing to sacrifice
substantial amounts to punish a greedy proposer and that
this is well anticipated by most proposers. (p. 331)
There have been numerous extensions of the original ultimatum game.
Just to name a few, Ochs and Roth [1989] investigated multiperiod ul-
timatum bargaining, Hoffman and Spitzer [1985] and Hoffman et al.
8 For further reference we refer to Güth [1995] and Bearden [2001].
9 Often, x is referred to be a “cake” which P1 and P2 can “eat”.
10 For a survey on literature on experiments for the ulimatum game see for example
Güth [1995].
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[1994] analyzed effects of position (proposer or responder) determi-
nation, Roth et al. [1991] examine cultural differences, Oppewal and
Tougareva [1992] study a three-person ultimatum game where the
responders have to share the residual of the proposer’s offer and
Gneezy et al. [2003] analyze what they call a “reverse” ultimatum
game in which the proposer is allowed to propose another (strictly
lower) offer if the first offer has been rejected. What these studies
have in common is that none of them found support for the theoreti-
cal predicition.
The underlying game of the experiment provided in this chapter
could be seen as contributing to the aforementioned literature of the
analysis of ultimatum games: As in the ultimatum game we ask play-
ers to devide an amount of money where proposals (offers) can be
made and accepted and in case that no proposal is accepted, none of
the players receives any payment. However, our underlying game em-
beds several extensions of the original ultimatum game: First of all,
there are not only more than just two players (which makes it a “mul-
tiplayer” game), there is an unequal number of players corresponding
to the two positions which makes the game “imbalanced”. Further-
more, our positions differ in the way that there are no proposers and
responders as all players are allowed to offer proposals (proposer
role) and to accept proposals (responder role) which makes the game
a “multiposition” game. Note that there is no explicit rejection of an
offer and remember that we still have two different positions, namely,
the left-glove and the right-glove holders. One could however argue
that proposers are sort of strong players while responders are sort
of weak players. Moreover, players are allowed to make more than
one offer. We could refer to the term “reverse ultimatum game” as in
Gneezy et al. [2003], however, they called their game “reverse” as
the proposer was only allowed to make strictly lower new offers,
that is, offers that lead to a strictly higher payoff for the responder.
We do not restrict new offers. Hence, we rather call it a “multioffer”
game. To summarize, the underlying game of our experiment could
be seen as an “imbalanced-multiplayer-multiposition-multioffer ulti-
matum game”.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no experimental studies on
either
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• imbalanced multiplayer ultimatum games in the sense that weak
players (or responders) have to bargain with each other as one
(or more) of them will stay alone (without payment) or
• multiposition and multioffer ultimatum games where every player
can be both proposer and responder and new offers can be
made unconditionally
Note that the experiment discussed in this chapter has been a pilot ex-
periment (or case study), we did not have different treatments to infer
one or the other extension separately and moreover, we in fact have
sort of two imbalanced ultimatum games simultanously as we even
have more than one strong player. However, also for our experiment,
the non-cooperative theoretical prediction would still be the same as
for the basic ultimatum game which is (99, 1) in our case (remember
that we set the worth of a matching pair to x = 100).11 This outcome
could be argued to be even “more reasonable” due to the imbalanced-
ness: the “punishing thread” of weak players is different to the one in
the basic ultimatum game as if one weak player “rejects” (i. e., does
not accept) an offer, the strong player does not receive zero, she could
still find an agreement with another weak player. One could argue
that the outcome might be different to (99, 1) as long as there are
several strong players that “compete” against each other but even if
we take this into account, as soon as one strong player found a part-
ner, the second matching pair would obtain (99, 1) due to the (non
cooperative) theoretical prediction.
Remark 3.1 (Ultimatum Game, Fairness and Allocation Rules). Note
that the most popular explanation for the discrepancy of observed
outcome to the theoretic prediction is the assumption that fairness
strongly affects the outcome. Interestingly, all cooperative allocation
rules we discussed in Chapter 2 are based on some sort of “fairness-
like” axiom(s) however it is not clear how to explicitly formalize “the
fairness axiom”: Myerson [1977] called the driving axiom of the Myer-
son value “Fairness”, this term has been criticized and changed later
on, for example Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] call it “equal bargain-
ing power” (which Jackson [2006] himself criticized again). Hence, an
11 Actually the smallest monetary amount in our experiment has been 0.01 tokens but
none of the participants ever used decimal places different from zero throughout the
entire experiment.
3.3 the experiment 47
analysis of “fairness” itself would not yield to a cooperative theoreti-
cal predictor for the ultimatum game. However it is notable that none
of the discussed allocation rules suggests a division of (99, 1) for our
experiment.
3.3 the experiment
We ran six sessions, in each session having two independent groups
of six participants each, hence, 12 participants per session and 72 par-
ticipants in total. Participants were male and female students from the
University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, who were paid for partici-
pating in a session lasting no longer than 60 minutes. Each participant
received a show-up fee of EUR 4 and earned additional money dur-
ing the session, depending on her decisions and the decisions made
by the other participants of the session. In addition to the show-up
fee paid to each participant, we paid EUR 100 in each session, dis-
tributed among the participants depending on their decisions. Hence,
on average, each participant earned EUR 100/(2*6) + EUR 4 = EUR
12.3312. To preserve anonymity, participants were paid out one after
the other.
The experiment was conducted computer-based and took place in
the “Essen laboratory for experimental economics (elfe)” at the Uni-
versity of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, in June 2012. Participants were
recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and the attached subject pool.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
To ensure anonymity during the experiment, the participants were
placed in seperated sound booths. The participants entered the labo-
ratory one after the other and each participant drew a ball on which
she found the number of her sound booth. The experiment consisted
of two parts. Inside the sound booths the participants found the in-
structions for the first part of the experiment as well as a simple
calculator, blank paper and a pen. They were given some time to
read the instructions (the doors of the sound booths were let open),
after that, an experimenter came to every participant separately to
12 Minimum was EUR 4, Maximum was EUR 25.20.
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ask whether there are open questions13. After all doors of the sound
booths were closed, no questions were allowed anymore. Part 1 of the
experiment started after six comprehension questions. The instruc-
tions stated that the participants were going to be paid depending
on their decisions. After the first part of the experiment, instructions
for the second part were distributed to the participants. Again, they
were given time to read them and an experimentator came to answer
open questions. After this, no further questions were allowed. Part 2
of the experiment started after two comprehension questions. The in-
structions stated that not every round of part 2 was going to be paid
and the participants were informed that in the end of the treatment,
one round was going to be drawn randomly for payment. This guar-
anteed that the motivation of the participants was equally high in all
rounds, that is, avoided “waiting for a better position”. Instructions
included example screens for higher understanding. Find the instruc-
tions and comprehension questions for both parts as well as example
screens in the Appendix.
The participants were split into groups of six participants each and
stayed in the same group all over the session. This allows us to study
behavior over time. In each group we assigned the positions of left-
and right-glove holders to the participants and the participants were
asked to build matching pairs. We always had two left-glove holders
and four right-glove holders, hence there could have been at most two
matching pairs and at least two participants were not able to find a
partner. A matching pair was build by agreeing on a certain distribu-
tion of 100 tokens (where 1 token is EUR 0.125). We chose the value
of a matching pair to be 100 referring to the theory of prominent
numbers: we assume participants to be able to distribute 100 more
in line with their actual preferences than non-prominent values (as
for examble 0.125). The experiment consisted of two parts, in the first
part participants were introduced to the experiment and exactely one
round was played. In the second part, participants were told to play
the same experiment as before, just that there were multiple rounds
(five) now. To avoid last round effects, it was not known by the partic-
ipants how many rounds are played. We split the experiment in order
13 For comparability, the experimenter who answered the questions was the same for
all sessions of the experiment.
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to observe data as in a One-shot-play from the first part and data for
behavior over time from the second part.
The experiment was modeled by a double auction: The participants
were allowed to make an offer about the distribution of tokens per
pair or accept an offer of another participant in the group. Every offer
that was made was observable for all other participants in the group
and every offer from a left-glove holder could have been accepted by
every right-glove holder of the group and vice versa. If an offer had
been accepted, a matching pair was formed. Accepting an offer was
binding as well as making an offer, that is, already made offers could
not be taken back. Players were allowed to make as many offers as
they wanted. However, every former offer they made could still have
been accepted leading to a matching pair with the distribution of this
offer. All offers were listed and once an offer was accepted, this offer
and all other offers from the two involved participants disappeared
from the list. The round ended if either two matching pairs have been
built or the time of 120 seconds has run out.
In each round, the positions were randomly assigned to the par-
ticipants. Hence, a participant could have been a right-glove holder
in one round and a left-glove holder in another round. The partici-
pants were not able to identify the other players. In order to make
the groups comparable to each other, the path of assigned positions
was equal in each group, that is, participant 1 in group 1 had the
same path of positions over the treatment as participant 1 in the other
groups and so on. To define the path of assigned positions, we drew
a set of 6x6 random integers online at www.random.org14.
After the second part of the experiment, the participants were in-
formed that the payment-relevant part of the experiment was over.
It followed a short payment-irrelevant part. In this part, participants
faced the following situation: A distribution of 200 tokens among 6 in-
dividuals was given. Participants got informed that individual 6 left
and how many tokens remain. They were asked to distribute the re-
maining tokens among the remaining 5 individuals. Find an example
14 For each of the six rounds we needed six integers to assign the positions among
the six participants per group. The first column of the integer set corresponds to
participant 1 in a group, the second column to participant 2 and so on. The first row
of the integer set assigns the positions of the two left-glove holders in round 1 to
the participants with the highest and second highest integer of this row, the other
participants are right-glove holders in round 1. The second row corresponds to the
second round and so on.
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screen in the appendix. The distribution of the 200 tokens slightly var-
ied for each participant: The basic distribution was 50, 25, 50, 25, 25, 25
and we created variance by adding a zero-sum random vector. The to-
kens remaining after individual 6 left depended on how many tokens
this individual had observed in the first distribution. The payment-
irrelevant part was followed by questions about personal details.
3.4 results
3.4.1 Outside Options
In this section, we provide descriptives of the experiment and evalu-
ate which of the allocation rules summarized and compared in sec-
tion 3.2.2 is consistent with our experimental data. A first discrimi-
natory feature of these value is the prediction of whether outside op-
tions matter at all: the Shapley value, the Owen value and the χ-value
are sensitive to outside options while the AD-value disregards alter-
natives outside one owns coalition. Therefore, we first test whether
outside options had an effect on bargaining outcomes in our experi-
ment. If the existence of outside options had an effect on bargaining
outcomes, we would expect that left-glove holders have significantly
larger payoffs than right-glove holders that are part of a matching
pair. In other words, left-glove holders would receive significantly
more than 50 tokens when a matching pair is formed.
Two points deserve further discussion.
1. In our basic approach, we restrict this test to the results from
the first experimental round.
The reason is that we had designed the first round as a one-shot game
such that the behavior of the participants was not biased by the possi-
bility of future rounds; participants did simply not know that further
rounds will be played. Furthermore, the focus on the first round re-
sults also ensures that the results are not biased by learning effects. We
have checked whether our results would differ if we consider all six
rounds, but found that this is not the case.
2. We restrict our attention to the results of the first matching pair
in each group.
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We do this because the results of the first and the second matching
pair in a group are likely to be not independent observations. Once one
pair is built, the ratio of the number of left- and right-glove holders
changes. This is problematic as theory predicts the price of a negoti-
ation to be dependent on this ratio. Furthermore, participants might
see the results of the first negotiation as a price signal on which they
base the second negotiation. In Section 3.4.4, we test whether this is
really the case.
Find the observations of the first round from all groups in Table
5 (the results for all rounds can be found in Table 20 in the ap-
pendix) and Figure 2 displays the histograms showing the frequency
of outcomes of the left-glove holders for both the one-shot game (first
round) and for all rounds.
Table 5: Distribution of Shares in 1st Round
Round Group
Distribution 1st pair Distribution 2nd pair
strong weak strong weak
1 1 65 35 66 34
1 2 80 20 79 21
1 3 50 50 55 45
1 4 75 25 73 27
1 5 50 50 80 20
1 6 60 40 90 10
1 7 75 25 75 25
1 8 80 20 80 20
1 9 70 30 70 30
1 10 80 20 51 49
1 11 60 40 70 30
1 12 70 30 90 10
Mean: 67.92 32.08 73.25 26.75
Note that due to our experimental design, the whole worth of a
matching pair has been distributed within a pair. Hence, the out-
comes of the corresponding right-glove holders are omitted. The his-
tograms already provide some evidence in favor of the impact of out-
side options (clustering above the 50 tokens mark). However, a formal
test shall confirm this finding.
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Figure 2: Histograms Outside Options
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Formally, let yilt and yirt be the payoff of the left- and right-glove
holders that have formed the first matching pair in group i and round
t, respectively.
Hypothesis 1 (Outside Options). Whether outside options matter can
be tested via the null hypothesis
H0 : yil1 6 50
against the alternative
H1 : yil1 > 50
We test the above null hypothesis with a one-sided t-test. We ac-
knowledge that the number of observations could be quite low to de-
fend the normality assumption that is needed. In robustness checks,
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we have therefore also used a non-parametric test. We have used the
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (Wilcoxon, 194515) which can be regarded
as the non-parametric analogue to the t-test. However, our results do
not differ which is why we restrict the presentation to the results from
the t-test. The test statistic of the t-test yields a value of 5.66 which
has to be compared with a t-distribution with 11 degrees of freedom.
Accordingly, the null hypothesis that outside options do not matter
is rejected at the 1%-level. In other words, left-glove holders obtain
significantly more than 50 tokens.
Observation 1: Outside options do affect negotiation.
3.4.2 Allocation Rules and the Splittingaxiom
What does the finding of the previous subsection imply for the valid-
ity of different allocation rules proposed by cooperative game theory?
As shown in Table 3 and Table 4, the AD-value proposes to distribute
the same amount of worth to both left- and right-glove holders of a
matching pair, whereas players that are not part of a matching pair
do not receive any payoff. Thus
Observation 2: Our experimental observations are inconsistent with the
AD-value.
Our experimental observations are, however, consistent with the Shap-
ley value, the χ-value and the Owen value. Recall that the Shapley
value, however outside-option-sensitive, is designed for cooperative
games without an inner structure, that is, does not take into account
the actual coalition (matching pair). Note that with our design we can-
not evaluate the appropriateness of the Shapley value, as the Shapley
value predicts positive payoffs for non-productive players (i. e., non-
matching-pair players), whereas in our experiments, payoffs for these
players are by design zero. The Shapley value could be seen as an
expected payoff before an actual matching pair is build. In our experi-
ment, however, we model the negotiation process to build the pair.
Observation 3: The Shapley value is an impossible outcome due to the
coalition structure and experimental design.
15 For further details also see Siegel [1956].
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Because the theoretical predictions for the χ-value and the Owen
value for the glove game used in the experiment are very similar16, it
thus is not expedient to use the payoffs observed in the experiment
to discriminate between these values.
Observation 4: The predicitions due to the χ-value and the Owen value
are barely statistically discriminable in our experiment.
Therefore, we design a test whether the Splittingaxiom SP is sup-
ported by the data. While the Owen value does not satisfy SP, the
χ-value crucially hinges on this axiom by its characterization. Thus, if
we find evidence in favor of the Splittingaxiom, we find evidence to
support the χ-value and against the Owen value.17
As described above, we have confronted the 72 participants of the
experiment with a hypothetical payoff structure for two left- and
four right-glove holders. After that, we have told the participants that
one right-glove holder disappears, and that therefore the worth dis-
tributed to the whole group shrinks. We have then asked the partici-
pants to state how they would distribute the remaining worth to the
remaining five players. This gives us a new payoff structure for each
of the 72 participants. We can also calculate a payoff structure that the
participants should have chosen if the Splittingaxiom SP were valid.
Our test for SP is based on comparing the chosen payoff structure
with those that would have resulted under the validity of SP. From
that comparison, we calculate the mean absolute deviance of the chosen
payoff structure from the calculated payoff structure. The intuition is
that if this mean deviance is close to zero, then both distributions are
equal and thus the participants would distribute worth according to
the predictions of SP. Find the mean absolute deviances displayed in
Figure 3.
A question that arises is how large this mean deviance should be to
conclude that it is not close to zero. It may well happen that some
16 Recall here the general structural difference between the χ-value and the Owen value:
While the χ-value considers productive unions (component efficiency), the Owen
value considers bargaining blocks (efficiency). We discussed this difference in Chap-
ter 2 where we explained that the Owen value can still be seen as an allocation rule
accounting for productive unions if we interpret the fixed bargaining blocks as such
productive unions. The theoretical predicition due to the Owen value has been cal-
culated using exactly the productive union as a bargaining block. Hence, there is no
reason for this structural difference affecting our analysis.
17 However note that the reverse does not hold. We will discuss this in the end of this
section.
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Figure 3: Mean Absolute Deviance
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participants make small calculation errors such that the mean abso-
lute deviance is slightly positive. We have chosen a cutoff value of 5,
that is, if the mean absolute deviance is larger than 5, then we would
reject the null hypothesis that SP is supported by the data.
Hypothesis 2 (Splittingaxiom). Whether the Splittingaxiom SP is sup-
ported by our data can be tested via the null hypothesis
H0 : mean absolute deviance 6 5
against the alternative
H1 : mean absolute deviance > 5
A t-test rejects the null hypothesis that the absolute mean deviance
is smaller than or equal to 5 (p-value: 0.000). Thus, there is very strong
evidence that SP does not hold. An interesting question is also how
high the threshold should have been to be able to not reject the null
hypothesis that the absolute mean deviance is small. We have tested
different thresholds in turn, and have found that the threshold must
have been set at 10 in order to be not able to reject the null hypothe-
sis. Given the basic underlying distribution faced by the participants,
this is a very huge mean deviance. Once more, this is strong evidence
against SP. Note that findings from the data for this part of the exper-
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iment have to be interpreted with caution as this part was payment
irrelevant and took place at the very end of each session.
Observation 5: We cannot support the χ-value by evidence in favor for its
crucial axiom.
To conclude, our experiments have shown that
1. outside options do indeed matter and
2. the Splittingaxiom SP cannot be supported by the data.
At first glance one could argue that these results imply that, since -
from the proposed allocation rules - only the χ-value and the Owen
value are consistent with outside options and our experiment, the
Owen value is most consistent with the data since the χ-value’s cru-
cial axiom cannot be supported. In fact, we did not test for any axiom
characterizing the Owen value and, therefore, cannot find any ex-
plicit support to select the Owen value as the “best” predictor. More-
over, we cannot conclude that we found evidence against the χ-value,
we just did not find evidence in favor of it. Also remember that the
predicitions according to the χ-value and Owen value are very similar
in our special case (which however does not generally hold).
Remark 3.2 (Axiomatization: Direction of Reasoning). Note that the
story of axiomatizations “if you support these axioms, take that rule”
(or an axiomatic method in general) basically is about finding reason-
able and convincing properties to uniquely describe an allocation rule
(or any theoretic model). The direction of reasoning is positive in the
sense that there is support in favor of axioms. The direction of reason-
ing is not meant to be negative in the sense of finding evidence against
axioms as “if there is an axiom that you do not support, do not take a
rule which satisfies it”.
3.4.3 Learning Effects
Due to the multiple-round-setup that we have used, our experiment
allows shedding some cautious light on the existence of learning ef-
fects. We pool the bargaining outcomes for the left-glove holders of
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each group and round that have first signed an agreement together
and estimate the following regression:
yilt = α+ νi + λt + it
where α is a constant, νi a group-fixed effect that captures time-invariant
group differences in bargaining outcomes and it is a standard er-
ror that is robust to heteroskedasticity. The main parameters of in-
terest are the round-fixed effects λt. We leave out the dummy for the
first round which serves as the reference category. Thus, we analyze
whether the outcomes of later rounds differ significantly from the
first round outcome. Table 6 shows the results.
Table 6: Results for Learning Effects Estimation
(1)
VARIABLES yilt
Round 2 4.417
(1.070)
Round 3 3.083
(0.845)
Round 4 0.083
(0.014)
Round 5 5.583
(0.726)
Round 6 14.333***
(3.231)
Constant 67.917***
(27.788)
Observations 72
Number of group 12
R-squared 0.114
Heteroskedasticity-Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Only the round 6 effect is significantly different from zero which
suggests that the share that left-glove holders receive is significantly
larger in the last round compared to the first round. Thus, there is
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evidence for some learning effects. However, we acknowledge that
the number of rounds in our experiment is rather low. It may be
possible that even stronger learning effects would have occurred at
later rounds.
3.4.4 Price Interdependency
An interesting question is also whether there is any interdependency
between the price of the first and the second matching pair in a group.
As argued above, this may be the case if individuals see the price of
the first matching pair as a signal of which price is “fair” and ap-
propriate for a left-glove holder in a matching pair. To investigate
whether this hypothesis is supported by the data, we run the follow-
ing regression:
y2ndilt = α+β1y
1st
ilt + νi + λt + it
A significant coefficient for β1 would indicate that there is indeed an
effect of the price of the first matching pair in a group-round combina-
tion on the price of the second matching pair. However, as shown in
Table 7, we did not find any significant effect of the first price on the
second price. Thus, price expectations of the remaining four partici-
pants were not influenced by the first negotiation in a group-round
pair.
3.5 discussion of results w.r .t. the ultimatum game
We will now briefly discuss our data and previous results in relation
to the ultimatum game. As discussed in Section 3.2.3, the non-co-
operative theoretical predicition of our experiment interpreted as an
extended ultimatum game would be a share of 99 and 1 for the strong
players and the weak matching-pair-players, respectively. Consulting
our data from the one shot play (first round of the experiment, cf.
Table 5), we see that the distribution with most divergent shares ob-
served is (share strong player, share weak player) = (80, 20) for the
first pair and (90, 10) for the second pair while the mean distrubtion
is about (68, 32) and about (73, 27) for the first and second pair, re-
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Table 7: Results for Price Interdependency Estimation
(1)
VARIABLES y2ndilt
y1stilt 0.059
(0.260)
Round 2 -3.844
(-0.361)
Round 3 -1.599
(-0.151)
Round 4 0.912
(0.086)
Round 5 1.420
(0.133)
Round 6 3.570
(0.322)
Constant 69.238***
(4.038)
Observations 72
Number of group 12
R-squared 0.013
Heteroskedasticity-Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
spectively. This obviously does not seem to support the theoretical
predicition of (99, 1).
Recall that one could argue that, due to the change of imbalanced-
ness, the theoretical predicition is even more reasonable for the sec-
ond matching pair in a group (decrease of punishing threads). How-
ever we found evidence against this difference in Section 3.4.4: oc-
cording to our data there is no evidence that a decrease of punishing
threads changes behavior.
An explanation used to save theoretical predictions of the ultima-
tum game has initially been suggested by Binmore et al. [1985] (p.
1180):
Subjects, faced with a new problem, simply choose “equal
division” as an “obvious” and “acceptable” compromise
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[...]. We suspect [...] that such considerations are easily dis-
placed by calculations of strategic advantage, once players
fully appreciate the structure of the game.
In other words, if participants are inexperienced with the game, their
decisions are just the result of misunderstanding but as soon as they
are experienced enough, the theoretical predicition will occur. Note
that in this explanation the authors suggest equal devision, namely
(50, 50) in our case, as an outcome for the first round as this distri-
bution is often observed in experimental studies on the one-shot ulti-
matum game. Note that we find strong evidence for outside options
affecting the outcome, that is, strong evidence exactely against equal
devision.
There have been experimental studies on the ultimatum game in-
vestigating learning effects which found that distributions, even though
changing over time, do not converge to the non-cooperative equilib-
rium (cf. Bearden, 2001). In Section 3.4.3 we also observed some evi-
dence for this change over time, that is, learning effects, occuring in
the last round of our experiment. Consulting our data we will now
take a brief look at the results from this last round which are pre-
sented in Table 8.
We see that the non-cooperative equilibrium indeed occured 3 times
in this last round (while it never occured in previous rounds) and an
almost equilibrium outcome of (98, 2) occured two more times (which
beside the last round only occured in the previous 2 rounds for the
second pair in Group 8). Hence, there might be some evidence for
the equilibrium outcome. However, the mean distribution of this last
round is still clearly different from this.
Notably, the mean distributions (82.25, 17.75) and (77.67, 22.04) with-
in pairs and (79.96, 20.04) across pairs seem to be remarkably close to
the theoretical predicitions of the χ-value and the Owen value. Unfor-
tunately, we do not have data on further rounds to deeper investigate
convergence.
3.6 conclusion
In the theoretical part of this chapter we analyzed glove games, which
are used to model simple markets, and corresponding outcomes with
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Table 8: Results for Left-glove Holders of last Round
Group 1st Pair 2nd Pair
1 90 99
2 95 90
3 70 70
4 84 20
5 90 87
6 50 99
7 95 95
8 98 98
9 75 10
10 90 99
11 90 95
12 60 70
Mean 82.25 77.67
Pair Independent Mean: 79.96
respect to different cooperative allocation rules. Corresponding for-
mulas for the special case of glove games have been derived which
we used to show the differences between the allocation rules with re-
spect to whether outside options or coalitional structures are taken
into account. In the economic interpretation of modeling a market,
sensitivity to outside options refers to whether imbalancedness of the
market is taken into account while the the question of accouning for
coalition structures could be interpreted as the question of discrimi-
nating between productive and unproductive market agents.
In the experimental part we investigated the question whether out-
side options do have an impact on bargaining outcome. We ran an ex-
perimental case study using a glove game which showed that outside
options significantly affect the outcomes. Among the theoretical allo-
cation rules we studied, there are two possible outside-option-sensiti-
ve predictors left which are compatible with our experimental design,
namely, the χ-value and the Owen value. For our experiment, theo-
retical predictions due to these values are very similar which did not
allow for a direct statistical discrimination. We hence implemented a
test on a certain axiom which could have distinguished between these
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two allocation rules if our data had supported this axiom. Unfortu-
nately, the axiom cannot be supported by our data and hence, we do
not find evidence in favor of one or the other allocation rule. Note
that existing studies on this topic ignore the Owen value.
We discuss the relation of our experiment to the ultimatum game
(in fact one could interpret our glove game as sort of an extended
ultimatum game). As we do not find evidence for the corresponding
non-cooperative equilibrium to occur in our experiment (in fact it
seems that we even might have evidence against it), our investigation
is in line with existing experimental literature on this topic. Note that
the sort of ultimatum game present in our experiment has not been
experimentally investigated before.
Furthermore, we find evidence that within a market, price expecta-
tions are not influenced by the outcome of negotiations which took
place before. This finding is in contrast to existing the literature (for
example Falk et al. [2006] on minimum wages).
Note that our experiment has been a pilot experiment. There are
some issues on the experimental design that should be improved. To
relate our experiment to the literature on ultimatum games, differ-
ent treatments for one or the other extension should be included. An
unfortunate issue is the number of rounds in the second part of our
experiment. We found some evidence for learning effects and conver-
gence for our last round and mean distributions of this last round
seem to be remarkably close to the theoretical predicitions of the χ-
value and the Owen value. Therefore, an investigation of convergence
in more rounds seems highly interesting. Generally, we only observed
a very small number of observations in the pilot experiment (strictly
speaking, we only have 12 independent observations) which did not
allow for the use of numerous statistical methods that rely on at least
sort of large numbers of observation and our results and analysis
would clearly benefit from more observations.
Therefore, beside the findings on the ultimatum game and price
interdependency, we see this pilot experiment as a starting point of
our analysis of outside options as we found strong evidence on their
effect. This leads to experimental evidence for the importance of out-
side options and we will continue to analyze whether we can theoret-
ically support this evidence.
4
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Forma-
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Outside
Options
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4.1 introduction
In the previous chapter we found experimental evidence for the im-
portance of “outside options” which will now be theoretically sup-
ported. Furthermore, as it is not yet clear from the literature what
an outside option or outside-option-sensitivity in the context of cooper-
ative allocation rules formally means, we will provide a theoretical
formalization and analysis.
While some research on cooperative game theory assumes that
some certain social or economic structure has already materialized,
that is, individuals have already formed certain coalitions (or a priori
unions) or networks, Gómez et al. [2008] and Belau [2010] provide
probabilistic forecasting models for network structures and coalition
structures that consider a point before any structure is fixed. Take for
example elections: at the time of election, it is not known which par-
ties will form coalitions in the end, but there might be some beliefs or
assumptions about all possible coalitions that could occur. Here it is
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not reasonable to take certain structures as a priori given, one should
include uncertainty and start the analysis at some point before coali-
tions are actually formed. To address this uncertainty, the generalized
models of Gómez et al. [2008] and Belau [2010] take into account the
likelihood of possible network or coalition structures. Referring to the
likelihood assumption, Belau [2010] calls these settings probabilistic
(instead of generalized) and we will follow this terminology.
For these probabilistic models, extensions of cooperative allocation
rules have been defined and characterized: Gómez et al. [2008] gave
the extension and characterization of the Myerson value (Myerson,
1977), the Position value (Meessen, 1988 and 1992, Borm et al.) was
generalized by Ghintran et al. [2012] and Belau [2010] generalized
the Aumann-Drèze value (Aumann and Drèze, 1974) and the χ-value
(Casajus, 2009b). All these values are expected payoffs of the deter-
minsitic analogs. Interestingly, all aforementioned probabilistic exten-
sions but the one of the χ-value used the “direct probabilization ap-
proach” (i. e., directly generalizing axioms of the original character-
ization of an allocation rule). For the χ-value, Belau [2010] shows
that this approach fails. While the main finding of Belau’s investiga-
tion was to finally characterize the probabilistic χ-value (introduc-
ing a new, fully probabilistic axiom), we are now interested in a
claim raised (but not formally investigated) in this work: that the
direct probabilization approach generally fails for “outside-option-
sensitive” allocation rules. This would provide a theoretical support
of the experimental finding in Chapter 3.
Following this claim, we first show that it indeed holds for the
Owen value (Owen, 1977), another allocation rule which seems to ac-
count for outside options (cf. Chapter 2.4) and has been supported
by our data in Chapter 3: the “direct probabilization approach” leads
to a value that is different from the expected payoff of the determin-
istic Owen value (and the value obtained will turn out to be sort
of “too risk averse”). The incompatibility of the direct approach and
“outside-option-sensitivity” supports the importance of outside op-
tions as there indeed seems to be a theoretical difference between
allocation rules accounting for outside options and those that do not.
However, outside-option-sensitivity of cooperative allocation rules
has not yet been explicitly formalized in the literature so far (and,
therefore, there have not been used formal arguments for the fail-
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ure of the direct probabilization approach). We formally define out-
side options for both coalition and network structures and axioms
for (weak) outside-option-sensitivity. We show that these axioms are in-
compatible with component decomposability, an axiom which is satis-
fied by all allocation rules where the direct probabilization approach
was suitable. Therefore, our new axioms are suitable for a formal
categorization of allocation rules into outside-option-sensitive and -
insensitive ones. We show that our axioms are indeed satisfied by the
Shapley value, the Banzhaf value, the Wiese value, the χ-value, the
Owen value and, as the only allocation rule in the setting of network
structures, the graph-χ-value. We further provide formal arguments
for Belau [2010]’s claim.
This chapter is organized as follows: in the next section we pro-
vide the formal notion of the probabilistic forecasting model for coali-
tion structures and Section 3 will discuss the direct probabilization
approach of the Owen value. In Section 4, we formally define out-
side options and the outside-option-sensitivity axioms and use these
axioms to categorize all allocation rules for coalition structures dis-
cussed so far. Section 5 provides the same definitions and catego-
rizations for the framework of network structures. Finally, Section 6
concludes and is followed by a section that discusses the probabilistic
forecasting model for networks to motivate our further investigations
in this thesis.
4.2 probabilistic coalition structures
Recall that a (deterministic) TU-game with a coalition structure is a
tuple (N, v,P) with N = {1, ...,n} being the (finite, non-empty) player
set, v ∈ VN the coalition (or characteristic) function describing the
game and P the partition on N defining the coalition structure. Now,
probabilistic coalition structures are modeled as follows (cf. Belau,
2010): consider a probability distribution over all coalition structures
P of N, that is, a probability distribution on PN. Define the set of all
probability distributions on PN:
∆(PN) :=
p : PN −→ [0, 1] , ∑
P∈PN
p(P) = 1
 .
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An element p ∈ ∆(PN) can be interpreted as p(P) being the probabil-
ity that the coalition structure P occurs. A TU-game with a probabilistic
coalition structure is a tupel (N, v,p) and an allocation rule for probabilis-
tic coalition structures is a function Y : {N}×VN × ∆(PN) −→ R|N|,
distributing the worth of any TU-game with a probabilistic coalition
structure among the players. An example of how the probabilistic
forecasting model can be applied can be found in the appendix.
Further, for any p ∈ ∆(PN), denote by P(p) := {P ∈ PN|p(P) > 0}
the set of all coalition structures whose probability to occur under
probability distribution p is not zero (i. e., the carrier of p).
A probability distribution p ∈ ∆(PN) is called degenerated if there
exists a P∗ ∈ PN such that p(P∗) = 1 (i. e., p(P) = 0 ∀P 6= P∗).
As a notation, we write pP∗ for the degenerated probability distribu-
tion corresponding to the partition P∗. Identifying pP with the corre-
sponding partition P, define for every allocation rule for probabilis-
tic coalition structures Y the corresponding (deterministic) allocation
rule for coalition structures via Ydet(N, v,P) := Y(N, v,pP).
An extension of (deterministic) axioms for coalition structures into
probabilistic ones on degenerated probability distributions is quite
straightforward: to obtain the degenerated pendant to deterministic
axiom · (d·), we replace Y(N, v,P) by Y(N, v,pP). Note that if an alloca-
tion rule for probabilistic coalition structures satisfies a degenerated
axiom, this implies that the corresponding (deterministic) allocation
rule for coalition structures satisfies the deterministic axioms.
Belau [2010] introduces a probabilistic axiom which fills the gap
between degenerated probability distributions and general ones.
Axiom 4.1 (Linearity on Probability Distributions (pL)). An allocation
rule for probabilistic coalition structures Y satisfies Linearity on Prob-
ability Distributions pL if we have
Y(N, v,αp+ (1−α)q) = αY(N, v,p) + (1−α)Y(N, v,q)
for all probability distributions p,q ∈ ∆(PN) and all α ∈ [0, 1].
This axiom states that mixing probabilities should lead to the same
mix for the corresponding payoffs. Note that convex combinations of
probability distributions are again probability distributions. Mixing
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probability distributions in a non-convex way would not make sense
in this setting.
With the following Theorem we give a more applicable version of
the one in Belau [2010].
Theorem 4.1 (Characterization via deg. prob. distr.). If an allocation
rule for probabilistic coalition structures is defined as an expected pay-
off of a deterministic one, it is characterized by pL and the degener-
ated versions of the characterizing axioms of the deterministic one.
Proof. Existence follows by
Yp(N, v,αp+ (1−α)q) =
∑
P∈PN
(αp+ (1−α)q)(P)Y(N, v,P)
= αYp(N, v,p) + (1−α)Yp(N, v,q)
and since Yp(N, v,pP) = Y(N, v,P) by the deterministic allocation
rule satisfying the deterministic axioms. Uniqueness follows by the
fact that every probability distribution p ∈ ∆(PN) can be written
as a convex combination of degenerated probability distributions (cf.
Belau, 2010):
p(P) =
∑
P ′∈PN
p(P ′)pP ′(P)
and the use of pL.
Note that every allocation rule for probabilistic coalition structures
which satisfies pL can be written as an expected payoff of a deter-
ministic allocation rule (which can always be derived via degener-
ated probability distributions)1. Hence, we already have a definition
and characterization for generalized versions of all mentioned alloca-
tion rules. But Linearity on Probability Distributions is a very strong
axiom. Hence, in order to avoid (or at least relax) pL, probabilistic
axioms defined for general probability distributions are needed.
Belau [2010] shows that while the probabilistic AD-value can be
characterized by probabilistic versions of the determinstic character-
izing axioms, this is not possible for the probabilistic χ-value. It is
claimed that the “direct probabilization approach” is problematic when-
ever an allocation rule is outside option sensitive (which has not been
1 see Belau [2010]
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formally defined so far). We will first investigate if the claim also
holds for the Owen value (Owen, 1977) which also seems to account
for outside options as we have seen in Chapter 2.4.
4.3 the probabilistic owen value
Recall the definition of the Owen value:
Owi(N, v,P) :=
1
|Σ(N,P)|
∑
σ∈Σ(N,P)
[v(Ki(σ)) − v(Ki(σ) \ {i})]
where Σ(N,P) is the set of all orders σ over the player set that are
compatible with the coalition structure P (i. e.∀ i, j ∈ P ∈ P we have
|σ(i) − σ(j)| < |P|) and Ki(σ) is the set of players that come before
player i and including i under order σ.
In line with the probabilistic extensions of the other allocation rules,
we define the probabilistic version as the expected payoff of the de-
terminstic Owen value:
Definition 4.1 (probabilistic Owen value). For any TU-game with a
probabilistic coalition structure (N, v,p), the probabilistic Owen-value
is given by
Owp(N, v,p) :=
∑
P∈PN
p(P)Ow(N, v,P).
Recall that the determinsitic Owen value is characterized by E, N,
CS, SC and A (Theorem 2.5). We will now follow the “direct probabi-
lization approach” of finding probabilistic versions of characterizing
axioms of the deterministic value and using these versions to deter-
mine the probabilistic value.
Belau [2010] already gives a probabilistic version of CS: Denote by
Pp the coarsest common refinement of all P ∈ P(p). One can interpret
a component Pp(i) ∈ Pp as the set of all players that are in the same
component as player i for sure, that is, for any player j ∈ Pp(i) we
have that j ∈ P(i) ∀ P ∈ P(p). Using this, a probabilistic version of
CS is defined:
Axiom 4.2 (probabilistic Symmetry within Components (pCS)). An
allocation rule for probabilistic coalition structures Y satisfies prob-
abilistic Symmetry within Components pCS if we have for all p ∈
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∆(PN) that Yi(N, v,p) = Yj(N, v,p) for all players i, j being symmetric
in (N, v), j ∈ Pp(i).
pCS states that players with the same productivity that are in the
same component for sure should not be treated differently in the dis-
tribution of the payoff. Note that this axiom, due to the use of Pp,
is not very restrictive as it only demands to treat those players with
the same productivity equally who are in the same coalition for all
coalition structures that could occur.
We now define probabilistic versions of the missing axioms (these
definitions are quite straigth forward):
Axiom 4.3 (probabilistic Efficiency (pE)). An allocation rule for proba-
bilistic coalition structures Y satisfies probabilistic Efficiency pE if we
have ∑
i∈N
Yi(N, v,p) = v(N).
Note that we do not have to use any sort of probabilistic coalition
function for pE since the worth of the grand coalition v(N) does not
depend on the coalition structure P.
Axiom 4.4 (probabilistic Null Player Axiom (pN)). An allocation rule
for probabilistic coalition structures Y satisfies the probabilistic Null
Player Axiom pN if we have Yi(N, v,p) = 0 for all Null players i ∈ N.
Axiom 4.5 (probabilistic Symmetry of Components (pSC)). An alloca-
tion rule for probabilistic coalition structures Y satisfies probabilistic
Symmetry of Components pSC if we have
∑
i∈P
Yi(N, v,p) =
∑
i∈P ′
Yi(N, v,p)
for P,P ′ ∈ Pp being symmetric in the intermediate game.
The aforementioned probabilistic axioms are indeed sufficient to
uniquely characterize an allocation rule:
Theorem 4.2. The allocation rule for probabilistic coalition structures
given by
Yi(N, v,p) := Ow(N, v,Pp)
for all i ∈ N is the unique allocation rule for probabilistic coalition
structures that satisfies pE, pN, pCS, pSC and A.
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Proof. For uniqueness, we mimic the original proof of the determin-
istic characterization. Let Y satisfy the axioms. Since the unanimity
games (uT )T form a basis of VN, by A, it is sufficient to show that
Y(N, λuT ,p) is uniquely determined. In the following we will use the
following properties of unanimity games:
1. All players i ∈ N\T are Nullplayers in uT , hence Yi(N, λuT ,p) =
0 by pN.
2. All i, j ∈ T are symmetric in uT , hence all P,P ′ ∈ Pp|T are
symmetric in the intermediate game uintT : P
p −→ R.
Further we will use that for all P ∈ Pp \ Pp|T = Pp|N\T we have
P ⊆ N \ T , that is, all i ∈ P are Nullplayers.
For all i ∈ T consider P := Pp(i)∩ T ∈ Pp|T . We have:
λuT (N)
pE
=
∑
j∈N
Yj(N, λuT ,p)
=
∑
j∈P ′,
P ′∈Pp|T
Yj(N, λuT ,p) +
∑
j∈P ′,
P ′∈Pp|N\T
Yj(N, λuT ,p)
pSC,pN
= |Pp|T |
∑
j∈P
Yj(N, λuT ,p) + 0
⇔
∑
j∈P
Yj(N, λuT ,p) =
λ
|Pp|T |
All players in P = Pp(i) ∩ T are symmetric in uT since for P ∈
Pp|T we have P ⊆ T . Hence, by pCS,
∑
j∈P
Yj(N, λuT ,p) = |Pp(i) ∩
T |Yi(N, λuT ,p) and together
Yi(N, λuT ,p) =
 λ|Pp|T |·|Pp(i)∩T | , i ∈ T
0 , i ∈ N \ T
(5)
which is uniquely determined.
The value given by (5) corresponds to Ow(N, v,Pp) (here we use
the basis-element representation of the Owen value for unanimity
games). It is straightforward to show that Ow(N, v,Pp) satisfies the
axioms A, pN, pE and pCS just by Ow satisfying the determinis-
tic analogs and the definition of Pp. By the so called intermediate
game property (see Peleg and Sudhölter, 2007) one can show that
OwP(N, v,P) is equal to Ow(N, vint, {P}) for any P ∈ PN and P ∈ P.
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Using that Ow(N, vint, {P}) = Sh(P, vint) we have pSC by Sh satisfy-
ing S.
While in the “direct probabilization approach” for generalizing the
χ-value a uniqueness proof simply failed (cf. Belau, 2010), it is pos-
sible to follow this approach for the Owen value to characterize a
unique value. However, we obtain another problem: the allocation
rule from Theorem 4.2 does not coincide with the probabilistic Owen
value.
Example 4.1. Consider N = {1, 2, 3}, P1 = {{1, 2}, {3}}, P2 = {{1}, {2, 3}},
v = uN and p(P1) = p(P1) = 12 . We get P
p = {{1}, {2}, {3}} and
Ow1(N, v,Pp) =
1
3
,
∑
P∈PN
p(P)Ow1(N, v,P)) =
1
2
· 1
4
+
1
2
· 1
2
=
3
8
6= 1
3
,
that is, the values do not coincide.
The application of the “direct probabilization approach” for the
χ-value failed as the probabilistic extensions of the original axioms,
even though satisfied by the probabilistic χ-value, have been insuf-
ficient for uniqueness (there exists another value which also satisfies
the axioms, see Belau, 2010). In contrast to that, the probabilistic exten-
sions of the Owen-axioms, even though leading to a unique value, are
not all satisfied the expected payoff extension: It is straightforward to
prove that the probabilistic Owen value satisfies pE, pN, pCS and A
by Owdet satisfying the deterministic versions and the definition of
Pp. Hence, by Theorem 4.2 and Example 4.1, the probabilistic Owen
value cannot satisfy pSC.
One could argue that Ow(N, v,Pp) should be taken as the prob-
abilistic Owen value but this value does not take into account the
actual probability of coalitions, it only takes into account whether a
coalition occurs with a probability not being zero. Furthermore, Pp
defines coalitions of players which are in the same coalition for sure;
in a lot of cases we have Pp = {{i}, i ∈ N}. One could say that using
Pp is “too risk averse”.
On the other hand, one could argue that another probabilistic gen-
eralization of SC should be used. The only other possibility that is in
line with the previous extensions of probabilistic axioms is the use of
Pp, which is the finest common coarsening of all P ∈ P(p) (cf. Belau,
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2010), employed in the definition of the probabilistic analog of CE.
However, it turned out that, due to the use of this Pp instead of Pp,
the probabilistic analog of CE was too weak to characterize the prob-
abilistic χ-value. Therefore, we assume to obtain the same problem if
we would redefine pSC with the use of Pp.
4.4 outside-option-sensitivity in coalition structures
Following Belau [2010] and our investigation in the previous section,
we have seen that both the χ-value and the Owen value cannot be
generalized for the probabilistic model using the “direct probabiliza-
tion approach” while this is possible for the AD-value (see Belau,
2010). For the χ-value, Belau [2010] claimed that this might be due
to the fact that it does not satisfy the following property while the
AD-value does:
Axiom 4.6 (Component Decomposability (CD) for Coalition Struc-
tures). An allocation rule for coalition structures Y satisfies Compo-
nent Decomposability CD if
Yi(N, v,P) = Yi(P(i), v|P(i), {P(i)})
CD states that the player’s outside world does not affect payoffs
within a component. Neither the potential coalitions between players
in and outside the component, nor the coalition structure can affect
a component decomposable allocation rule. Therefore, Belau [2010]
states that CD stands in contradiction to outside-option-sensitivity.
However, outside-option-sensitivity has not been explicitly formal-
ized so far. We will now suggest an axiom which accounts for outside
options and indeed is incompatible with CD.
Definition 4.2 (Outside Option in Coalition Structures). Let (N, v,P)
be a TU-game with a coalition structure. A coalition K ⊆ N is called
outside option in (N, v,P) for player i ∈ N if
K ⊆ N \ P(i) and v(K∪ {i}) − v(K) > 0.
Player i has an outside option if she could create a surplus by join-
ing a group of other players outside her coalition P(i). Note that this
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definition only specifies outside options of a single player and not of
a group of players.
Definition 4.3 (Outside-option-reduced Game). Let K˜ be an outside
option in (N, v,P) for player i ∈ N. Then, the outside-option-reduced
game w.r.t. K˜ and i is given by
vK˜,i(K) :=
v(K) , if K 6= K˜∪ {i}
v(K˜) , if K = K˜∪ {i}
In the outside-option-reduced game w.r.t. K˜ and i, player i’s outside
option K˜ is neutralized: the surplus created by player i joining K˜ is set
to zero. The first step towards an axiom for outside-option-sensitivity
is given by the following axiom:
Axiom 4.7 (Weak Outside-Option-Sensitivity (WOOS) for Coalition
Structures). Let (N, v,P) be a TU-game with a coalition structure. An
allocation rule for coalition structures Y satisfies Weak Outside-Option-
Sensitivity WOOS if for all i ∈ N and for all outside options K˜ in
(N, v,P) for player i ∈ N there exists a coalition structure P ′ with K˜
also being outside option in (N, v,P ′) for player i ∈ N such that
Yi(N, v,P ′) 6= Yi(N, vK˜,i,P ′).
WOOS states that in at least one possible coalition formation the
neutralization of a non-isolated player’s outside options changes this
players payoff. One could argue that neutralizing an outside option
should always have an effect (for every coalition structure) and that
this effect should be strictly negative. This is a convincing argument
for coalition structures and any sort of player-based values.2 Hence,
we define:
Axiom 4.8 (Outside-Option-Sensitivity (OOS) for Coalition Structures).
Let (N, v,P) be a TU-game with a coalition structure. An allocation
rule for coalition structures Y satisfies Outside-Option-Sensitivity OOS
if for all i ∈ N such that |P(i)| > 1we have
Yi(N, v,P) > Yi(N, vK˜,i,P)
2 The weak axiom will only become important in a special case of Chapter 6. Here, we
will also discuss why OOS indeed might be seen as sort of “strong”.
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for all K˜ being an outside option in (N, v,P) for i.
OOS states that a non-isolated player’s payoff should strictly de-
crease if her outside options are neutralized which implies that out-
side options have a positive impact on a player’s payoff. It is obvious
that OOS implies WOOS. Note that OOS still is not very strong as
the size or strength of this impact is not specified. Furthermore, we
only analyze outside options of one player and not of a group of play-
ers.
Although WOOS seems to be a weak axiom at first glance, it is
sufficient to state that an allocation rule is somehow affected, that is,
sensitive to outside options. It turns out that it is already incompatible
with CD:
Lemma 4.1 (CD vs. WOOS and OOS). If an allocation rule for coali-
tion structures Y satisfies CD, it cannot satisfy WOOS or OOS and
vice versa.
Proof. Let K˜ be an outside option for some i ∈ N. We have that
K˜ ⊆ N \ P(i), that is, K˜ ∩ P(i) = ∅ and hence, the restriction of v
on P(i) is not affected by a neutralization of K˜. In other words, we
have vK˜,i|P(i) = v|P(i). Therefore, on the one hand, if an allocation
rule satisfies CD, we obtain
Yi(N, vK˜,i,P)
CD
= Yi(N|P(i), vK˜,i|P(i),P|P(i))
= Yi(N|P(i), v|P(i),P|P(i))
CD
= Yi(N, v,P)
for all outside option K˜ and all coalition structures P. On the other
hand, if an allocation rule satisfies WOOS, there exists a coalition
structure P such that
Yi(N, vK˜,i,P) 6= Yi(N, v,P).
Hence, an allocation rule can either satisfy CD or WOOS but not both
of them and as OOS implies WOOS, the same holds for OOS.
Lemma 4.1 shows independence of CD and OOS (neither axiom
can imply the other) and, by means of outside-option-sensitivity w.r.t.
OOS, Lemma 4.1 implies that all component decomposable allocation
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rules are outside-option-insensitive. Hence, to categorize allocation
rules into outside-option-sensitive and -insensitive ones by means
of OOS, CD implies outside-option-insensitivity. However note that
the reverse does not hold: if an allocation rule does not satisfy CD,
this does not imply that OOS is automatically satisfied, that is, there
are allocation rules that are neither component decomposable nor
outside-option-sensitive.
Example 4.2 (Neither CD nor (W)OOS). Consider for example
Yi(N, v,P) :=
v(N)
|N|
∀ i ∈ N
and a glove game with one left glove and two right gloves. For any
P, the allocation rule above allocates 1/3 to each player. Consider P
such that one pair is build and the other right-glove holder stays alone.
Reduced to the component of the pair, every pair-building player ob-
tains 1/2 and hence, CD is not satisfied. For every coalition structure P
with at least two components, the singelton glove holder is an out-
side option for at least one other glove holder but, since the corre-
sponding outside-option-reduced game still assigns the same value
to the grand coalition (as there is still a matching pair), payoffs do not
change. Hence, also WOOS and OOS are not satisfied.
Lemma 4.2 (Outside-Option-Sensitivity of the Shapley and the Banz-
haf value). The Shapley value and the Banzhaf value are outside-option-
sensitive.
Proof. Let (N, v,P) be a TU-game with a coalition structure, i ∈ N
with |P(i)| > 1 and let K˜ be an outside option in (N, v,P) for i. Note
that Sh(N, v,P) = Sh(N, v) and Ba(N, v,P) = Ba(N, v) as both values
are allocation rules that do not account for any inner structure. By the
definition of vK˜,i we have for the Shapley value
Shi(N, vK˜,i) =
∑
K⊆N\{i}
|K|!(|N|− |K|− 1)!
|N|!
[
vK˜,i(K∪ {i}) − vK˜,i(K)
]
=Shi(N, v) +
|K˜|!(|N|− |K˜|− 1)!
|N|!
[
vK˜,i(K˜∪ {i}) − vK˜,i(K˜)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−
|K˜|!(|N|− |K˜|− 1)!
|N|!
[
v(K˜∪ {i}) − v(K˜)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
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<Shi(N, v)
and analogously we have for the Banzhaf value
Bai(N, vK˜,i) =
∑
K⊆N\{i}
1
2|N|−1
[
vK˜,i(K∪ {i}) − vK˜,i(K)
]
= Bai(N, v) +
1
2|N|−1
[
vK˜,i(K˜∪ {i}) − vK˜,i(K˜)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−
1
2|N|−1
[
v(K˜∪ {i}) − v(K˜)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< Bai(N, v)
Remark 4.1 (Outside-Option-Insensitivity of the AD-value). The AD-
value is component decomposable (by definition), hence, it cannot be
outside-option-sensitive.
Lemma 4.3 (Outside-Option-Sensitivity of the Owen value). The Owen
value is outside-option-sensitive.
Proof. Let (N, v,P) be a TU-game with a coalition structure, i ∈ N
with |P(i)| > 1 and let K˜ be an outside option in (N, v,P) for i. Note
that v(Ki(σ) \ {i}) 6= K˜∪ {i} for all σ ∈ Σ(N,P). Therefore we have
Owi(N, vK˜,i,P) =
1
|Σ(N,P)|
∑
σ∈Σ(N,P)
[
vK˜,i(Ki(σ)) − vK˜,i(Ki(σ) \ {i})
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
6v(Ki(σ))−v(Ki(σ)\{i})
with strict inequality for all σ such that Ki(σ) = K˜∪ {i} which implies
Owi(N, vK˜,i,P) < Owi(N, v,P).
Lemma 4.4 (Outside-Option-Sensitivity of the Wiese-value). The Wiese-
value is outside-option-sensitive.
Proof. Let (N, v,P) be a TU-game with a coalition structure, i ∈ N
with |P(i)| > 1 and let K˜ be an outside option in (N, v,P) for i. As
before we have
vK˜,i(Ki(σ)) − vK˜,i(Ki(σ) \ {i}) 6 v(Ki(σ)) − v(Ki(σ) \ {i})
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with strict inequality for all σ such that Ki(σ) = K˜∪ {i}. Now consider
j ∈ P(i) \ {i} and σ ∈ Σi(N,P), that is, i is the last player of P(i) under
σ. Hence we have i /∈ Kj(σ) which implies that Kj(σ) 6= K˜ ∪ {i} and,
hence, we have
vK˜,i(Ki(σ)) − vK˜,i(Ki(σ) \ {i}) = v(Ki(σ)) − v(Ki(σ) \ {i})
for all σ ∈ Σi(N,P) which proves OOS.
Lemma 4.5 (Outside-Option-Sensitivity of the χ-value). The χ-value
is outside-option-sensitive.
Proof. Let (N, v,P) be a TU-game with a coalition structure, i ∈ N
with |P(i)| > 1 and let K˜ be an outside option in (N, v,P) for i. For all
j /∈ K˜, j 6= i we have that j /∈ K˜∪ {i} and hence, K∪ {j} 6= K˜∪ {i} for all
K ⊆ N \ {j}. Using this and setting
k˜ :=
|K˜∪ {i}|!(|N|− |K˜∪ {i}|− 1)!
|N|!
> 0
we obtain
Shj(N, vK˜,i) = Shj(N, v) + k˜
[
vK˜,i(K˜∪ {i}∪ {j}) − vK˜,i(K˜∪ {i})
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=v(K˜∪{i}∪{j})−v(K˜)
−k˜
[
v(K˜∪ {i}∪ {j}) − v(K˜∪ {i})]
= Shj(N, v) + k˜
[
v(K˜∪ {i}) − v(K˜)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> Shj(N, v)
Therefore and since P(i)∩ K˜ = ∅ we have for the χ-value of player i
χi(N,vK˜,i,P) = Shi(N, vK˜,i) +
vK˜,i(P(i)) −
∑
j∈P(i)
Shj(N, vK˜,i)
|P(i)|
=
(
1−
1
|P(i)|
)
Shi(N, vK˜,i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<Shi(N,v)
+
v(P(i)) −
∑
j∈P(i)\{i}
>Shj(N,v)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Shj(N, vK˜,i)
|P(i)|
<
(
1−
1
|P(i)|
)
Shi(N, v) +
v(P(i)) −
∑
j∈P(i)\{i}
Shj(N, v)
|P(i)|
=χi(N, v,P)
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which proves OOS.
Note that the previous proofs of WOOS provided more than “just”
outside-option-sensitivity of the analyzed allocation rules as we can
explicitly determine the structural effect of an outside option on allo-
cation. Fix player i ∈ N, outside option K˜ and TU-game (N, v). The
structural effect arising due to outside option K˜ on allocation by allo-
cation rule Y can be expressed by
E(Y) := Yi(N, v,P) − Yi(N, vK˜,i,P)
Denote by A := v(K˜∪ {i}) − v(K˜) player i’s contribution when joining
outside option K˜ and find the expressions for E(Y) in Table 93
Table 9: Structural Effects of an Outside Option on Allocation
Y Structural Effect E(Y)
Sh
|K˜|!(|N|− |K˜|− 1)!
|N|!
A
Ba
1
2|N|−1
A
Ow
∣∣∣{σ|Ki(σ) = K˜∪ {i}}∣∣∣A
W
|K˜|!(|N|− |K˜|− 1)!
|N|!
A
χ
(
|K˜|!(|N|− |K˜|− 1)!
|N|!
+ B︸︷︷︸
>0
)
A
Remark 4.2 (Comparison of Structural Effects of an Outside Option
on Allocation). Note that all structural effects are multiples of player
i’s contribution when joining outside option K˜. The effects for the
Banzhaf value, the Shapley value and the Owen value generally dif-
fer in their structure: the effect for the Banzhaf value only depends on
A and |N| while the effect for the Shapley value also depends on the
size of K˜ and the one for the Owen value on the number of orders and
3 We used the expressions of the Wiese value and the χ-value given by Casajus [2007],
p.81, to obtain that Wi(N, v,P) = Shi(N, v) + FW and χi = Shi(N, v) + Fχ where
FW does not change for the outside-option-reduced game as only σ ∈ Σi(N,P)
occurs while Fχ increases for the outside-option-reduced game. The explicit proofs
are omitted.
4.4 outside-option-sensitivity in coalition structures 79
K˜. Note that the effect for the χ-value is strictly larger than the one
of the Shapley value which strongly emphasizes the outside-option-
issue while the effect for the Wiese value is equal to the one for the
Shapley value. One could argue that, in terms of structural effects, the
analysis of the Wiese value does not provide new insights as this is
covered by an analysis of the Shapley value.
We have categorized all dicussed allocation rules for coalition struc-
tures and without inner structure. We found that, due to Lemma 4.1,
the χ-value, the Wiese value and the Owen value are not component
decomposable. Note that the “direct probabilization approach” has
to use some sort of probabilistic component which could be the prob-
abilistic components Pp or Pp. For the outside-option-sensitive allo-
cation rules for coalition structures the step from these probabilistic
components to the deterministic components did not work out: for
the χ-value, a version using Pp also satisfies the probabilistic axioms
(cf. Belau, 2010) and for the Owen value we obtained a version using
Pp. We claim that it is the absence of component decomposability
which causes these problems:
Remark 4.3 (Component Decomposability and the “Direct Probabi-
lization Approach”). To obtain a deterministic component out of a
probabilistic one there has to be a point where the situation can be re-
duced to an allocation rule without inner structure (like the Shapley
or the Banzhaf value) since in this case, probabilistic differences are
absent and equivalence between probabilistic and deterministic com-
ponents occurs. This reduction has to be sort of general, that is, a re-
duction to components. If, however, an allocation rule can be reduced
to components of the underlying structure, it is component decompos-
able which means that this allocation rule cannot be outside-option-
sensitive.
Recall that the network approach for modeling social or economic
situations captures more information about the structure of the soci-
ety or economy than the coalition structure approach (cf. Chapter 2).
Hence, it seems to be a more adequate approach for various appli-
cations. We will now investigate the same idea of categorization for
network structures where we will also obtain further issues leading
to the following investigations of this thesis.
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4.5 outside-option-sensitivity in network structures
Recall that a (deterministic) TU-game with a network structure is
a tuple (N, v,g) that consists of a (non-empty and finite) player set
N = {1, ...,n}, a coalition function v ∈ VN := {v : 2N −→ R|v(∅) = 0}
and a network structure (N,g) with nodes N = {1, ...,n} and a net-
work g ⊆ {ij|i, j ∈ N}. Nodes i and j are called connected in network
g if there exists a path ih1, ...,hkj ∈ g, h1, ...,hk ∈ N and the result-
ing connected components build a partition on N denoted by C(N,g)
where Ci is the component of all players connected with player i ∈ N.
Gómez et al. [2008] define the probabilistic model for network struc-
tures and characterize the probabilistic Myerson value via the “direct
probabilization approach”. Ghintran et al. [2012] define the probabilis-
tic Position value via a probabilistic extension of the coalition func-
tion but it turned out that this definition is equivalent to the expected
payoff of the deterministic Position value. They further find that the
probabilistic Position value can be characterized via the “direct proba-
bilization approach” using probabilistic analogs of the characterizing
axioms of the deterministic Position value. Belau [2010] claims that
the “direct probabilization approach” for the graph-χ-value will fail,
already the definitions of the probabilistic extensions of the charac-
terizing axioms turn out to be problematic in application and rea-
sonability. This claim is in line with our discussion in Remark 4.3
for coalition structures as the graph-χ-value indeed is not component
decomposable
Axiom 4.9 (CD for Network Structures). An allocation rule for net-
work structures Y satisfies Component Decomposability CD if
Yi(N, v,g) = Yi(Ci(g), v|Ci(g),g|Ci(g))
We follow the steps of formalizing outside options for coalition
structures.
Definition 4.4 (Outside Option in Network Structures). Let (N, v,g)
be a TU-game with a network structure. A coalition K ⊆ N is called
outside option in (N, v,g) for player i ∈ N if
K ⊆ N \ Ci(g) and v(K∪ {i}) − v(K) > 0.
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Player i has an outside option if she could create a surplus by join-
ing a group of other players outside her connected component Ci(g).
Axiom 4.10 ((Weak) Outside-Option-Sensitivity for Network Struc-
tures). Let (N, v,g) be a TU-game with a network structure. An al-
location rule for network structures Y satisfies Weak Outside-Option-
Sensitivity WOOS if for all i ∈ N and for outside options K˜ in (N, v,g)
for player i ∈ N such that |Ci(g)| > 1 there exists a network structure
(N,g ′) with K˜ also being outside option in (N, v,g ′) for player i ∈ N
such that
Yi(N, v,g ′) 6= Yi(N, vK˜,i,g ′).
An allocation rule for network structures Y satisfies Outside-Option-
Sensitivity OOS if for all i ∈ N such that |Ci(g)| > 1we have
Yi(N, v,g) < Yi(N, vK˜,i,g)
for all K˜ being an outside option in (N, v,g) for i.
Obviously, the analogue of Lemma 4.1 also holds in the framework
of network structures. Hence, we obtain the corresponding catego-
rization possibilities as in the previous section.
Before we start to categorize the allocation rules we discussed so
far, let us briefly emphasize the use of the lower outside option graph
(LOOG), given by g(i) = g|Ci ∪ {jk ∈ gN|j ∈ Ci,k ∈ N \ Ci}. Let
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and g = {12, 34, 45}, the LOOGs are displayed in
Figure 4.
Figure 4: Network and corresponding LOOGs
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5 1
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5 1
2
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g g(1) = g(2) g(3) = g(4) = g(5)
Remark 4.4 (Outside Options, Games on Networks and the LOOG).
Note that an outside option K˜ is a group of players outside a player i’s
connected component. Therefore, no network-resricted game as the
graph-restricted game or the arc-game can be affected by the differ-
ence between v and and vK˜,i as K˜ ∪ {i} is always unconnected and,
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hence, split up into connected subsets. Recall that the lower outside
option graph (LOOG) for any player i ∈ N is given by the connected
component of player i plus a link between any player inside this com-
ponent to every player outside this component (and there are no other
connections between players outside player i’s connected component).
Therefore, the LOOG ensures that all outside options of player i for the
original structure are taken into account in the graph-restricted game
as well as in the arc-game.
Remark 4.5 (Outside-Option-Insensitivity of the Myerson value and
the Position value). Both the Myerson value and the Position value
are component decomposable (cf. van den Nouweland, 1993), hence,
cannot be outside-option-sensitive.
Lemma 4.6 (Outside-Option-Sensitivity of the Graph-χ-value). The
graph-χ-value is outside-option-sensitive.
Proof. Let (N, v,g) be a TU-game with a network structure, i ∈ N
with |Ci(g)| > 1 and let K˜ be an outside option in (N, v,g) for i. We
first analyze
µi(N, vK˜,i,g(i)) =
∑
K⊆N\{i}
f(K)
[
v
g(i)
K˜,i
(K∪ {i}) − vg(i)
K˜,i
(K)
]
where f(K) :=
|K|!(|N|− 1− |K|)!
|N|!
, K ⊆ N
Note that vg(K) is not affected by neutralizing the outside option K˜
for all K ⊆ N such that K˜ 6⊆ K for any network g. Using this, the
special form of the LOOG g(i) and since K˜ ⊆ N \ Ci(g) we have
µi(N, vK˜,i,g(i)) = µi(N, v,g(i)) +
∑
K⊆N\{i}
K˜⊆K
f(K)
[
v
g(i)
K˜,i
(K∪ {i}) − vg(i)
K˜,i
(K)
]
−
∑
K⊆N\{i}
K˜⊆K
f(K)
[
vg(i)(K∪ {i}) − vg(i)(K)
]
= µi(N, v,g(i)) +
∑
K⊆N\K˜
i/∈K
f(K∪ K˜)
[
v
g(i)
K˜,i
(K∪ K˜∪ {i}) − vg(i)
K˜,i
(K∪ K˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=vg(i)(K∪K˜)
as i/∈K
]
−
∑
K⊆N\K˜
i/∈K
f(K∪ K˜)
[
vg(i)(K∪ K˜∪ {i}) + vg(i)(K∪ K˜)
]
= µi(N, v,g(i))
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+
∑
K⊆N\K˜
i/∈K
f(K∪ K˜)
[
v
g(i)
K˜,i
(K∪ K˜∪ {i}) − vg(i)(K∪ K˜∪ {i})︸ ︷︷ ︸
60∀K⊆N\K˜ with i/∈K and <0 e.g. for K=∅
]
< µi(N, v,g(i))
Consider any j ∈ Ci(g) \ {i}. Analogously to the case of i we first have
µj(N, vK˜,i,g(i)) =µj(N, v,g(i))
+
∑
K⊆N\K˜
j/∈K
f(K∪ K˜)
[
v
g(i)
K˜,i
(K∪ K˜∪ {j}) − vg(i)
K˜,i
(K∪ K˜)
]
−
∑
K⊆N\K˜
j/∈K
f(K∪ K˜)
[
vg(i)(K∪ K˜∪ {j}) − vg(i)(K∪ K˜)
]
Note that here, in contrast to the case of i, we have
v
g(i)
K˜,i
(K∪ K˜∪ {j}) = vg(i)(K∪ K˜∪ {j})
as j /∈ K˜∪ {i} and therefore K∪ K˜∪ {j} 6= K˜∪ {i} for all K ⊆ N \ K˜ such
that j /∈ K. Hence, we get
µj(N, vK˜,i,g(i)) =µj(N, v,g(i))
+
∑
K⊆N\K˜
j/∈K
f(K∪ K˜)
[
vg(i)(K∪ K˜) − vg(i)
K˜,i
(K∪ K˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0∀K⊆N\K˜ with j/∈K
and >0 e.g. for K={i}
]
>µj(N, v,g(i))
Using these findings for i and all j ∈ Ci(g) \ {i} we obtain OOS for
the graph-χ-value:
χ#i(N,vK˜,i,g) = µi(N, vK˜,i,g(i)) +
vK˜,i(Ci(g)) −
∑
j∈Ci(g)
µj(N, vK˜,i,g(i))
|Ci(g)|
=
(
1−
1
|Ci(g)|
)
µi(N, vK˜,i,g(i))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<µi(N,v,g(i))
+
v(Ci(g)) −
∑
j∈Ci(g)
j6=i
>µj(N,v,g(i))︷ ︸︸ ︷
µj(N, vK˜,i,g(i))
|Ci(g)|
<
(
1−
1
|Ci(g)|
)
µi(N, v,g(i)) +
v(Ci(g)) −
∑
j∈Ci(g)
j6=i
µj(N, v,g(i))
|Ci(g)|
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=χ#i(N, v,g)
Due to the intuition of the LOOG, Remark 4.4 and the use of the
outside option consistency axiom, the result itself that the graph-χ-
value is outside-option-sensitive is not very surprising. However, a
finding that occured within the proof is notable:
Remark 4.6. If an allocation rule is outside-option-sensitive and com-
ponent efficient, it is quite clear that the loss player i experiences by
neutralizing her outside option is distributed as a surplus among the
other players in i’s connected component (as the value of the coali-
tion/connected component does not change). We have also seen this
effect within the proofs of the outside-option-sensitive allocation rules
for coalition structures and without inner structure.
We found that, among the allocation rules for network structures
analyzed, the graph-χ-value is the only outside-option-sensitive allo-
cation rule. Following Remark 4.4, we suspect that allocation rules not
using any sort of outside-option-graph as the LOOG will in general
not be outside-option-sensitive.
4.6 conclusion
Gómez et al. [2008] and Belau [2010] provide probabilistic forecasting
models for network structures and coalition structures and, among
others, analyze the generalization of cooperative allocation rules in
this setting. While the “direct probabilization approach” (directly gen-
eralizing axioms of the original characterization of an allocation rule)
turns out to be suitable for characterizing most probabilistic exten-
sions, this approach failed for the χ-value. We were interested in a
claim raised (but not formally investigated) in Belau [2010]: that the
direct probabilization approach generally fails for “outside-option-
sensitive” allocation rules. Following this claim, we first show that
it indeed holds for the Owen value, another allocation rule which
seems to account for outside options. As outside-option-sensitivity of
cooperative allocation rules has not been explicitly formalized in the
literature so far, we formally define outside options for both coalition
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and network structures and suggest outside-option-sensitivity-axioms.
We have shown that these axioms are incompatible with component
decomposability (which is satisfied by all allocation rules where the di-
rect probabilization approach was suitable) and, therefore, our new
axioms are suitable for a formal categorization of allocation rules into
outside-option-sensitive and -insensitive ones. We show that our ax-
ioms are indeed satisfied by the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value,
the Wiese value, the χ-value, the Owen value and, as the only alloca-
tion rule in the setting of network structures, the graph-χ-value. We
briefly analyzed the explicit (numerical) structural effects of an out-
side option on allocation with respect to the outside-option-sensitive
allocation rules for coalition structres where we found that this ef-
fect is equal for the Shapley value and the Wiese value. We further
provide formal arguments for the claim of Belau [2010].
4.7 recap and outlook
Note that the probabilistic forecasting model we discussed in this
chapter in fact raises many more questions than “just” the formaliza-
tion of outside-option-sensitivity. Let us shortly recap our findings so
far: We have found experimental and theoretical support for outside
options and during the categorization by our outside-option-sensiti-
vity axioms we further found that there is only one outside-option-
sensitive allocation rule for network structures so far. Recall that the
network approach captures more information about the structure of
a society or economy than the coalition structure approach (cf. Chap-
ter 2). This motivates the analysis of this allocation rule and whether
there might be some drawbacks such that there is a need for another
outside-option-sensitive approach for networks. Before we can start
with such an analysis, we have to specify which potential drawbacks
might exist.
Let us take a brief look at the probabilistic model for network struc-
tures: As the model we analyzed in the beginning of this chapter, the
probabilistic model for network structures uses the likelihood of each
network structure that could possibly occur. Note that even if this
probabilistic model might look useful for forecasting issues at first
glance, it bears some general drawbacks in contrast to the probabilis-
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tic model for coalition structures. There is a huge difference between
the number of elements in ∆(PN) and
∆(GN) :=
p : GN → [0, 1], ∑
g∈GN
p(g) = 1
 ,
the set of all probability distributions over all possible networks g on
N: Let n := |N| be the number of players/nodes. It is quite known that
there exist n(n−1)2 possible (bilateral) links. From combinatorics we
further know that there exist
(
n
k
)
possibilities to choose k objects from
a set of n objects. Hence, to find the number of all possible networks,
we have to sum up the numbers of possible networks with k links for
k = 0, ..., n(n−1)2 . Therefore, the number of all possible networks is
n(n−1)
2∑
k=0
(n(n−1)
2
k
)
= 2
n(n−1)
2
The number of partitions of a set with n players is given by the nth
Bell number where the Bell numbers are defined recursively via
Bk+1 =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
Bk
with B0 = 0.4 Obviously, the nth Bell number is much smaller than
the corresponding number of all possible networks. To see that the
difference already occurs to be notable for a very small number of
agents, consider the situation for n = 4: Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let m
denote the number of connected components in a network. For pos-
sible partitions P = {P1, ...,Pm} and networks corresponding to each
m see Figures 11 and 12 in the appendix. While there are 15 possible
partitions in the case of n = 4, the number of possible networks al-
ready reaches 64, that is, more than 4 times the number of partitions.
Most probably, beliefs of subjects will not be sufficiently detailed to
actually form a probability distribution over all possible networks,
therefore, the probabilistic approach seems not to be applicable for
forecasting and we would like to find another method.
4 As a reference, see sequence A000110 in the On-Line Encyclopedia of Integer Se-
quences (OEIS).
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As “One of the open problems in the theory of cooperative games
are power indices”5, this leads to the motivation of our first further
investigation
1. Can we find an allocation rule for (political) networks that is
both a power index and suitable for forecasting?
Calvo et al. [1999] introduced a generalized setting for networks con-
sidering the probability of each bilateral relation between agents where
the structure analyzed is seen as the result of independent relations.
Recall that, in contrast to that, Gómez et al. [2008] consider the like-
lihood of all possible networks because “the importance of removing
the independence assumption should not be underestimated”. This is
explained for example by incompatibilities: the presence of a certain
relation between persons, enterprises, or political parties can exclude
the possibility of a relation between one of them and a third actor
(Gómez et al., 2008, p. 540). A coalition between two parties might
exclude the possibility of a coalition between them and a third one
due to insuperable conflicts between this third party and one of the
first two. This brings us to a further question
2. Can we find an allocation rule for (political) networks that is
suitable in the presence of incompatibilities?
We will find such an allocation rule for the last two questions in Chap-
ter 5. Note that there is an important difference between this rule and
other power indices: The index we propose is link-based, that is, ac-
counts for links rather than whole nodes. Recall that we aimed to
further analyze the graph-χ-value and whether there might be some
drawbacks. In fact, the graph-χ-value is not link-based. As the index
we propose is not outside-option-sensitive, this leads to the the fol-
lowing question
3. Can we find a link-based allocation rule for (political) networks
that is outside-option-sensitive?
Recall that we analyzed the structural effects of outside options on
allocation for the allocation rules for coalition structures. Having in
mind the previous research question, the last question is obvious:
5 Gianfranco Gambarelli in the Plenary Session at the SING10 Conference, July 2014
over the Special Issue of the International Game Theory Review, also see for example
Bertini et al. [2013].
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4. Is there a difference in structural effects of outside options on
link-based allocation compared to player-based allocation?
We will find a link-based allocation rule that is outside-option-sensitive
and an extension for political networks (i. e., suitable for incompatibil-
ities) in Chapter 6. There, we will further discuss the outside-option-
sensitivity axioms and find that the structural effect of outside op-
tions on allocation is indeed more complex for link-based allocation
rules than for player-based ones. This leads to the explanation why
our “weak” axiom might not be that weak and our “normal axiom”
might actually be sort of strong.
Part III
C E N T R A L I T Y A N D L I N K - B A S E D
VA L U E S

5
C E N T R A L I T Y A N D C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F
C O N N E C T I O N FA I L U R E
W E I G H T E D V O T I N G ( S T I L L ) D O E S N ’ T W O R K
Evidence on Outside Options
Forma-
lizing
Outside
Options
Networks
Outside-
Option-
Sensitivity
Position
Centrality
κ-value
5.1 introduction
In this chapter we address the first two questions raised in Chap-
ter 4, namely, whether we can find an allocation rule for networks
which can be used as a power index and is suitable in the presence
of incompatibilities. As we focus on networks, the analysis of cen-
trality of an agent within a network seems worthwile, especially for
the application to measure (relative) power. Before we connect this is-
sue with outside-option-sensitivity in Chapter 6, this chapter focuses
on connected networks (i. e., networks in which there exists a path
between any two agents) as in this case, outside options are absent.
This allows us to first analyze the centrality issue independently of
outside-option-sensitivity.
There is a large literature on centrality measures, mostly applied
for social networks, economic networks and also political networks.
Centrality is often used to identify top key nodes, those nodes in
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the network being most important for the network. But what means
important? Mostly, we mean importance for cohesion, that is, how cru-
cial or essential a node is for the network (or a set of nodes) to be
connected.1 A reasonable and convincing approach for the analysis
of importance for cohesion is the analysis of consequences of failure.
Application domains are for example energy networks or political
networks: consequenses of failure are capacity overloads or blackouts
for energy networks or a (partly or complete) breakdown of trading
routes/networks or an Economic and Monetary Union. These exam-
ples are of recent importance considering increasing blackout proba-
bilities due to outdated reactors as for example in France or the recent
nuclear phaseout decision in Germany.
While the existing literature on centrality only analyzes failure con-
sequences of whole nodes, already the failure of a certain connection
can seperate a whole network into pieces. The application of analyz-
ing failure consequences of connections seems even more relevant for
political or economic networks: oil pipelines can break (connection
failure) without a breakdown of the whole gas province (node fail-
ure), a bilateral trading agreement can be broken without a whole
country leaving the trading union, political parties can stop bilat-
eral coalitional negotiations due to imcompatibilities without leaving
the political spectrum or a country might stop monetary flows for
bail-out packages without leaving the European Union. Hence, con-
sequences of connection failure should be considered in a measure
for identifying top key nodes or (relative) coalitional power by means
of relative importance for cohesion of the whole.
Existing centrality measures either generally ignore the importance
of cohesion or bear other drawbacks. As an example, consider the fol-
lowing simple transit-country example: Imagine one wants to travel
from London, England (E) to Cologne, Germany (G) and has a fear of
flying and boats, hence, has to go by train. While London is connected
to Paris, France (F) by the Eurostar train and Paris and Cologne are
connected by the Thalys train, there is no direct train connection be-
tween England and Germany. Hence, France as a transit country con-
nects the boundary countries England and Germany. The situation
can be described by the train-network in Figure 5.
1 When talking about cohesion we basically refer to structural cohesion by means of
essentiality for connectedness of a network.
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Figure 5: Train Connections
E F G
Eurostar Thalys
Now, we are interested in the relative power of each country in this
train-network. The most popular centrality measures (measuring how
crucial a node is for connectedness) are Bonacich [1972]’s eigenvector
centrality or Freeman [1978]’s closeness, betweenness and degree mea-
sures. Centrality according to these approaches (normalized for com-
parability issues) is presented in Table 10.
Table 10: Centrality in the Train-Network
Country E F G
Eigenvector 29.29 41.42 29.29
Closeness 28.57 42.86 28.57
Betweenness 0 100 0
Degree 25.00 50.00 25.00
Eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1972) is based on the idea that rel-
ative power of a node depends to the relative power of the node’s
neighborhood and measures the influence of a node on the network
by analyzing eigenvalues of the corresponding adjacency matrix (this
idea is for example the basis of Google’s PageRank). Due to use of
the adjacency matrix, this approach accounts for connectedness of
the whole network. However, for the train example above we see that
this approach leads to relatively small distances between the relative
power of the boundary countries (England (E) and Germany (G)) and
the transit conutry (France (F)) which could be seen as unreasonable
in terms of failure consequences: remember that the transit country
connects the boundary countries and a failure would result in a com-
plete breakdown of the train-network.
The closeness measure counts the length of shortest paths, that is,
how many intermediate nodes have at least to be passed to get from
one node to another. As paths between any two nodes are considered,
also this measure accounts for connectedness of the whole network,
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but, as the eigenvector approach, the relative difference of centrali-
ties between the boundary countries and the transit country is very
small. Furthermore, the closeneness measure bears some problems
for weighted networks as the “length” of a shortest path is difficult to
measure correctly. For a further discussion on drawbacks of closeness,
also see Gómez et al. [2003].
Usually, the betweenness measure which counts how often a node
lies between any two other nodes on a shortest path is suggested to
be the most suitable measure for cohesion/connectedness. In the train
example we obtain a sort of an opposed problem to the cases before:
the boundary countries obtain no power at all and the whole power is
distributed to the transit country. One could argue that the boundary
countries do have some power as their existence actually “creates” the
transit country’s power: if a boundary country fails (i. e., leaves the
train network), the betweenness measure of the former transit country
becomes zero.2 These problems with the betweenness measure are
generally quite likely to occur in small networks or large networks
with a small number of connections. Note that our interest is more
on small than large networks.
The degree measure counts the number of direct connections of a
node and, beside generally demanding the lowest computational ef-
fort, in the example clearly differentiates between boundary and tran-
sit countries and accounts for the boundary countries creating the
transit country’s power. However, the degree measure only consid-
ers a node’s direct links and not the structure of the whole network,
that is, generally does not account for connectedness of the whole
network. This is unproblematic in the train example and one could
argue that in more complex networks this problem could be solved
by normalization, but this turns out not to be the case.3
Beside the aforementioned drawbacks, there is another general prob-
lem in the use of “classic” centrality measures: centrality measures
are independent of any characteristic function modelling the specific
situation (i. e., the underlying game) which makes them barely ap-
plicable for specific economic or political applications where the un-
2 As an alternative to the original betweenness measure, Freeman et al. [1991] suggest
a betweenness measure based on network flow. Still, in the example, the boundary
countries would obtain a centrality of zero.
3 Find an example of a simple communication network and a discussion on drawbacks
of the classic centrality measures for this case in the appendix.
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derlying game matters. Especially for the application as a power in-
dex for political networks, centrality measures are not affected by a
weighted voting game (modelling potential winning coalitions), that
is, generally not affected by differences in seat shares (or vote shares)
in a parliament.
Considering game theoretic approaches, there of course exist the
popular Shapley-Shubik-Power-Index (Shapley and Shubik, 1969) and
the Banzhaf-Power-Index (Banzhaf, 1952)4 which apply the Shapley
or Banzhaf value, respectively, to a majority game (weighted voting
game). However, these indices are not designed to account for cen-
trality as they do not consider any inner structure like a network.
Accounting for the network structure, one could apply the commu-
nication restricted Shapley value (known as the Myerson value, cf.
Myerson, 1977). Applied to the train example, power resulting from
these approaches is reported in Table 11 where we used the so-called
unanimity game with respect to whether England and Germany are
connected.
Table 11: Game Theoretic Approaches (uE,G) in the Train-Network
Country E F G
Shapley/Banzhaf 50.00 00.00 50.00
Myerson 33.33 33.33 33.33
We see that the Shapley- or Banzhaf-Power-Index, respectively, com-
pletely ignores the existence of the transit country while the Myerson
approach does not disinguish between boundary and transit coun-
tries at all.
There only exist few game theoretic investigations directly related
to network centrality. Existing approaches are for example Gómez
et al. [2003] or Suri and Narahari [2008] (using the Shapley value) or
Grofman and Owen [1982] (using the Banzhaf value). These measures
take into account consequences of failure by analyzing marginal con-
tributions, that is, the surplus a certain node creates when entering
a network (which could be seen as the negative of the failure of this
node for each coalition). The network structure is taken into account
4 The Banzhaf-Power-Index is also known as Banzhaf-Coleman index (cf. Coleman,
1971) or Penrose-Banzhaf index (cf. Penrose, 1946).
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by using functions for the underlying game which consider (shortest)
paths present in the network depending on the presence or absence
of a node. Note that these approaches account for centrality by fix-
ing the underlying game and hence, would also not be applicable
as power indices with respect to a weighted voting game. Further-
more, all these approaches analyze failure of a whole node with all
its connections while already the failure of one connection influences
(shortest) paths and even might split the whole network. We will
present a political example which shows that these game theoretic
approaches are not always suitable while the analysis of connection
failure solves this problem. Moreover, these approaches have no ex-
tension for weighted networks.
Even though not directly applied to the centrality issue, the Posi-
tion value (Meessen, 1988 and Borm et al., 1992) does account for the
relative importance of links (instead of nodes). Note that the original
characterization (Borm et al., 1992) indirectly includes the centrality
issue: in fact, the Position value is a generalization of Freeman’s de-
gree measure. Remember that the degree measure has provided the
most promising distribution of power in the train example. There
are different extensions of the Position value: Ghintran et al. [2012]
extend it to the probabilistic model (cf. Chapter 4), Ghintran [2013]
provides a version using weights based on the weighting scheme in-
troduced by Haeringer [2006] and Kamijo and Kongo [2009] provide
non-symmetric generalizations.5 However, all these approaches ap-
ply the Shapley value to measure the importance of a link. Remem-
ber that the Shapley approach uses different weights, depending on
the size of the coalitions for which a node or player creates surplus
when entering. This so-called “weighted voting” might be unreason-
able if for example incompatibilities between actors are present be-
cause then, weights are not relatively balanced anymore. Beside the
problem of incompatibilities, especially for an application of politi-
cal networks, Banzhaf [1952] generally argued that “Weighted voting
doesn’t work”: the Shapley weights could lead to implausible high or
low distribution of power.6
5 There also exist generalizations in the Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] framework of
networks as for example Kamijo [2009].
6 Also consider the communication network example in the appendix to see the dif-
ference between both approaches.
5.2 preliminaries 97
In this chapter, we suggest a new approach for (but not restricted
to) centrality: a new (axiomatically characterized) cooperative alloca-
tion rule for network structures which accounts for a node’s impor-
tance for connectedness of the network by the relative impact of its
connections. For this, we analyze consequences of link failure using
the Banzhaf value, generalized for a game which accounts for the
links of a network, the so-called arc game. We assign the correspond-
ing Banzhaf values to all links of the network to capture consequences
of failure, that is, the importance for cohesion/connectedness of con-
nections. Then, we apply the generalization of Freeman [1978]’s de-
gree measure for weighted networks to obtain the Banzhaf Position
value.
Moreover, we suggest an alternative centrality measure by means of
Bonacich [1972]’s eigenvector measure, the Shapley/Banzhaf-Eigenvector-
value, and a generalization to weighted networks by implementing
an emphasis parameter which allows regulating emphasis for impor-
tance for connectedness or centrality by means of political, economic
or social weights individually.
This chapter is organized as follows: the following section provides
definitions and notations, in Section 3 we define our new allocation
rule, the Banzhaf Position value, and provide axiomatic characteriza-
tions. Section 4 discusses properties and extensions. In Section 5 we
apply our approach to the case of the state parliament elections (Bür-
gerschaftswahl) 2001 in Hamburg, Germany to use our allocation rule
as a power index. We further provide an example where we use our
allocation rule as a centrality measure to identify top key nodes which
also discusses exclusiveness of links. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
5.2 preliminaries
Recall the framework of cooperative network structures. A TU-game
with a network structure (N, v,g) consists of a (non-empty and finite)
player set N = {1, ...,n}, a coalition function v ∈ VN := {v : 2N −→
R|v(∅) = 0} and a (binary) network structure (N,g) with nodes in N =
{1, ...,n} and a (binary) network g ⊆ {ij|i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}, that is, strength
of all links is equal and normalized to 1. Let GbN denote the set of all
binary networks g. Recall that nodes i and j, i 6= j, are called connected
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in the network g if there exists k ∈ N and a path ih1, ...,hkj ∈ g,
h1, ...,hk ∈ N and that the resulting connected components build a
partition on N denoted by C(N,g) where Ci is the component of all
players connected with player i ∈ N.
A TU-game is called simple if v(K) ∈ {0, 1} for all K ⊆ N and is called
zero-normalized if v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N. As every v ∈ VN can be zero-
normalized, we can restrict ourselves to the set of zero-normalized
games, that is, v ∈ V0N. Recall the definition of the link-game (or arc
game) in which the links in the network are the players:
vN : {g ′ ⊆ g} −→ R, vN(g ′) := vg ′(N) =
∑
S∈C(N,g ′)
v(S) ∀g ′ ⊆ g
where vg is the graph-restricted game and v is zero-normalized.
An allocation rule for (binary) network structures is a function Y : {N}×
VN×GbN −→ Rn, assigning payoffs Yi(N, v,g). Recall the definitions
of the Shapley value Sh and the Banzhaf value Ba, for all i ∈ N given
by
Shi(N, v) =
∑
K⊆N\{i}
|K|!(|N|− 1− |K|)!
|N|!
[v(K∪ {i}) − v(K)]
Bai(N, v) =
∑
K⊆N\{i}
1
2|N|−1
[v(K∪ {i}) − v(K)]
which are designed for TU-games without inner structure. In contrast,
recall the Position value pi, for all i ∈ N given by
pii(N, v,g) =
∑
λ∈gi
1
2
Shλ(g, vN).
The Position value takes into account the role of links in which a
player is (directly) involved.
For normalization issues, we will now introduce a new version of
feasibility, designed for network structures.
Definition 5.1 (Feasibility in network structures). An allocation rule
for network structures Y(N, v,g) is called feasible if
∑
i∈N
Yi 6
∑
C∈C(N,g)
v(C).
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In the commonly used definition of feasiblity, the literature uses
v(N) instead of
∑
C∈C(N,g)
v(C). But the use of v(N) is only suitable
if the cooperative game has no inner structure or if g is connected,
because only then
∑
C∈C(N,g)
v(C) = v(N) holds for sure.
In order no model potential differences between the links (for ex-
ample different strengths), we use weighted graphs:
Definition 5.2 (Weighted Network Structure). A weighted (social, eco-
nomic or political) network g(N,w) is a binary network g endowed
with a weight wij for every link ij ∈ g. If wij = 0, we could inter-
pret the “dummy link” ij as not existing in network g. Hence, a binary
network corresponds to a weighted network with weights being 0 or
1. Let GwN denote the set of all weighted networks g(N,w). Note that
GbN ⊂ GwN. Then, a weighted network structure is a tuple (N,g,w).
Independently of an underlying game, centrality measures are used
as sort of allocation rules on binary or weighted network structures.
Definition 5.3 (Centrality Measure). A centrality measure is a func-
tion C : GwN −→ Rn which assigns an index to every node depending
on how “central” this node is in network g.
Most centrality measures are originally designed for binary net-
works and later generalized to weighted ones. The most popular cen-
trality measures for binary networks are Freeman’s centrality mea-
sures (Freeman, 1978). The first (and simplest) one is the degree mea-
sure which has been extended for weighted networks by Barrat et al.
[2004], Newman [2004] and Opsahl et al. [2008]:
Definition 5.4 ((generalized) Degree Measure). The (generalized) de-
gree measure Cd for weighted network g(N,w) is for every i ∈ N
given by
Cdi (g(N,w)) =
∑
j∈N\{i},
ij∈g
wij.
The degree measure for binary networks counts the number of di-
rect connections and in case of weighted networks, the weights of
those connections are summed up.
As we do not explicitly analyze the other classic centrality mea-
sures, we will only provide a brief, less formal overview. Formal
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definitions are provided in the appendix. Freeman’s closeness and be-
tweenness are designed by so-called shortest paths: A (binary) shortest
path between node i and j, i 6= j, is defined by the minimal number
of links that have to passed from i to j. Closeness is measured by the
lengths of the shortest paths from a node to all other nodes (close-
ness to other nodes) while betweenness counts how often a node lies
on a shortest paths between two other nodes (betweenness of nodes)
relative to all shortest paths.
Beside Freeman’s centrality measures, Bonacich [1972] introduces
the Eigenvetor centrality. The idea of this approach is that the central-
ity of a node should be proportional to the centralities of the node’s
neighbors. Formally, the Eigenvector centrality of a node i is given
by the i’s entry of the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigen-
value of g’ adjacency matrix.
Closeness and Betweenness have been extended to weighted net-
works by Brandes [2001] and Newman [2001] using fastest paths. Note
that Eigenvector centrality is originally applicable for weighted net-
works due to the use of the adjacency matrix.
5.3 the banzhaf position value
5.3.1 Derivation and Definition
We will now relate the issue of relative importance of links to the
centrality measures. For this, we consider the train example from the
introduction in a more formal way:
Example 5.1 (Transit Countries, Centrality and the Position value).
Let N = {England (E), France (F) , Germany (G)} and consider again
the train-network with links Eurostar:= {EF} and Thalys:= {FG}. The
E F G
Eurostar Thalys
degree measure distributes 1 to England and Germany and 2 to France
as France has twice as many connections as the other two countries.
Now let v(K) = 1 if K = N and v(K) = 0 otherwise. Both links are
needed to create worth and Eurostar is needed as much as Thalys, that
is, they are symmetric in the link-game. Hence, they both obtain half
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of the worth: ShEurostar = ShThalys = 12 . The Position value assigns to
every country half of the payoff of every link it is involved in, hence,
piE =
1
2ShEurostar =
1
4 , piF =
1
2ShEurostar +
1
2ShThalys =
1
2 and piG =
1
2ShThalys =
1
4 . Note that this is proportional to the degree measure.
The motivation for the use of degree centrality is that France is more
central by means of trade, travel, ect. The motivation for the Position
value by means of the cooperative game is that France is “needed
more” to create the worth. Both ideas use that France, as a transit coun-
try, connects the three countries and hence, its position in the network
is stronger which comes through the fact that it is involved in more
links than the other two countries.
In fact, the Position value is a generalization of the degree measure.
To see this, we will first generally introduce how we combine the
cooperative approach with the centrality approach.
Let g be a (binary) network. For the moment, we will only consider
connected networks (where outside options are absent). Note that
this especially excludes empty networks (i. e., networks where there
do not exist any connections) which is important for normalizations.
Let v ∈ V0N be any coalition function.7
Transformation 5.1. Define a new weighted network g(N, w˜(v, Y))
(Y = Sh or Y = Ba) with
w˜ij(v,Sh) := Shij(g, vN) or
w˜ij(v,Ba) := Baij(g, vN), respectively
Now we apply the generalized degree measure:
Definition 5.5 (Shapley/Banzhaf-Degree-value). For any v ∈ V0N and
every network g ⊆ gN, the Shapley-Degree-valueCDSh and the Banzhaf-
Degree-value CDBa are given by
CDYi (g, v) : = C
d
i (g(N, w˜(v, Y))) =
∑
j∈N\{i}
w˜ij(v, Y)
where Y = Sh or Y = Ba, respectively.
7 If one is only interested in a centrality measure, v should only account for connect-
edness of the network or a set of nodes. As a simple example one could consider
the unanimity games where the corresponding T ⊆ N represents the set of essential
nodes.
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For comparability (and in order to define a feasible/efficient allo-
cation rule), we can normalize the values. This is unproblematic in
terms of axiomatic justification in our applications as we are mainly
interested in ranks and relative distances (cf. Remark 2.6). Here, we
follow the multiplicative efficient normalization approach used for nor-
malization of the Banzhaf value due to Dubey and Shapley [1979]8
and normalize by multiplication with the scaling factor
v(N)∑
j∈N
CDYj (g, vN)
while one could also use the additive efficient normalization approach
used for the additive normalized Banzhaf value introduced by Ham-
mer and Holzman [1992] which we find less applicable.9
Corollary 5.1 (Relation to the Position value). The normalized Shapley-
Degree-value coincides with the Position value.
Proof. Generally, it holds that
∑
j∈N
CDYj (g, v
N) =
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈N\{j}
w˜λ(v, Y)
= 2·
∑
λ∈g
w˜λ(v, Y) = 2·
∑
λ∈g
Yλ(gb, vN).
For Y = Sh we have
∑
λ∈g
Yλ(gb, vN) = v(N), hence, the multiplicative
scaling factor becomes 1/2 in this case.
Remark 5.1 (Shapley Position value). Due to Corollary 5.1 and to high-
light the difference between the use of either the Banzhaf or the Shap-
ley value, we will use the notion “(Shapley) Position value” instead of
Position value throughout this chapter.
Remark 5.2 (Relation to Closeness and Betweenness). Our transfor-
mation uses the corresponding Shapley/Banzhaf value of links, that
is, we calculate how important a certain connection is for the cohesion
of a network. This is done by taking into account all other connections
8 An axiomatization of the multiplicative normalized Banzhaf value is for example
proposed by van den Brink and van der Laan [1998].
9 Here, we would add the factor
v(N)−
∑
j∈N
CDYj (g,v
N)
|N|
. An axiomatization of the addi-
tive normalized Banzhaf value is for example proposed by Ruiz et al. [1996].
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of the network, hence, these values capture the idea of (relative) neces-
sity of connections which is the basic idea of betweenness. Taking into
account the actual value captures the idea of closeness. Hence, one
could argue that the Degree-values are sufficient as the position be-
tween other nodes and relative necessity are captured by the weights
for importance of cohesion.
However, applying closeness and betweenness can be done analo-
gously using the transformation above and the corresponding gener-
alized measures for weighted networks. Eigenvector centrality can be
applyed directly using the transformation above. For completeness
we provide the formal definitions in the appendix.
We will continue by providing axiomatic characterizations of the
Banzhaf-Degree-value for binary networks. For motivating issues, we
focused on connected networks. However, the following axioms and
characterizations are defined and hold for general ones. In line with
Corollary 5.1 and Remark 5.1, we define
Definition 5.6 (Banzhaf Position value). For any TU-game with a net-
work structure (N, v,g), the Banzhaf Position value piBa is given by
piBa(N, v,g)i :=
∑
λ∈gi
1
2
Baλ(g, vN).
To be precise, the Banzhaf Position value is the Banzhaf-Degree-
value scaled by factor 1/2.
Remark 5.3 (Link-Based and Player-Based Values). Beside the differ-
ence in outside-option-sensitivity discussed and analyzed in Chapter
4, there is another notable difference between cooperative allocation
rules we did not formally denote so far. Remember that we are inter-
ested in consequences of link failure (rather than node failure) in this
chapter. Allocation rules accounting for consequences of link failure
are also know as link-based values and allocation rules accounting for
consequences of node failure are also known as player-based values.
Note that the Position values (and its variants as given in the intro-
duction of this chapter) are link-based while all other allocation rules
analyzed in this thesis so far are player-based.
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5.3.2 Axiomatization on Cycle-Free Networks
We will first provide an axiomatization of the Banzhaf Position value
which is closely related to the original axiomatization of the Shapley
value by Shapley [1953]. Recall that the Shapley value is characterized
by Additivity A, Efficiency E, Symmetry S and the Null Player Axiom
N (cf. Chapter 2). Unfortunately, this characterization only holds on
cycle-free networks and as Borm et al. [1992] for the (Shapley) Posi-
tion value, we are not able to find a “Shapley-like” characterization
for general networks.10
Definition 5.7 (Cycle-free Network). A network g is called cycle-free
if there exists at most one path between any two nodes.
Remark 5.4 (Relation to Graph-Theory: Trees and Forests). In graph
theory, a cycle-free connected subnetwork is called tree, a cycle-free
connected network (i. e., all nodes are connected) is called spanning
tree and cycle-free network which consists of connected subnetworks
is called forest.
We first introduce an axiom which could be seen as the “original
driving force” of the (Shapley) Position value (cf. Borm et al., 1992)
and shows the relation to the degree measure (even though this had
never been an application)11:
Axiom 5.1 (Degree Property (DEG)). A game (N, v,g) is called link
anonymous if ∃ f : {0, 1, ..., |g|} −→ R such that vN(g ′) = f(|g ′|) for all
g ′ ⊆ g. An allocation rule for network structures satisfies the Degree
Property DEG if for all link anonymous games (N, v,g) there exists
α ∈ R such that
Y(N, v,g) = α ·Cd(g).
In a link anonymous game, we have vN(g ′ \ λ) = vN(g ′ \ λ ′) for
all λ, λ ′ ∈ g ′ ⊆ g, hence, all links provide the same marginal contri-
10 van den Nouweland and Slikker [2012] show that such a Shapley-like characteriza-
tion indeed generally holds for superadditive coalition functions within the frame-
work of Jackson and Wolinsky [1996]. Note that this framework explicitly differs
from the framework of communication situations we use in this thesis such that
findings cannot be transferred. Furthermore, superadditivity is quite a restrictive
property, especially for political applications and in presence of incompatibilities.
11 This axiom is also know as arc anonymity, see for example van den Nouweland [1993]
for the framework of communication structures, or link anonymity, van den Nouwe-
land and Slikker [2012] for the framework due to Jackson and Wolinsky, which might
be more convincing terms if no relation to centrality is of interest. We stick to the
original term due to Borm et al. [1992] to emphasize this relation.
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butions and are therefore equally important within the network. One
could argue that in this case, the strength of a node should be mea-
sured by its degree. If an allocation rule is used for centrality issues,
DEG seems a favourable axiom.
Remark 5.5 (The Degree Property and Symmetry). Note that DEG is
closely related to S (players that are not distinguishable but by name
should obtain the same payoff), but in the context of a link-based
value (instead of a player-based one as the Shapley value). In a link
anonymous game, only the size of subnetworks matters, independently
of the inner structure. Hence, in this case, players can only be distin-
guished by the number of their links and DEG implies that players
with the same number of links should be treated equally in the alloca-
tion of worth.
Example 5.2. Consider N = {1, 2, 3}, g = {13, 23} and the unanimity
game u{1,2}. Note that for
f : {0, 1, 2, 3} −→ R, f(x) :=
1, if x = 3
0, else
it holds that uN
{1,2}(g
′) = f(|g ′|) for all g ′ ⊆ g, that is, (N, v,g) is link
anonymous. For the Shapley value, the multiplicative efficient normal-
ized Banzhaf value and the Myerson value we get
Sh(N, v) = (
1
2
,
1
2
, 0) = Ba(N, v),µ(N, v,g) = (
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
while the degree measure is given by Cd(g) = (1, 1, 2), hence, DEG is
not satisfied by the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value and the Myerson
value.
On the other hand, the (Shapley) Position value and the Banzhaf Posi-
tion value are given by
piSh(N, v,g) = (
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
2
),piBa(N, v,g) = (
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
4
).
that is, they are proportional to the degree measure.
Borm et al. [1992] show that the (Shapley) Position value satisfies
DEG.
Lemma 5.1. The Banzhaf Position value satisfies DEG.
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Proof. Let (N, v,g) be link anonymous, that is, there exists a function
f : {0, 1, ..., |g|} −→ R such that f(|g ′|) = vN(g ′) for all g ′ ⊆ g. For
g = ∅, we have piBai (N, v,g) = 0 = Cd(g). Let g 6= ∅ and λ ∈ g.
Baλ(g, vN) =
1
2|g|−1
∑
g ′⊆g\λ
(
vN(g ′ ∪ λ) − vN(g ′))
=
1
2|g|−1
|g\λ|∑
i=0
∑
g ′⊆g\λ
|g ′|=i
(f(i+ 1) − f(i))
=
1
2|g|−1
|g|−1∑
i=0
(
|g|− 1
i
)
(f(i+ 1) − f(i))︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=A∈R independent of λ
⇒ piBai (N, v,g) =
∑
λ∈gi
A
2|g|
=
A
2|g|
|gi| =
A
2|g|︸︷︷︸
:=α∈R
Cd(g)
The next axiom is used to characterize the (Shapley) Position value
on cycle-free networks (cf. Borm et al., 1992).
Axiom 5.2 (Superfluous Link Property (SLP)). A link λ is called super-
fluous if vN(g ′ ∪ λ) = vN(g ′) for all g ′ ⊆ g, that is, if λ is a Nullplayer
in (g, vN). An allocation rule for network structures Y satisfies the Su-
perfluous Link Property SLP if Y(n, v,g) = Y(N, v,g \ λ) for all super-
fluous links λ.
Remark 5.6 (The Superfluous Link Property and the Null Player Ax-
iom). Note that SLP is closely related to N (a null player, that is, a
player that never creates any surplus, should obtain a payoff of zero).
In the framework of network structures, a player can be seen as a Null
player if all her links are superfluous and in this case SFL implies a
payoff of zero.
Borm et al. [1992] show that, on cycle-free networks, the (Shapley)
Position value is uniquely determined by DEG, SLP, A and CE.12
As a difference to the (Shapley) Position value, the Banzhaf Position
value does not satisfy component efficiency CE. Hence, we need a
new axiom to close the emerging gap.
12 cf. Chapter 2 for CE
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Recall that the Banzhaf value has originally been defined for simple
games: If v ∈ VN is simple, the Banzhaf value is given by
Bai(N, v) =
# of swings for i
# of potential swings for i
=
# of swings for i
2|N|−1
where K ⊆ N is a swing for i iff v(K ∪ {i}) − v(K) = 1. As v is sim-
ple, a swing can be seen as coalition where player i is crucial for to
become a winning coalition when joining. Hence, the basic idea of
the Banzhaf value (used as a power measure) is that the worth of an
agent is given by the number of this agent’s swings (i. e., the number
of coalitions this agent is crucial for to become a winning coalition
when joining) relative to the number of potential swings (i. e., the
numer of coalitions the agent is potentially crucial for to become a
winning coalition when joining which equals the numer of possible
coalitions without the agent). This is the agent’s relative power. Com-
bining this intuition with the idea of CE (productive units observe
the worth created) and our aim of considering power of links rather
than nodes, one could argue that the worth of a component should be
equal to the relative power of this component, that is, the sum of all
swings within this component relative to all potential swings within
the component.
In other words, for an allocation rule Y and v being simple we
should have
∑
i∈C
Yi(N, v,g) =
#of all subnetworks a link in C is crucial
for becoming a winning subnetwork
# of all subnetworks a link in C is potentially
crucial for becoming a winning subnetwork
=
# all link-swings within a component
# of potential link-swings in the component
=
∑
λ∈g|C
# of swings for λ
# of potential swings for λ in g|C
=
1
2|g|C|−1
∑
λ∈g|C
# of swings for λ.
For general games, swings are generalized by marginal contributions,
hence, counting link-swings can be generalized by marginal contribu-
tions in the arc game. This leads to the following axiom:
108 centrality and consequences of connection failure
Axiom 5.3 (Component Link Banzhaf Efficiency (CLBE)). An alloca-
tion rule for network structures Y satisfies Component Link Banzhaf
Efficiency CLBE if we have for all C ∈ C(N,g):
∑
i∈C
Yi(N, v,g) =
∑
λ∈g|C
Baλ(g|C, vN|C).
CLBE could be interpreted as follows: the worth of a component
is equal to the relative link-power of this component, that is, relative
power measured by the links (contributions of links relative to their
potential contributions). For connected networks, this is in the same
spirit as Banzhaf Efficiency, the crucial axiom of the characterization of
the Banzhaf value, just with respect to link contributions.
Theorem 5.1. The Banzhaf Position value is uniquely determined by
A, DEG, SLP and CLBE for all cycle-free networks.
Proof. Existence: A is clear and DEG has been shown in Lemma 5.1.
SLP: Let λ be superfluous in game (N, v). By the Banzhaf value satisfy-
ing the Nullplayer axiom, we then have Baλ(g, vN) = 0. For ν 6= λ ∈ g
we have
Baν(g, vN) =
1
2|g|−1
∑
g ′⊆g\ν
[
vN(g ′ ∪ ν) − vN(g ′)]
=
1
2|g|−1
 ∑
g ′⊆g\ν
λ∈g ′
[
vN(g ′ ∪ ν) − vN(g ′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=vN((g ′\λ)∪ν)−vN(g ′\λ)
+
∑
g ′⊆(g\λ)\ν
[
vN(g ′ ∪ ν) − vN(g ′)]

=
2
2|g|−1
∑
g ′⊆(g\λ)\ν
[
vN(g ′ ∪ ν) − vN(g ′)]
= Baν(g \ λ, vN)
and hence, piBa(N, v,g) = piBa(N, v,g \ λ).
CLBE: Let C ∈ C(N,g).
∑
i∈C
piBai (N, v,g) =
∑
i∈C
∑
λ∈gi
1
2
1
2|g|−1
∑
g ′⊆g\λ
(
vN(g ′ ∪ λ) − vN(g ′))
=
∑
λ∈g|C
1
2|g|−1
∑
g ′⊆g\λ
(
vN(g ′ ∪ λ) − vN(g ′))
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=
∑
λ∈g|C
1
2|g|−1
∑
g ′⊆g\λ
[
vN((g ′ ∩ g|C)∪ λ) − vN(g ′ ∩ g|C)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
for λ∈g|C, marginal contributions are
not effected by connections outside C
=
∑
λ∈g|C
1
2|g|−1
∑
g ′⊆g\λ
[
vN(g ′|C∪ λ) − vN(g ′|C)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
the same for all g ′,g ′′⊆g\λ
such that g ′|C=g ′′|C
=
∑
λ∈g|C
1
2|g|−1
∑
g˜⊆(g|C)\λ
2|g|N\C|
[
vN(g˜∪ λ) − vN(g˜)]
|g|=|g|N\C|+|g|C|
=
∑
λ∈g|C
1
2|g|C|−1
∑
g˜⊆(g|C)\λ
[
vN(g˜∪ λ) − vN(g˜)]
=
∑
λ∈g|C
Baλ(g|C, vN|C)
Uniqueness13: Let Y satisfy A, DEG, SLP and CLBE and g be cycle
free. By A, it is sufficient to show that
Y(N,βuT ,g) = pi(N,βuT ,g)
for all β ∈ R and T ∈ 2N such that |T | > 2. Let such β, T be arbitrary
but fixed.
Case 1: @ C ∈ G(N,g) such that T ⊆ C.
That is, there exist i, j ∈ T being unconnected in g and hence, βuNT (g ′) =
0 for all g ′ ⊆ g. Therefore, Baλ(g,βuT ) = 0 for all λ ∈ g and
piBai (N,βuT ,g) = 0 for all i ∈ N.
On the other hand, if βuT (g ′) = 0 for all g ′ ⊆ g, every λ ∈ g is
superfluous, and hence, by SLP, we have Y(N,βuT ,g) = Y(N,βuT ,g\
λ1) = Y(N,βuT ,g \ {λ1, λ2}) = ... = Y(N,βuT , ∅).
Trivially, the game (N,βut, ∅) is link anonymous and hence, by DEG,
there exists α ∈ R such that
Yi(N,βuT ,g) = Yi(N,βut, ∅) = α ·Cdi (∅) = 0 ∀ i ∈ N
⇒Y(N,βuT ,g) = piBa(N,βuT ,g)
13 We follow the idea of the proof for the (Shapley) Position value of Borm et al. [1992].
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Case 2: ∃ C ∈ G(N,g) such that T ⊆ C.
Consider the (unique) connected hull (cf. Owen, 1986) of T , H(T), given
by
H(T) :=
⋂
{S|T ⊆ S ⊆ C such that g|S is connected subgraph}
As g is cycle-free, H(T) is the minimal set of nodes that are essential
to connect T . Note that cycle-freeness is essential here: if there is more
than one path connecting T , the intersection is empty on the disjoint
parts of the connecting paths. We have
βuNT (g
′) =
β , if g|H(T) ⊆ g
′
0 , otherwise
If λ /∈ g|H(T), we have Baλ(g,βuNT ) = 0. For λ ∈ g|H(T), we have
Baλ(g,βuNT ) =
1
2|g|−1
∑
g ′⊆g\λ
(
βuNT (g
′ ∪ λ) −βuNT (g ′)
)
cf. existence CLBE
=
1
2|g|H(T)|−1
∑
g ′⊆g|H(T)\λ
(
βuNT (g
′ ∪ λ) −βuNT (g ′)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=

β , if g ′ = g|H(T) \ λ
0 , otherwise
=
β
2|g|H(T)|−1
and therefore, it holds that
Baλ(g,βuNT ) =

β
2
|g|H(T)|−1
, if λ ∈ g|H(T)
0 , otherwise
= Baλ(g|C,βuNT )
= Baλ(g|H(T),βu
N
T )
⇒ piBai (N,βuT ,g) =
∑
λ∈gi∩g|H(T)
1
2
· β
2|g|H(T)|−1
=
|gi|H(T)| ·β
2|g|H(T)|
=
β
2|g|H(T)|
·Cdi (g|H(T))
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On the other hand, all links λ /∈ g|H(T) are superfluous in (N,βuT ),
hence, by SLP, Y(N,βuT ,g) = Y(N,βuT ,g|H(T)).
The game (N,βuT ,g|H(T)) is link anonymous (all links have the same
number of swings, namely, one) with
f : {0, 1, ..., |g|H(T)|} −→ R, f(x) :=
β , if x = |g|H(T)|
0 , otherwise
hence, by DEG, there exists α ∈ R such that
Yi(N,βuT ,g)
SLP
= Yi(N,βuT ,g|H(T))
DEG
= α ·Cdi (g|H(T)) (∗)
It directly follows that
Yi(N,βuT ,g) = 0 ∀ i ∈ N \H(T) (∗∗)
By (∗∗) and CLBE, we have
∑
i∈H(T)
Yi(N,βuT ,g)
(∗∗)
=
∑
i∈C
Yi(N,βuT ,g)
CLBE
=
∑
λ∈g|C
Baλ(g|C,βuNT )
=
∑
λ∈g|H(T)
β
2|g|H(T)|−1
=
|g|H(T)| ·β
2|g|H(T)|−1
On the other hand, by (∗), we have
∑
i∈C
Yi(N,βuT ,g) = α
∑
i∈C
Cdi (g|H(T)) = α · 2 · |g|H(T)|
Combining this, we get
α · 2 · |g|H(T)| =
|g|H(T)| ·β
2|g|H(T)|−1
⇔ α = β
2|g|H(T)|
and hence
Yi(N,βuT ,g) =
β
2|g|H(T)|
Cdi (g|H(T)) = pi
Ba
i (N,βuT ,g)
which finishes the proof.
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Remark 5.7. On cycle-free networks the following holds:
1. The Harsanyi-dividend representation of piBa is
piBai (N, v,g) =
∑
T⊆2N\{∅}
λT (v)
2|g|H(T)|
Cdi (g|H(T)),
where λT (v) is the Harsanyi dividend of v corresponding to T . Hence,
the Banzhaf Position value is given by the degree measures of the con-
nected hulls of v’s basis representations, weighted accordingly.
2. The (multiplicative efficient) normalized Banzhaf Position value of
any unanimity game is given by
piBai (N,βuT ,g) :=
piBai (N,βuT ,g)∑
j∈N
piBaj (N,βuT ,g)
· v(N) = |gi|H(T)|
2 · |g|H(T)|
·β
which coincides with the (Shapley) Position value pi(Sh)i (N,βuT ,g).
This is due to the fact, that on cycle-free networks, only the connected
hull matters and there, all links are equally important.
5.3.3 General Axiomatization
As mentioned before, there is no “Shapley-like” axiomatization of
the (Shapley) Position value for general networks. For a general ax-
iomatization of the Banzhaf Position value we make use of an axiom
which, together with CE, characterizes the (Shapley) Position value
for general networks (Slikker, 2005): An allocation rule for network
structures Y satisfies Balanced Link Contributions BLC if we have for
all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and v ∈ V0N:∑
λ∈gj
[Yi(N, v,g) − Yi(N, v,g \ λ)] =
∑
λ∈gi
[
Yj(N, v,g) − Yj(N, v,g \ λ)
]
.
BLC states that the total threat of a player towards another player
should be equal to the reverse total threat. Using BLC, we find the
following general characterization of the Banzhaf Position value:
Theorem 5.2. The Banzhaf Position value piBa is uniquely determined
by BLC and CLBE.
Proof. Existence: We have already shown that piBa satisfies CLBE.
To see BLC, we follow Slikker [2005], who states that there exists a
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unique linear combination of link-unanimity games which represents
any link game vN : 2|g| −→ R: for any vN exist βg ′ , g ′ ⊆ g, such that
vN(g˜) =
∑
g ′⊆g
βg ′u
N
g ′(g˜).
For (g,βg ′uNg ′) we get
Baλ(g,βg ′uNg ′) =

βg ′
2|g
′|−1 , if λ ∈ g ′
0 , if λ /∈ g ′
and using this, we have
piBai (N, v,g) =
∑
λ∈gi
1
2
Baλ(g, vN)
Ba satisfies A
=
∑
λ∈gi
1
2
∑
g ′⊆g
Baλ(g,βg ′uNg ′)
=
∑
g ′⊆g
∑
λ∈gi
1
2
Baλ(g,βg ′uNg ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=

βg ′
2|g
′|−1 , if λ ∈ g ′ ∩ gi
0, if λ /∈ g ′ ∩ gi
=
∑
g ′⊆g
∑
λ∈g ′i
βg ′
2|g
′| =
∑
g ′⊆g
βg ′
|g ′i|
2|g
′|
and therefore
∑
λ∈gj
[
piBai (N, v,g) − pi
Ba
i (N, v,g \ λ)
]
=
∑
λ∈gj
∑
g ′⊆g
βg ′
|g ′i|
2|g
′| −
∑
g ′⊆g\λ
βg ′
|g ′i|
2|g
′|

=
∑
λ∈gj
∑
g ′⊆g
λ∈g ′
βg ′
|g ′i|
2|g
′| =
∑
g ′⊆g
∑
λ∈g ′j
βg ′
|g ′i|
2|g
′|
=
∑
g ′⊆g
βg ′
|g ′j| · |g ′i|
2|g
′|
backwards
=
∑
λ∈gi
[
piBaj (N, v,g) − pi
Ba
j (N, v,g \ λ)
]
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for all i ∈ N.
Uniqueness: Suppose Y,W being two allocation rules satisfying BLC
and CLBE. We proceed by induction over |g|.
Induction basis [IB]: For |g| = 0, that is, g = {∅}, we have that C(N,g) =
{i}i∈N and hence, by CLBE, we have
Yi(N, v,g) =
∑
i∈C
Yi(N, v,g) =
∑
λ∈{∅}
Baλ(g, vN) = 0
=
∑
i∈C
Wi(N, v,g) =Wi(N, v,g).
Now suppose that Y(N, v,g) = W(N, v,g) for all g such that |g| = k,
k > 0 (induction hypothesis [IH]).
Consider g such that |g| = k+ 1. As k+ 1 > 1, there exists i, j ∈ N,
i 6= j such that j ∈ Ci(N,g) (for all l with |Cl(N,g)| = 1, we have
Yl(N, v,g) = Wl(N, v,g) by CLBE). By BLC, we have for all i, j ∈
Ci(N,g):∑
λ∈gj
Yi(N, v,g) −
∑
λ∈gi
Yj(N, v,g)
BLC
=
∑
λ∈gj
Yi(N, v,g \ λ) −
∑
λ∈gi
Yj(N, v,g \ λ)
[IH]
=
∑
λ∈gj
Wi(N, v,g \ λ) −
∑
λ∈gi
Wj(N, v,g \ λ)
BLC
=
∑
λ∈gj
Wi(N, v,g) −
∑
λ∈gi
Wj(N, v,g)
and hence
|gj|Yi(N, v,g) − |gi|Yj(N, v,g) = |gj|Wi(N, v,g) − |gi|Wj(N, v,g) (6)
Summing up (6) over all j ∈ C yields:
∑
j∈C
[
|gj|Yi(N, v,g) − |gi|Yj(N, v,g)
]
=
∑
j∈C
[
|gj|Wi(N, v,g) − |gi|Wj(N, v,g)
]
⇔Yi(N, v,g)
∑
j∈C
|gj|︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=A(j)>0
by |Ci|>1
−|gi|
∑
j∈C
Yj(N, v,g)
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=Wi(N, v,g)
∑
j∈C
|gj|︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=A(j)>0
by |Ci|>1
−|gi|
∑
j∈C
Wj(N, v,g)
CLBE⇒ A(j) · Yi(N, v,g) − |gi|
∑
λ∈g|C
Baλ(g|C, vN|C)
= A(j) ·Wi(N, v,g) − |gi|
∑
λ∈g|C
Baλ(g|C, vN|C)
⇔Yi(N, v,g) =Wi(N, v,g) ∀ i ∈ N
which finishes the proof.
Remark 5.8 (Shapley vs. Banzhaf Positions). The main difference be-
tween the (Shapley) Position value and the Banzhaf Position value is
how a certain position is actually valued. While the Shapley approach
weights swings with respect to their “strength”, the Banzhaf approach
weights swings equally. The use of one or the other approach depends
on the application domain and whether “weighted voting” is of inter-
est: on the one hand, if differences in the strength of outcome matter,
different weights might be more appropriate while on the other hand,
“weighted voting” can lead to unreasonable allocations and is some-
times not applicable at all, especially in political applications with in-
compatibilities as in the political example in the applications section.
5.4 consequences for outside-option-sensitivity, prop-
erties and extensions
In this section we will discuss properties of the Position values and
and provide an extension of our approach to weighted networks and
briefly discuss the eigenvector approach.
However uniquely characterizing the Position values on cycle-free
networks only, all axioms but CLBE in Theorem 5.1 are generally
satisfied by both Position values. Let us take a more detailed look on
the crucial axioms in this axiomatization (remember that A is usually
satisfied by allocation rules): Degree Property DEG: A game (N, v,g)
is called link anonymous if ∃ f : {0, 1, ..., |g|} −→ R such that vN(g ′) =
f(|g ′|) for all g ′ ⊆ g. An allocation rule for network structures satisfies
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the DEG if for all link anonymous games (N, v,g) there exists α ∈ R
such that
Y(N, v,g) = α ·Cd(g).
Remark 5.9 (Degree Property and Outside-Option-Sensitivity). Note
that link anonymity of a TU-game with a network structure (N, v,g)
does not imply link anonymity of the corresponding game using the
lower outside option graph (N, v,g(i)). Now consider a link anony-
mous (N, v,g) such that g consists of one connected component and
singletons and suppose there exists an outside option for a player
within the connected component. As DEG implies proportionality to
the degree measure of g which will not change if this outside option
is neutralized, DEG stands in contradiction to the outside-option-sen-
sitivity axioms WOOS and OOS.
Superfluous Link Property SLP: A link λ is called superfluous if
vN(g ′ ∪ λ) = vN(g ′) for all g ′ ⊆ g, that is, if λ is a Nullplayer in
(g, vN). An allocation rule for network structures Y satisfies the SLP
if Y(n, v,g) = Y(N, v,g \ λ) for all superfluous links λ.
Remark 5.10 (Superfluous Link Property and Outside-Option-Sensi-
tivity). If a link is superfluous in TU-game (N, v,g), its presence never
creates any surplus. However, such a superfluous link might be in-
volved in an outside option, that is, it might create a surplus in com-
bination with unmaterialized links of the lower outside option graph.
Hence, a link that is superfluous in (N, v,g) does not have to be su-
perfluous in the corresponding (N, v,g(i)). Furthermore, deleting a
superfluous link does not affect payoffs within a component but, as
deleting such a link possibly changes connected compomponents, the
resulting lower outside option graph differs. In other words, chang-
ing connected components might create outside options which have
not been present before. An outside-option-sensitive allocation rule is
however affected by all outside options, hence, SLP stands in contra-
diction to WOOS and OOS.
Note that the two previous remarks already show us that the Po-
sition values cannot be outside-option-sensitive. This will be further
analyzed in Chapter 6.
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We will now briefly discuss computational complexity for calculat-
ing the Banzhaf and Shapley weights needed for the Position values.
Taking the unanimity game of the grand coalition
uN(K) =
1 , if K = N
0 , otherwise
as a basis, the calculation is mainly about checking whether a subnet-
work is connected or not.
Theorem 5.3 (Computational Complexity of Weights). For v = uN,
computational complexity is at most
|g|·
|g|−1∑
k=|T |−1
(
|g|− 1
k
)
connectivity checks for the Banzhaf value and for the Shapley value it
is the same connectivity checks, just that for every “yes”-labeled item,
one number has to be stored.
Proof. In general, the computational effort for calculating the Shap-
ley or the Banzhaf value is high (at least P-complete) as it increases
disproportionately with the number of nodes in the network of in-
terest. But, as uNT is a simple game, the Shapley and the Banzhaf
value can be calculated via swings: g ′ ⊆ g \ {λ} is swing for λ ∈ g
iff uNT (g
′ ∪ λ) − uNT (g ′) = 1. For the Shapley value, swings have to
be weighted according to their cardinality, for the Banzhaf value, one
only has to count the total number of swings and devide this by the
number of potential swings, namely, 2|g|−1.
The effort of identifying swings in uNT further decreases as g
′ is
a swing for λ = ij iff T ⊆ G ∈ G(N,g ′ ∪ {ij}) while @G ∈ G(N,g ′)
with T ⊆ G. That is, iff g ′ ∪ {ij} connects T while g ′ does not. For all
λ ∈ g, there are 2|g|−1 subnetworks of g \ {λ}. Of interest are those of
the 2|g|−1 subnetworks, that do not connect the nodes in T but the
nodes will be connected when adding λ, that is, we can restrict the
analysis of the 2|g|−1 subnetworks to those with at least |T |− 1 links.
The number of subnetworks that have to be checked is at most:
|g|−1∑
k=0
(
|g|− 1
k
)
−
|T |−2∑
k=0
(
|g|− 1
k
)
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= 2|g|−1 −
|T |−2∑
k=0
(
|g|− 1
k
)
=
|g|−1∑
k=|T |−1
(
|g|− 1
k
)
It is well known that, unfortunately, there is no closed formula for
the number of all subsets of a certain set with cardinality greater than
some border. Note that the number of subnetworks of interest further
decreases as only those that include all nodes in T are of interest.
We end up with the fact that calculating the Shapley and the Banz-
haf value are counting problems: For the Banzhaf value, one has to
count for any λ ∈ g how many of the subnetworks of interest do not
connect T but will when adding λ. For the Shapley value, also the
cardinality of these subnetworks is of interest. Computational com-
plexity is at most checking
|g|
|g|−1∑
k=|T |−1
(
|g|− 1
k
)
networks, where a connectivity check (g ′ does not connect T but g ′ ∪
λ does: yes/no) is sufficient; for the Shapley value, one further has
to save the information about the cardinality of those g ′ with label
“yes”.
Remark 5.11 (NP-Hardness). Connectivity checks are made by depth-
first search algorithms. It is well known, that worst case performance
of a depth-first-search is O(|N|), that is, not NP-hard. However, the
number of connectivity checks needed might exceed polynomial or-
der.
Now we will suggest an extension of our approach for weighted
networks. Let g = g(N,w) be a weighted network. In this case, we
consider the corresponding binary network gb of g and combine the
new weights as defined for the binary transformation with the origi-
nal weights. For this, we need to match the size of the two different
weights. As numerical size of indices or weights does not change
ranks and relative distances, we normalize w as follows:
wij : =
wij∑
λ∈g
wλ
·
∑
λ∈g
Yλ(gb, vN), Y = Sh,Ba
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Note that for Y = Sh, this is normalization to v(N) as due to efficiency
of the Shapley value we have
∑
ij∈g
Shij(gb, vN) = vN(gb) = v(N)
where the latter follows from the fact that we assumed g to be con-
nected.
Transformation 5.2. Define the new weighted network g(N, w˜(v,α, Y))
(Y = Sh or Y = Ba) with
w˜ij(v,α,Sh) := αwij + (1−α)Shij(gb, vN) or
w˜ij(v,α,Ba) := αwij + (1−α)Baij(gb, vN), respectively
where α ∈ [0, 1]. We call α the emphasis parameter regulating the em-
phasis of social/economic/political weights and importance for cohe-
sion.
Note that
∑
λ∈g
w˜λ(v,α, Y) = α
∑
λ∈g
wλ + (1−α)
∑
λ∈g
Yλ(gb, vN) =
∑
λ∈g
Yλ(gb, vN)
Remark 5.12 (α for binary networks). Note that the definition of w˜ in
the case of binary networks coincides with the definition for weighted
networks for α = 0.
Now, Shapley/-Banzhaf-Centralities can be defined as in the binary
approach, just using w˜ij(v,α, Y) instead of w˜ij(v, Y).
Remark 5.13 (Relation to Freeman’s Centrality measures). For α =
1, the normalized Shapley/Banzhaf-Centrality-values coincide with
Freeman’s centrality measures.
Note that Freeman’s closeness and betweenness measures bear some
problems in application to weighted networks as the extension of
shortest paths by fastest or weighted shortest paths (see appendix) is
problematic as this concept has been originally designed for networks
in which weights represent costs. In cases where a “good” link has a
high weight instead of low costs, Brandes [2001] and Newman [2001]
invert weights to interpret them as costs. The potential problem is ob-
vious as the sum of fractions is not equal to the sum of the denomina-
tors. However, this problem does not arise for Bonacich’s eigenvector
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approach. Therefore, it might be of interest, at least for the application
section, to consider this approach as well.
Definition 5.8 (Shapley/Banzhaf-Eigenvector-value). For every net-
work g, the Shapley-Eigenvector-valueCEVSh and the Banzhaf-Eigen-
vector-value CEVBa are given by
CEVYi (N, v,g) : = C
EV
i (g(N, w˜(v, Y)))
where Y = Sh or Y = Ba, respectively.
That is, CEVY is given by the unique nonnegative solution of
(w˜(v, Y)ij)ij ·CEVY = λ ·CEVY .
Derivation and further details can be found in the appendix.
5.5 applications
We provided generally holding axiomatizations of the Banzhaf Po-
sition value as a cooperative allocation rule. The Banzhaf Position
value can hence be applied for any sort of coalition function, that is,
any sort of economic, social or political situation. In this section we
will provide examples for the application as a power index and as a
centrality measure.
5.5.1 The Banzhaf Position value as a Power Index
As an application for political networks and the use of our new al-
location rule as a power index, let us consider the state parliament
elections (Bürgerschaftswahl) in Hamburg, Germany in 2001. After the
election, there were five parties obtaining seats in the parliament14,
namely the Social Democratic Party “SPD”, the Christian Democratic
Union “CDU”, the Conservative Law and Order Party “Schill”, the
Green/Alternative Party “Grüne” and the Free Democratic Party “FDP”.
The distribution of seats was according to Table 12. To build the gov-
ernment, a coalition needs at least 50% of the seats15. In the end, the
14 Due to regulations, parties obtaining a vote share less than 5% are not going to be in
the parliament.
15 Parties are assumed to vote en bloc
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Table 12: Results of the State Parliament Elections in Hamburg, 2001
party SPD CDU Schill Grüne FDP
∑
seats 46 33 25 11 6 121
seat share 0.38 0.27 0.21 0.09 0.05 1
source: Statistical Office of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein
government was built by the coalition {CDU, Schill, FDP}16. We are
now interested in the question if this outcome could have been fore-
casted by the use of centrality measures.
For notational reasons, let us denote the parties by N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
(i. e., SPD is player 1, CDU is player 2,...). The situation can be mod-
eled by a simple weighted voting game: assign to every player i ∈ N
the corresponding seat share si. Then, the coalition function is given
by
v(K) :=

1 , if
∑
i∈K
si > 0.5
0 , otherwise
.
Minimal winning coalitions are {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4, 5}, {2, 3, 4} and {2, 3, 5}.
Applying the Shapley value or the normalized Banzhaf value leads to
a distribution of power and resulting coalitional power displayed in
Table 13.
In fact, a coalition between “CDU” and “Grüne” as well as between
“Schill” and “Grüne” was excluded by the parties due to ideolog-
ical/political incompatibilities. This means, that (minimal winning)
coalition {2, 3, 4} would not materialize as well as all K ⊆ N such that
{2, 4} ⊆ K or {3, 4} ⊆ Kwould not be winning coalitions. To account for
these incompatibilities, we restrict the space of potential swings17: any
set including {2, 3} or {3, 4} is excluded as potential swing for i ∈ {1, 5},
any set including {4} is excluded for i ∈ {2, 3} and any set including
{2} or {3} is excluded for i = 4. Due to this restriction, Shapley-based
approaches are not suitable anymore as the weights of the marginal
contributions would be unappropriate and not be relatively balanced
16 For completeness one should note that this coalition broke 2 years later due to up-
coming personal issues between the leaders of “CDU” and “Schill”. However, these
issues have not been known after the elections and hence, can not be taken into
account for forecasting issues.
17 Here, K ⊆ N \ {i} is a swing for i iff v(K∪ {i}) − v(K) = 1.
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Table 13: Gametheoretic Approaches, Unrestricted Case
Distribution of Power (normalized to 100 %)
party 1 2 3 4 5
Shi 40.00 23.33 23.33 6.67 6.67
Bai 38.46 23.08 23.08 7.69 7.69
Resulting Coalitional Power
coalition {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4, 5} {2, 3, 4} {2, 3, 5}∑
Shi 63.33 63.33 53.34 53.33 53.33∑
Bai 61.54 61.54 53.84 53.85 53.85
(Highest coalitional power is bolt face.)
anymore, hence, we will only use the Banzhaf-based approaches from
now on18. Distribution of power and resulting coalitional power for
restricted case is displayed in Table 1419.
Table 14: Gametheoretic Approach, Restricted Case
Distribution of Power (normalized to 100 %)
party 1 2 3 4 5
Bai 40.00 20.00 20.00 6.67 13.33
Resulting Coalitional Power
coalition {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4, 5} {2, 3, 4} {2, 3, 5}∑
Bai 60.00 60.00 60.00 - 53.33
(Highest coalitional power is bolt face.)
As we see, the coalitions obtaining the highest coalitional power
are {1, 2} and {1, 3} in the unrestricted case (for both the Shapley and
the normalized Banzhaf value) and {1, 2}, {1, 3} and {1, 4, 5} in the re-
stricted case, which does not explain the resulting coalition {2, 3, 5}.
Now, take a look at the corresponding political network where we
could interpret a link as a potential coalitional negotiation. We could
argue that relative political power of a party should depend on the
18 Note that for voting games, one usually uses the Banzhaf approach to avoid the
different weights of swings.
19 For further details consult the appendix, Table 24.
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seats obtained and the position within the political network. Taking
into account the incompatibilities, the network could be modeled as
presented by Figure 6.
Figure 6: Political Network
1
2
3
4 5
Applying the classical centrality measures (which are independent
on the weighted voting game) is not appropriate for the use of a
power index as in this case, there is no difference between parties
1 and 5 while the relative power of a party should depend on the
seats obtained.20 The Banzhaf Position value accounts for both the
seat share and the position within the political network. We restrict
the set of potential swings for a connection containing 2 or 3 to the
set of connections not containing 4 and for a connection containing 4
to the set of connections not containing 2 or 3.21 Find the distribution
of individual and coalitional power due to the (multiplicative effi-
cient) normalized Banzhaf Position value and Banzhaf-Eigenvector-
value displayed in Table 15.22
We see that, taking into account both centrality in the political net-
work and relative importance in the voting game, the coalition {2, 3, 5}
is uniquely selected with respect to highest coalitional power. Hence,
both our new approaches could have been considered for forecasting
issues leading to the coalition which was actually built. Note that the
other approaches either do not forecast the actual coalition or are not
suitable as the seat share was not taken into account.
20 However, only Eigenvector centrality uniquely selects coalition {2, 3, 5} obtaining
the highest coalitional power. For completeness, find the values for the classic ap-
proaches in Table 25, appendix.
21 One could argue that this is too restrictive and connections containing 4 can still be
part of a swing for a connection containing 2 or 3 as long as no connected component
resulting in excluded coalitions is build (and correspondingly for swings for connec-
tions containing 2 or 3). Note that in this less restrictive case the order of highest
individual and coalitional power does not change. For completeness, find details for
this case in the appendix, Table 24 and Table 26.
22 For further details consult the appendix, Table 24.
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Table 15: Banzhaf Position Power
Distribution of Power (normalized to 100 %)
party 1 2 3 4 5
piBai 30.00 20.00 20.00 6,67 23.33
CEVBai 27.04 21.81 21.81 7.28 22.05
Resulting Coalitional Power
coalition {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4, 5} {2, 3, 4} {2, 3, 5}∑
piBai 50.00 50.00 60.00 - 63.33∑
CEVBai 48.85 48.85 56.37 - 65.67
(Highest individual and coalitional power are bolt face.)
5.5.2 The Banzhaf Position value as a Centrality Measure
Recall that our anaylsis was motivated by the analysis of centrality
measures. So far, we did not explicitly apply the Banzhaf Position
value for this issue. For this, we first give examples of coalition func-
tions for which the Banzhaf Position value could be used as a central-
ity measure. In order to calculate relative importance for cohesion of
essential nodes, a simple and convincing coalition function would be
the unanimity game
uT (K) =
1 , if T ⊆ K
0 , otherwise
where T ⊆ N is the set of essential nodes that one likes to stay con-
nected.
Lemma 5.2 (Proportionality). Let g be a cycle-free connected binary
network (i. e., a spanning tree) and consider the unanimity game βuT ,
T ⊆ N, |T | > 1. Then, we have for Y = Sh or Y = Ba
CD
Y
i (g,βuT ) = Cdi(g|H(T)),
CC
Y
i (g,βuT ) = Cci(g|H(T)),
CB
Y
i (g,βuT ) = Cbi(g|H(T)) and
CEV
Y
i (g,βuT ) = CEVi(g|H(T))
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where H(T) is the connected hull of T , that is, set of nodes that are
essential to connect T .
Proof. Let g be a minimal connected binary network and v = uT .
Then, following the uniqueness proof of Theorem 5.1 (and similar for
the (Shapley) Position value), we have
Yλ(g,βuNT ) =
constant , for λ ∈ g|H(T)
0 , for λ /∈ g|H(T)
for Y = Sh or Y = Ba. Hence, in network gH(T), all weights w˜λ
are constant. As the scale of weights does not matter for ranks and
relative distances of the indices, weights can be rescaled to 1 which
leads the original (binary) network, restricted on H(T), that is, gH(T).
This proves proportionality to Freeman’s centrality measures as well
as Eigenvector centrality.
The unanimity game is simple in calculations and a natural and
intuitive way to define a game accounting for cohesion of a specific
set of nodes. Michalak et al. [2013] discuss other possibilities for the
coalition function which are more general as they do not rely on a
specific set of nodes; here, the number of nodes that are reachable by
path from a certain coalition is counted:
v(K) = # of nodes in K and those (directly) connected to K
where one could either analyze direct connections or paths with at
most k steps.
In order to match this value function with our framework, we have
to zero-normalize the function and transform the weights correspond-
ingly. This can be done for any coalition function by the following
transformation:
Transformation 5.3. For any coalition function v ∈ VN, proceed as
follows
STEP 1: Zero-normalization:
v0(K) := v(K) −
∑
i∈N
v({i}) · u{i}(K)
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STEP 2: Transformation of weights: Set
Yij(gb, vN) := Yij(gb, vN0 ) + v
N({ij}), where Y = Sh,Ba.
Following the idea of reachability, we define another possible cohe-
sion game which directly accounts for the network structure:
Definition 5.9 (Cohesion Game). Given a network g ∈ GbN, we define
the corresponding cohesion game c : GN −→ R as follows:
c(g,K) :=
∑
i∈K
ci(g) ∀K ⊆ N
where ci(g) := # of nodes reachable from i by path in g
Note, that we do not need a zero-normalization for the cohesion
game (as c(∅) = 0) or a transformation via the link-game as it directly
works on networks (that is, c ∈ VGN).
Remark 5.14. Note that the unanimity games form a basis ofVN and
both the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value are linear in the coali-
tion function, hence, we can express any v ∈ VN by unanimity games.
Therefore, we will focus on unanimity games.
We will now discuss an example on the performance of our new
approach used as centrality measures. For comparative reasons we do
not restrict ourselves to the Banzhaf Position value and will discuss
the Position and Eigenvector approach using both the Banzhaf and
the Shapley value.
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and consider the binary network:
1
2
3
4 5 6
g = {12, 13, 14, 23, 24, 34, 45, 56}
Let v = uN, that is, we are interested in connectedness of the whole
network. Weights are displayed in Table 16.
Results for the degree measure and Eigenvector centrality and the
corresponding Shapley/Banzhaf-Centralities are given in Table 17.
This example does not only show numerical differences, also the rank-
ing between nodes changes. Consider the top 2 nodes: in contrast to
the Degree or Eigenvector measure (α = 1), node 5 is under the top
2 nodes for the Shapley/Banzhaf-Centralities (α = 0) and even the
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Table 16: Weights
λ 12, 13, 14, 23, 24, 34 45, 56
Shλ 17/420 53/140
Baλ 10/136 38/136
Table 17: Classical Centrality Measures and Shapley/Banzhaf-Centralities
(in share of 100%)
Y 1 2 3 4 5 6
Degree and Shapley/Banzhaf-Degree
C
d (α = 1) 18.75 18.75 18.75 25.00∗ 12.50 6.25
piSh (α = 0) 6.07 6.07 6.07 25.00 37.86∗ 18.93
piBa (α = 0) 11.03 11.03 11.03 25.00 27.94∗ 13.97
Eigenvector and Shapley/Banzhaf-Eigenvector
C
EV (α = 1) 21.65 21.65 21.65 23.74∗ 8.56 2.76
CEV
Sh (α = 0) 2.43 2.43 2.43 27.48 38,28∗ 26.93
CEV
Ba (α = 0) 7.04 7.04 7.04 25.38 31.87∗ 21.61
Top-2-nodes are bolt face,∗ identifies Top-node
top node changes. From an interpretative point of view, it is reason-
able that nodes 4 and 5 should obtain the highest value in terms of
centrality and connectedness as node 4 is the most central while 5
is essential for connectedness (the only node that connects 6 to the
network).
One could argue that node 6 and node 1 (or 2 or 3) should obtain
the same payoff as there is no structural reason (as connection node
versus boundary node) to treat them differently. This can be regulated
by the emphasis parameter α. If α decreases, one could argue that, as
cohesion emphasis (1− α) increases, node 6 should obtain a higher
payoff than 1 (or 2 or 3) due to the “exclusiveness” of node 6: there is
only one connection to node 6, hence an exclusive connection which
could be seen as more important than other connections. If emphasis
for centrality increases, 1 (or 2 or 3) should obtain a higher payoff
than 6 due to a higher centrality in terms of connections (or original
weights for weighted graphs).
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Remark 5.15 (Moderate Relative Distances and the Banzhaf Approach).
Even though not affecting ranks of top-key-nodes, notice the differ-
ences in relative distances between using the Shapley- or the Banzhaf-
based approach (especially for the Position values): Due to the weight-
ed-voting approach, nodes 1, 2 and 3 obtain very low payoffs while
nodes 5 and 6 obtain very high payoffs for the Shapley-based mea-
sures. One could argue that the relative distances due to the weighted-
voting in the Shapley-based measures are disproportionately high /
out-of-scale. Here we see that the Banzhaf Position approach might be
seen as more moderate.
Remark 5.16 (Gametheoretic Approaches). Gómez et al. [2003] and
Suri and Narahari [2008] suggest to identify top nodes by computing
the Myerson value of the nodes (or its difference to the Shapley value)
while no specific game is suggested. Considering the game uN and
our example, both the Shapley value and the Myerson value assign an
equal share of 1/6 to every node. This stands in contradiction to central-
ity (4 and 5 are more central than 1, 2 and 3 and all more central than
6) and furthermore, the difference between the connections 1-4 and 5-
6 (exclusiveness) is ignored. One can argue that the drawbacks arise
due to the too simple form of the unanimity game we use. However,
independently of the characteristic function, the concepts suggested
above only analyze failure of a whole node with all its connections at
once.
5.6 conclusion
We introduced a cooperative allocation rule for network structures,
the Banzhaf Position value, accounting for the importance for connect-
edness of the network and relative power of connections using coop-
erative game theory. This allocation rule could be seen as a centrality
measure or power index. In contrast to existing (cooperative) game
theoretic approaches on centrality or power indices, we analyzed con-
sequenses of connection failures rather than failures of whole nodes.
This makes our approach suitable in applications in for example en-
ergy networks or political networks: oil pipelines can break (connec-
tion failure) without a breakdown of the whole gas province (node
failure), a bilateral trading agreement can be broken without a whole
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country leaving the trading union or, as in the political example
we used, political parties can have bilateral incompatibilities without
leaving the whole political spectrum.
We provided axiomatic characterizations of the Banzhaf Position
value for both cycle-free and general (binary) networks. Furthermore,
we suggested an extension to weighted networks or the eigenvector
approach. Applying our approach to the state parliament elections
in Hamburg, Germany 2001, we showed that, in contrast to existing
power indices, the Banzhaf Position value used as a power index is
able to forecast the actual government formation. Using our approach
as a centrality measure, we discussed an example which emphasized
the differences to classic centrality measures and the identification of
top key nodes due to our approach might be seen as more plausible if
one is interested in connectedness of a network, that is, exclusiveness
of links or nodes for connectedness. These applications shed some
more light on the difference between the Shapley and the Banzhaf
approach and could be argued to support that “weighted voting (still)
doesn’t work”.
For the examples in the application section we have seen that our
extension using the eigenvector approach performed comparably well
to the Banzhaf Position value. Therefore, for further research, a deeper
analysis of this approach seems worthwile. Moreover, further inves-
tigation of the extension for weighted networks and an application
for weighted networks might be of interest. Beside these possibilities,
another issue occured within our analysis of the axiomatic character-
ization for cycle-free networks: our “old friend” outside-option-sensi-
tivity. Remember that we focused on connected networks throughout
this chapter, that is, situations where outside options are absent. How-
ever, both Position values are applicable for general networks and the
discussion in Remark 5.9 and Remark 5.10 showed that the link-based
Position values cannot be outside-option-sensitive. This leads to the
investigation in the next chapter.
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O U T S I D E - O P T I O N - S E N S I T I V E A L L O C AT I O N
R U L E S F O R N E T W O R K S
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Forma-
lizing
Outside
Options
Networks
Outside-
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Sensitivity
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Centrality
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6.1 introduction
In an economic or social situation where agents have to group in
order to achieve common goals, how should we allocate the worth
arising from the coalition formation among the agents? There are var-
ious frameworks and various allocation rules suggested in literature,
each suitable for one or another application domain, dependent on
the framework itself and the characterizing axioms. In this chapter
we suggest a new allocation rule for network structures which, in
contrast to existing allocation rules, accounts for both outside options
and the role of an agent within the network.
We analyze situations where coalition formation is restricted by an
undirected graph, that is, the economic or social structure is described
by a network which captures the (bilateral) relations between agents
and agents can only form a coalition if they are connected in such an
interaction network via path (directly or indirectly). This approach
was introduced by Myerson [1977] (for applications and further ap-
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proaches on communication structures see for example van den Brink
et al., 2007 and 2011). We use undirected networks to describe the re-
lations between the agents while it would also be possible to use
directed networks (i. e., interaction has a fixed direction) as analyzed
by González-Arangüena et al. [2008]. They use generalized character-
istic functions as introduced by Nowak and Radzik [1994a], that is,
games where the worth of a coalition depends on the order in which
agents enter the coalition. In our approach, interaction is not directed
and the order of entry does not change the worth of the coalition.
There are various examples in which an allocation rule should take
into account outside options. In Chapter 3 we found experimental ev-
idence for outside options significantly affecting negotiations and we
theoretically disussed the outside-option-issue in detail in Chapter 4.
Recall the simple example from section 2.4, the glove game with more
right gloves than left gloves where a pair of gloves produces worth
which has to be distributed among the agents holding the gloves. Due
to the bargaining position (outside options) of the left glove holder,
this agent should obtain a higher payoff than the others. Recall “the
need to let the players know what to expect from each coalition struc-
ture” (Maschler, 1992, p. 595) and that any formed coalition between
individuals “only describes one particular consideration” while “the
other [alliances] are present in virtual existence: although they have
not materialized, they have contributed essentially to shaping and de-
termining the actual reality” (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944,
p. 36).
Furthermore, an allocation rule should take into account the spe-
cific position of agents within the network, that is, taking into ac-
count the path of information flow. We discussed this issue in detail
in Chapter 5: Recall the simple example on train connections between
England, France and Germany. The Eurostar train connects London
and Paris and the Thalys train connects Paris and Cologne while there
is no direct train connection between England and Germany. Hence,
as a transit country, France has to be passed for any kind of flow via
trains between England and Germany (travel, trade,...). As further ex-
amples consider cost allocation among the nodes in energy networks
or social networks used for job offers (nodes with a lot of links should
be treated differently to nodes with just a few links) or the political
application in Chapter 5.5.1.
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Recall the different popular allocation rules suggested in literature
and presented in Chapter 2: The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) as
well as the component-restricted Shapley value (AD-value, Aumann
and Drèze, 1974) and, as another modification of the Shapley value,
the Owen value (Owen, 1977) do not take into account the network
structure as they are designed for coalitional models without any in-
teraction structure. Also more recent allocation rules that account
for outside options, the Wiese value (Wiese, 2007) and the χ-value
(Casajus, 2009a), do not consider the inner interaction structure of a
coalition. In order to account for the position within the network, this
chapter only analyzes allocation rules designed for networks (with-
out further structure). These are the Position value (Meessen, 1988
and further analyzed by Borm et al., 1992 and Slikker, 2005), the
Banzhaf Position value suggested in Chapter 5, the graph-χ-value
(Casajus, 2009b) and the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) or, as a gen-
eralization of the latter to the Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] approach,
the equal bargaining rule (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996)1. The Position
values never account for structures outside the own coalition, hence,
are outside-option-insensitive while we show that the graph-χ-value
generally does not take into account the network structure within a
coalition for weighted voting games with minimal winning coalitions.
We further show that the Myerson value, and hence also the equal
bargaining rule, even have both these drawbacks. Therefore, there is
a need for a new allocation rule.
The contribution of this chapter is the definition and characteriza-
tion of a new allocation rule, the kappa-value, that is outside-option-
sensitive and takes into account the position of an agent within the
network. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no other allo-
cation rule combining these properties. The kappa-value has a nice
axiomatization, we only need already known and approved axioms
or weakened versions of them (which combine the ideas of known
and approved axioms). The kappa-value combines the advantages of
the graph-χ-value and the Position value while lacking their draw-
backs and furthermore provides an elegant use of the quite intuitive
1 We do not analyze the equal splitting rule (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), since it
does not account for any inner structure (neither coalitions nor interaction between
agents).
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concept of the Position value. We further show the independence of
the characterizing axioms.
To motivate the need for an allocation rule accounting for both
outside options and the specific position of agents within the network,
consider the following weighted voting game: we have four agents
{1, 2, 3, 4} holding weights (w1,w2,w3,w4) = (39, 30, 25, 6) and let the
threshold be T = 60, that is, the worth of a coalition is 1 if the sum
of weights of the coalitional agents is at least 60 and 0 otherwise.
Hence, minimal winning coalitions are {1, 2}, {1, 3} and {2, 3, 4}. We
consider minimal winning coalitions without organized opposition,
that is, agents outside the winning coalition stay as singletons. The
networks that could occur are shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Networks for Minimal Winning Coalitions
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
g1−2 g1−3 g3−2−4 g2−3−4 g2−4−3 g2−3−4−2
Table 18 reports the the distribution of worth assigned by the Position
value2, denoted by pi and the graph-χ-value, denoted by χ#.3
Table 18: Payoffs using pi or χ#
network pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4 χ#1 χ
#
2 χ
#
3 χ
#
4
g1−2 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.58 0.42 0 0
g1−3 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.58 0 0.42 0
g3−2−4 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 0.39 0.39 0.22
g2−3−4 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0.39 0.39 0.22
g2−4−3 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.39 0.39 0.22
g2−3−4−2 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0.39 0.39 0.22
2 To avoid indices, we will omit the reference to Shapley we used in Chapter 5 for the
Position value.
3 Note that the value function considers all possible winning coalitions, not only the
minimal ones. We consider marginal contributions: {2, 3} does not create worth but
together with 1 it does. Hence, it has to be considered to assign the right distribution
even though it ends up in a winning coalition not being minimal.
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Consider the networks g3−2−4 and g2−3−4: the graph-χ-value as-
signs the same payoff to agent 2 even though its position in the first
case is stronger than in the second case while the Position value ac-
counts for the different positions. On the other hand, the Position
value does not take into account the existence of alternative winning
coalitions, that is, outside options: consider the network g3−2−4 again
and note that agents 3 and 4 obtain the same payoff even though 3
would have the outside option of a winning coalition with 1 while
4 has no outside option. The graph-χ-value accounts for outside op-
tions and assigns a higher payoff to agent 3.
Table 19 reports the distribution of worth by the new allocation rule
suggested in this chapter, the kappa-value, denoted by κ.
Table 19: Payoffs using the new κ
network κ1 κ2 κ3 κ4
g1−2 0.56 0.44 0 0
g1−3 0.56 0 0.44 0
g3−2−4 0 0.42 0.35 0.23
g2−3−4 0 0.35 0.42 0.23
g2−4−3 0 0.36 0.36 0.28
g2−3−4−2 0 0.37 0.37 0.27
The kappa-value takes into account both outside options and the
position within the network: consider the coalition {2, 3, 4}, agents 2
and 3 always obtain a higher payoff than 4, because they could also
cooperate with 1 instead, while 4 has no outside option. Agents 2 and
3 are symmetric in terms of outside options but 2 obtains a higher
payoff than 3 if the coalition is connected through 2, a lower payoff
than 3 if the coalition is connected through 3 and the same payoff
if the coalition is connected through 4. An agent obtains the highest
payoff within the coalition if she has the strongest position.
Note that not every outside option has the same value/impact: con-
sider g1−2 and note that agents 1 and 2 have the same position in
this network. Agent 1 obtains a higher payoff due to the fact that her
outside options (building a coalition with 3) is valued higher/has a
larger impact than the outside option of 2 (cooperating with {3, 4}).
136 outside-option-sensitive allocation rules for networks
This can be explained by the fact that in smaller coalitions, the worth
has to be distributed among less agents.
In contrast to defining a coalition as the group of agents that is
connected via path, one could define a coalition by complete subnet-
works, that is, as the group of agents that are directly connected to
each other. The latter definition has the drawback of not taking into
account different interaction paths within a coalition and the position
of all agents within the coalition would be the same. This is why we
use the more general definition of a coalition. But still it is notable
that also in the case of equal positions, the kappa-value is not redun-
dant; it differs from the graph-χ-value as shown by g1−2, g1−3 and
g2−3−4−2.
As an application one could consider weighted voting games as
simple trade agreements: countries hold a specific amount of an in-
put good and have to form agreements in order to reach some re-
quired amount of these input goods to produce an output. There ex-
ist different possible trade routes (outside options) and furthermore,
transit countries and other countries should be treated differently (po-
sition within the network). Using allocation rules, we can distribute
the worth of the output good among the countries. This can also be
seen as measuring the (relative) distribution of power of the countries.
As other applications one could consider weighted voting games as
defense agreements (taking into account rights of way) or political
agreements: There is a specific vote distribution among parties in a
parliament and the parties have to build agreements in order to reach
some required quorum (for example to pass a bill). Here we can use
allocation rules to measure the (relative) distribution of power of the
parties as for example in the political application in Chapter 5.
This chapter is structured as follows: we start with the framework
and analyze weighted voting games to show the drawbacks of the ex-
isting allocation rules. Following the idea of combining the properties
of the analyzed allocation rules, Section 3 will give an axiomatic char-
acterization of the the kappa-value and analyzes independence of the
characterizing axioms. In Section 4, we provide a variant of the kappa-
value using the Banzhaf approach which seems more adequate in
application to political networks, again providing an axiomatic char-
acterization and indepenedence of axioms. Section 5 shows that the
kappa-values indeed are outside-option-sensitive w. r. t. the axioms
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we suggested in Chapter 4 and we discuss why the suggested “weak”
axiom in fact is not that weak and the “normal” axiom actually could
be seen as sort of strong, especially for link-based values. Section 6
concludes.
6.2 framework and the need of a new allocation rule
6.2.1 Framework
Recall the framework for network structures: we model a network
as an undirected graph where the nodes represent the players and
the edges represent the links between the players. Let N = {1, ...,n},
non-empty and finite, be the player set and GN := {g|g ⊆ {ij :=
{i, j}|i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}} denotes the set of all possible networks on N. A
TU-game (N, v) consists of the player set N and a coalition function
v ∈ VN := {v : 2N −→ R|v(∅) = 0} and V0(N) is the set of all
zero-normalized coalition functions, that is, v({i}) = 0 ∀ i ∈ N. Without
loss of generality, we will restrict ourselves to zero-normalized games
since any v ∈ VN can be zero-normalized. An allocation rule Y : {N}×
VN ×GN −→ RN distributes the arising worth among the players,
that is, assigns a payoff to each player. For notational convenience we
define
∑
i∈K Yi =: YK. An allocation rule is feasible if YN(N, v,g) 6
v(N).
Recall the allocation formula of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953):
∀ i ∈ N : Shi(N, v) :=
∑
K⊆N\{i}
k!(n− 1− k)!
n!
[v(K∪ {i}) − v(K)],
where k = |K|,n = |N|.
The Shapley value assigns to every player her share of what she cre-
ates when entering a coalition, that is, her marginal contributions
[v(K∪ {i}) − v(K)].
We say that players i and j are connected in the network g if there
exists a path in g connecting them. Recall that connected players form
components of a network g and these components build a partition
on the player set N, denoted by C(N,g) where Ci(N,g) ∈ C(N,g) is
the component of all players connected with player i ∈ N. If N is
fixed, we will write Ci(g) or simply Ci.
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Further recall the graph-restricted game (Myerson, 1977)
vg(K) :=
∑
S∈C(K,g|K)
v(S),
where g|K = {ij ∈ g|i, j ∈ K}.
used to define the Myerson value µ(N, v,g) := Sh(N, vg) and the link-
game (Meessen, 1988 and Borm et al., 1992)
vN(g ′) := vg
′
(N) ,g ′ ⊆ g
used to define the Position value (for zero-normalized games)4:
pii(N, v,g) :=
∑
λ∈gi
1
2
Shλ(g, vN),
where gi := set of links including player i.
As an alternative, Casajus [2009a] introduced an outside-option-sensi-
tive allocation rule. To reflect all (productive) outside options, he de-
fines for every network g the corresponding lower outside option graph
(LOOG), the graph that captures the alternatives/outside options the
players have: g(i,N) := g|Ci ∪ {jk ∈ gN|j ∈ Ci,k ∈ N \ Ci}. For nota-
tional convenience, if the player set is fixed, we will only write g(i).
To recall the specific form of the LOOG consider again the example
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and g = {12, 34, 45} (cf. Chapter 4). The LOOGs are
displayed in Figure 8. The LOOG reflects all alternative links a player
Figure 8: Network and corresponding LOOGs
1
2
3 4
5 1
2
3 4
5 1
2
3 4
5
g g(1) = g(2) g(3) = g(4) = g(5)
and her coalitional players might have outside their actual coalition
(which stays fixed). To provide these alternatives, links outside the
own coalition are broken.
4 Note that we restricted ourselves to zero-normalized games, otherwise vN might not
be a coalition function because vN(∅) = v∅(N) 6= 0.
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Using the LOOG, Casajus [2009a] defines the the graph-χ-value:
χ#i(N, v,g) := µi(N, v,g(i)) +
v(Ci) − µCi(N, v,g(i))
|Ci|
.
The graph-χ-value values outside options by adding or substracting
some share of the Myerson value of her component to the Myerson
value of the player (where the Myerson value is the Shapley value
of the graph-restricted game), taking into account the outside option
graph.
6.2.2 The Need of a new Allocation Rule
Analyzing weighted voting games, we will now explain the draw-
backs of the graph-χ-value, the Myerson value and the Position value
and, therefore, the need of a new allocation rule which closes the
arising gap.
Definition 6.1 (Weighted Voting Game). A weighted voting game,
denoted by (N, vw,T ), is a TU-game that consists of the set of play-
ers N = {1, 2, ...,n}, each endowed with weights w = (w1,w2, ...,wn),
wi ∈ R+ and a threshold T ∈ R. The worth of a coalition K ⊆ N is
given by
vw,T (K) =
1 , if
∑
i∈Kwi > T
0 , otherwise
.
Without loss of generality, we normalize w such that
∑
i∈Nwi = 100.
Definition 6.2 (Minimal winning coalition and Opposition). A min-
imal winning coalition is a coalition K ⊆ N such that v(K) = 1 and
v(K \ {i}) = 0 for all i ∈ K. We say that there is no organized opposi-
tion if all players outside this coalition stay alone (i. e., as singletons).
We will restrict ourselves to situations with wi < T for all i ∈ N
(i. e., we neglect the trivial case that one individual builds a minimal
winning coalition by itself).
Remark 6.1 (Outside-Option-Insensitivity of the Position value and
the Myerson value). Recall that the Position value and the Myerson
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value satisfy Component Decomposability CD, that is, are outside-
option-insensitive (cf. Chapter 4).
Lemma 6.1 (Invariance of the Myerson value). Let (N, vw,T ) be a weight-
ed voting game with T > 50 and consider a network g describing
a unique minimal winning coalition without organized opposition.
Then, we have
µi(N, vw,T ,g) =

1
|C| , if i ∈ C
0 , otherwise
where C is the minimal winning coalition and uC the corresponding
unanimity game (uC(K) = 1 if C ⊆ K and zero otherwise).
Proof. Let v and g be of the required form. Then, C(N,g) consists of
one connected component C and singletons, where C is a minimal
winning coalition. It holds that vgw,T (K) = vw,T (K ∩C), independent
of the network structure within C. Since C is a minimal winning coali-
tion (i. e., vw,T (S) = 1 if and only if C ⊆ S), this is the same as consid-
ering the unanimity game uC. Since the Myerson value is component
decomposable, we can, for every i ∈ N, restrict the player set (and the
value function) to Ci. Hence, µi(N, vw,T ,g) = Shi(Ci,uC|Ci). For all
i /∈ C (the minimal winning coalition), we have Ci = {i} (no organized
opposition) and therefore Shi(Ci,uC|Ci) = 0. As Ci = C, we have for
i ∈ C
Shi(Ci,uC|Ci) = Shi(C,uC)
=
∑
K⊆C\{i}
|K|!(|C|− 1− |K|)!
|C|!
(uC(K∪ {i}) − uC(K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0∀K
)
=
∑
K⊆C\{i}
|K|!(|C|− 1− |K|)!
|C|!
uC(K∪ {i})︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
{
1, if K=C\{i}
0, otherwise
=
|C \ {i}|!(|C|− 1− |C \ {i}|)!
|C|!
=
(|C|− 1)!(|C|− 1− (|C|− 1))!
|C|!
=
1
|C|
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leading to
µi(N, vw,T ,g) =

1
|C| , if i ∈ C
0 , otherwise
.
Lemma 6.2 (Invariance of the graph-χ-value). Let (N, vw,T ) be a weighted
voting game with T > 50 and only consider networks describing mini-
mal winning coalitions without organized opposition. Then, the graph-
χ-value coincides with the χ-value for coalition structures (Casajus,
2009b) of the partition identified with this coalition:
χ#i(N, vw,T ,g) = χi(N, vw,T ,C(N,g))
= Shi(N, vw,T ) +
vw,T (Ci) − ShCi(N, vw,T )
|Ci|
Proof. Let v and g be of the required form. Then, C(N,g) consists of
one connected component C and singletons. Note that we excluded
the case where one player obtains the threshold by herself without
the need of cooperation. For any singleton it is obvious that its graph-
χ-value is zero. We will show that for any i ∈ C we have
vg(i)(K∪ {i}) − vg(i)(K) = v(K∪ {i}) − v(K) ∀K ⊆ N \ {i}
because this leads to µ(N, v,g(i)) = Sh(N, vg(i)) = Sh(N, v) and
hence
χ#i(N, v,g) = χ
#
i(N, v,g
′) ∀g,g ′ s.th. Ci(N,g) = Ci(N,g ′)
which finishes the proof.
First note that whenever there exist j1, j2 ∈ K such that j1 ∈ Ci and
j2 ∈ N \ Ci, then g(i)|K is connected, i. e.C(K,g(i)|K) = {K} and there-
fore vg(i)(K) = v(K).
For K = Ci, we have vg(i)(K) = 1. If K ⊂ Ci, we have vg(i)(K) = 0
because the Ci is minimal winning coalition (i. e.all members of Ci
are needed to create worth). If K ⊆ N \ Ci, C(K,g(i)|K) = {{j}|j ∈ K}
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and therefore vg(i)(K) = 0.
Case 1: K = Ci \ {i}
vg(i)(Ci) − v
g(i)(Ci \ {i}) = v(Ci) − 0 = v(Ci) − v(Ci \ {i})
Case 2: K ⊂ Ci \ {i}
vg(i)(K∪ {i}) − vg(i)(K) = 0− 0 = v(K∪ {i}) − v(K)
Case 3: K ⊆ N \ Ci
vg(i)(K∪ {i})︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(i)|K∪{i}connected
−vg(i)(K) = v(K∪ {i}) − 0 = v(K∪ {i}) − v(K)
since the members of Ci achieve at least the threshold T and hence
any group in N \ Ci can at most achieve (100− T) < T (since T > 50).
Identify all g,g ′ such that Ci(N,g) = Ci(N,g ′) with one representing
element g˜. Using that Sh(N, vg(i)) = Sh(N, v), we obtain for any g in
the same “equivalence class”
χ#i(N, v,g) = Shi(N, v) +
v(Ci) − ShCi(N, v)
|Ci|
= χi(N, v,C).
Remark 6.1 tells us that both the Position value and the Myerson
value do generally not account for outside options. Lemma 6.1 and
Lemma 6.2 tell us that, for an economically important and large class
of games, the Myerson value and the graph-χ-value do not take into
account the specific position of a player within the network, that is,
the communication path. In other words, these allocation rules do
not consider differences in the agents centralities and, therefore, are
“centrality-invariant”. Hence, to account for both outside options and
the position of a player within the network, we need a new allocation
rule.
6.3 a new outside option value : the kappa-value
In this section we define a new allocation rule for network structures
which takes into account both outside options and the position of an
agent within the network/the path of information flow. In the previ-
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ous section we have seen that (for a large class of games) the graph-
χ-value does not differ within the class of networks referring to the
same coalition but it takes into account outside options. While the lat-
ter is not true for the Position value, it takes into account the position
of an agent within a network. We have seen that the Myerson value
lacks both desired properties. Hence, we will further analyze the char-
acterizing axioms of the graph-χ-value and the Position value.
Recall that an allocation rule satisfies Component Efficiency CE if for
all C ∈ C(N,g) we have
∑
i∈C
Yi(N, v,g) = v(C)
and that an allocation rule satisfies Balanced Link Contributions BLC if
for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j and v ∈ V0 we have∑
λ∈gj
[Yi(N, v,g) − Yi(N, v,g− λ)]
=
∑
λ∈gi
[
Yj(N, v,g) − Yj(N, v,g− λ)
]
.
Further recall that the Position value is characterized by CE and BLC
and also satisfies CD (i. e., for all i ∈ C ∈ C(N,g) we have Yi(N, v,g) =
Yi(C, v|C,g|C)) which stands in contradiction to outside-option-sensi-
tivity (see Remark 6.1 and Chapter 4). Hence, if we want an allocation
rule to account for outside options but still to consider the role of a
player within the network, we need to weaken BLC (in order to get
rid of the allocation rule satisfying CD but still having CE). Note that
a connected network lacks outside options (see Chapter 5). Having
this in mind, we define the following weaker version of BLC:
Axiom 6.1 (Weak Balanced Link Contributions (WBLC)). An alloca-
tion rule for network structures Y satisfies Weak Balanced Link Con-
tributions WBLC if we have
∑
λ∈gj
[
Yi(N, v,g) − Yi(Ci(N,g− λ), v|Ci(N,g−λ),g|Ci(N,g−λ))
]
=
∑
λ∈gi
[
Yj(N, v,g) − Yj(Cj(N,g− λ), v|Cj(N,g−λ),g|Cj(N,g−λ))
]
.
for all connected g and all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and v ∈ V0
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WBLC combines the ideas underlying BLC and Weak Fairness 2
WF2, the modification of Fairness F that characterizes the Myerson
value.
Lemma 6.3. If an allocation rule for network structures Y(N, v,g) sat-
isfies CE and WBLC, it coincides with the Position value for all con-
nected networks.
Proof. Note that in presence of CD, WBLC reduces to BLC on con-
nected networks. Hence, since the Position value satisfies CD and is
characterized by CE and BLC, it satisfies CE and WBLC (which pro-
vides existence). For uniqueness, we cannot use the presence of CD
any longer, hence, we cannot use BLC. We follow the idea of the proof
for the Myerson value of Casajus [2009b]. Let ϕ and ψ be allocation
rules satisfying CE and WBLC. Suppose N is the minimal player set
such that ϕ and ψ differ on a connected graph. We must have |N| > 1,
because for |N| = 1 we would have a contradiction by CE due to the
connectedness of the graph. Suppose that g is the minimal connected
graph on N such that ϕ 6= ψ. Now let i, j ∈ N. By WBLC we have
|gj|ϕi(N, v,g) − |gi|ϕj(N, v,g)
=
∑
λ∈gj
ϕi(Ci(N,g− λ), v|Ci(N,g−λ),g|Ci(N,g−λ))
−
∑
λ∈gi
ϕj(Cj(N,g− λ), v|Cj(N,g−λ),g|Cj(N,g−λ))
Note that g|C is always connected on the connected component C. If
now Ck(N,g− λ) 6= N (for k = i, j), we have Ck(N,g− λ) ⊂ N and
hence
ϕk(Ck(N,g− λ), v|Ck(N,g−λ),g|Ck(N,g−λ))
= ψk(Ck(N,g− λ), v|Ck(N,g−λ),g|Ck(N,g−λ))
since N is the minimal player such that ϕ and ψ differ on a connected
graph. If Ck(N,g− λ) = N we have that g− λ is connected on N and
hence
ϕk(Ck(N,g− λ), v|Ck(N,g−λ),g|Ck(N,g−λ))
= ψk(Ck(N,g− λ), v|Ck(N,g−λ),g|Ck(N,g−λ))
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since g is the minimal connected graph onN such that ϕ and ψ differ.
Using that ψ satisfies WBLC, we get
|gj|ϕi(N, v,g) − |gi|ϕj(N, v,g) = |gj|ψi(N, v,g) − |gi|ψj(N, v,g)
⇔ |gj| [ϕi(N, v,g) −ψi(N, v,g)] = |gi|
[
ϕj(N, v,g) −ψj(N, v,g)
]
Summing up over j ∈ Ci(N,g) = N (connected graph), we have by
CE: ∑
j∈N
|gj|
 |N|
|gi|︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[ϕi(N, v,g) −ψi(N, v,g)] = v(N) − v(N) = 0
and hence ϕi(N, v,g) = ψi(N, v,g).
If we combine Lemma 6.3 with the presence of CD, we will have a
characterization of the Position value. Hence, we need to weaken CD.
We use the characterizing axiom of the graph-χ-value that accounts
for outside options given by Casajus [2009b]: Recall that an allocation
rule satisfies Outside Option Consistency OO if for all i, j ∈ C ∈ C(N,g)
we have
Yi(N, v,g) − Yj(N, v,g) = Yi(N, v,g(i)) − Yj(N, v,g(j)).
Theorem 6.1 (The Kappa-value). Let v ∈ V0. There is a unique alloca-
tion rule for network structures that satisfies CE, OO and WBLC:
κi(N, v,g) := pii(N, v,g(i)) +
v(Ci) − piCi(N, v,g(i))
|Ci|
Proof. Uniqueness: We follow the idea of the uniqueness proof of the
graph-χ-value (Casajus, 2009a). Let Y satisfy CE, OO and WBLC. For
i, j ∈ Ci we have g(i) = g(j). First, by OO, we get
Yi(N, v,g) − Yi(N, v,g(i)) = Yj(N, v,g) − Yj(N, v,g(i)).
Then, summing up over j ∈ Ci and using CE gives
|Ci| [Yi(N, v,g) − Yi(N, v,g(i))] = v(Ci) − YCi(N, v,g(i)).
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Since g(i) is connected, Lemma 6.3 implies
Yi(N, v,g(i)) = pii(N, v,g(i))
for all i ∈ N and hence we have
Yi(N, v,g) = pii(N, v,g(i)) +
v(Ci) − piCi(N, v,g(i))
|Ci|
(7)
which uniquely determines Y.
Existence: It is easily shown that the value given by equation (7)
satisfies CE and OO (note that (g(i))(i) = g(i)). To see WBLC, first
note that the Position value satisfies WBLC by satisfying BLC and
CD. Let g be connected and i, j ∈ N, then we have Ci = Cj = N and
g(i) = g(j) = g. Hence,
∑
λ∈gj
Yi(N, v,g) −
∑
λ∈gj
Yj(N, v,g)
=
∑
λ∈gj
pii(N, v,g) + v(N) − piN(N, v,g)|N|︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by CE

−
∑
λ∈gi
pij(N, v,g) + v(N) − piN(N, v,g)|N|︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by CE

=
∑
λ∈gj
pii(N, v,g) −
∑
λ∈gi
pij(N, v,g)
WBLC
=
∑
λ∈gj
pii(Ci(N,g− λ), v|Ci(N,g−λ),g|Ci(N,g−λ))
−
∑
λ∈gj
pij(Cj(N,g− λ), v|Cj(N,g−λ),g|Cj(N,g−λ))
=
∑
λ∈gj
Yi(Ci(N,g− λ), v|Ci(N,g−λ),g|Ci(N,g−λ))
−
∑
λ∈gj
Yj(Cj(N,g− λ), v|Cj(N,g−λ),g|Cj(N,g−λ))
where the last step follows from the fact that g|Ck(N,g−λ) is connected
on Ck(N,g− λ) and by CE.
We call the value given by (7) “kappa-value” and denote it by κ.
The kappa-value assigns to each player in a coalition the worth of the
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position she would obtain in the outside option graph plus her share
of the worth players outside the actual coalition would obtain in the
outside option graph. This share is equal for all players in the actual
coalition and the worth of a position is given by the Shapley value of
the arc game, the Position value.
The kappa-value provides a very elegant use of the quite intu-
itive Position value, lacking its drawbacks by using the outside op-
tion graph. Note that pi(N, v,g(i)) also captures both positions in the
network and outside options. Besides the fact that it is not feasible5
which could be solved by (multiplicative or additive efficient) normal-
izations, note that the LOOG only reflects possible outside options
that might alternatively have been formed, that is, these outside options
have not actually materialized. Hence, pi(N, v,g(i)) might distribute
non-negative payoffs to agents being actually unproductive.
In order to avoid the mentioned drawbacks of the graph-χ-value,
the kappa-value differs by using the Position value instead of the
Myerson value. Note that the proof of Lemma 6.2 directly implies that
the Myerson value of the LOOG (µ(N, v,g(i))) also has the drawback
of not accounting for the position of an agent within the network
for a broad class of games. Hence, there is no simpler alternative
to the kappa-value. However, in the following chapter we present
an alternative to the kappa-value which is not simpler but uses the
Banzhaf approach instead of the Shapley approach which might be
more suitable for political applications.
Lemma 6.4 (Independence of κ-Axioms). The axioms CE, OO and
WBLC are independent.
Proof. Consider the weighted voting game from the introduction (N =
{1, 2, 3, 4}, w = (39, 30, 25, 6) and T = 60).
Independence 1 (CE+WBLC, ¬ OO). The Position value satisfies CE
and WBLC (because of BLC and CD). Consider g = {12}. We have
pi1(N, v,g) − pi2(N, v,g) =
1
2
−
1
2
= 0 and
pi1(N, v,g(1)) − pi2(N, v,g(2)) =
49
120
−
34
120
6= 0
5 Consider the example from the introduction and g = {23, 24, 34}, then g(2) = g(3) =
g(4) while g(1) differs and pi1(N, v,g(1)) = 1/2 > 2/5 = pi1(N, v,g(2)), hence∑
i∈N pii(N, v,g(i)) >
∑
i∈N pii(N, v,g(2)) = v(N) (by pi satisfying CE and Ci = N
on g(i)).
148 outside-option-sensitive allocation rules for networks
⇒ OO is violated.
Independence 2 (CE+OO, ¬ WBLC). The graph-χ-value satisfies CE
and OO. Consider g = {12, 23, 34}. We have
∑
λ∈g1
[
χ#2(N, v,g) − χ
#
2(C2(N,g− λ), v|C2(N,g−λ),g|C2(N,g−λ))
]
= χ#2(N, v,g) − χ
#
2(N \ {1}, v|N\{1},g− 12) =
7
12
−
1
6
=
5
12
and∑
λ∈g2
[
χ#1(N, v,g) − χ
#
1(C1(N,g− λ), v|C1(N,g−λ),g|C1(N,g−λ))
]
= 2χ#1(N, v,g) − χ
#
1({1}, v|{1}, ∅) − χ#1({1, 2}, v|{1,2}, {12})
= 2· 3
12
− 0−
1
2
= 0 6= 5
12
⇒WBLC is violated.
Now consider the TU-game (N, v) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and v = uN.
Independence 3 (WBLC+OO, ¬ CE). Yi(N, v,g) := pii(N, v,g(i)) sat-
isfies OO by (g(i))(i) = g(i) and WBLC by Y = pi for connected
networks. Consider g = {12, 23}. We have
Y1(N, v,g) = Y3(N, v,g) =
13
60
,
Y2(N, v,g) =
17
60
and Y4(N, v,g) =
1
2
⇒Y{4} = Y4 =
1
2
6= 0 = uN({4}) and
Y{1,2,3} =
43
60
6= 0 = uN({1, 2, 3})
⇒ CE is violated.
6.4 the banzhaf-kappa-value
In this section we give an alternative to the kappa-value which is in
line with the investigations in Chapter 5 of emphazising the use of
the Banzhaf Position value. For this, we first note that the Banzhaf
Position value is outside-option-insensitive.
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Lemma 6.5 (Outside-Option-Insensitivity of the Banzhaf Position value).
The Banzhaf Position value satisfies CD and hence, is outside-option-
insensitive (cf. Chapter 4).
Proof. Let i ∈ C ∈ C(N,g). Note that if λ ∈ gi, we also have that
λ ∈ g|C. Recall from the proof of piBa satisfying CLBE that for λ ∈ g|C,
marginal contributions are not effected by connections outside C and
are the same for all g ′,g ′′ ⊆ g \ λ such that g ′|C = g ′′|C. Hence we
have
piBai (N, v,g) =
∑
λ∈gi
1
2
1
2|g|−1
∑
g ′⊆g\λ
(
vN(g ′ ∪ λ) − vN(g ′))
=
∑
λ∈gi
1
2
1
2|g|−1
∑
g˜⊆(g|C)\λ
2|g|N\C|
[
vN(g˜∪ λ) − vN(g˜)]
|g|=|g|N\C|+|g|C|
=
∑
λ∈gi
1
2
1
2|g|C|−1
∑
g˜⊆(g|C)\λ
[
vN(g˜∪ λ) − vN(g˜)]
Note that for λ ∈ gi ⊆ g|C and g˜ ⊆ (g|C) \ λ ⊂ g|C we have that
g˜ ∪ λ ⊆ g|C. Further, from the definition of vN, we obtain for any
g ′ ⊆ g|C
vN(g ′) =
∑
S∈g|N
v(S) =
∑
S∈g|C
v(S) = vC(g)
and therefore, using vN|C = vC, we get
piBai (N, v,g) = pi
Ba
i (C, v|C,g|C).
Lemma 6.6. If an allocation rule for network structures Y(N, v,g) sat-
isfies CLBE and WBLC, it coincides with the Banzhaf Position value
for all connected networks.
Proof. We follow the arguments of Lemma 6.3: recall that in presence
of CD, WBLC reduces to BLC on connected networks. Hence, since
the Banzhaf-Position value satisfies CD by Lemma 6.5 and is char-
acterized by CLBE and BLC by Theorem 5.2, it satisfies CLBE and
WBLC (which provides existence). Recall that for uniqueness, we can-
not use the presence of CD and therefore BLC any longer. Let ϕ and
ψ be allocation rules satisfying CLBE and WBLC. Suppose N is the
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minimal player set such that ϕ and ψ differ on a connected graph.
Again, by CLBE, we must have |N| > 1, because for |N| = 1 we would
have a contradiction. Suppose that g is the minimal connected graph
on N such that ϕ 6= ψ. Now let i, j ∈ N. By WBLC and the same
arguments as in the proof of Lemma 6.3 we get
|gj|ϕi(N, v,g) − |gi|ϕj(N, v,g) = |gj|ψi(N, v,g) − |gi|ψj(N, v,g)
⇔ |gj| [ϕi(N, v,g) −ψi(N, v,g)] = |gi|
[
ϕj(N, v,g) −ψj(N, v,g)
]
.
Summing up over j ∈ Ci(N,g) = N (connected network), we have by
CLBE:∑
j∈N
|gj|
 |N|
|gi|︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[ϕi(N, v,g) −ψi(N, v,g)]
=
∑
λ∈g|C
Baλ(g|C, vN|C) −
∑
λ∈g|C
Baλ(g|C, vN|C)
= 0
and hence ϕi(N, v,g) = ψi(N, v,g).
Theorem 6.2 (The Banzhaf-kappa-value). Let v ∈ V0. There is a unique
allocation rule for network structures that satisfies CLBE, OO and
WBLC:
κBai (N, v,g) := pi
Ba
i (N, v,g(i)) +
piBaCi (N, v,g) − pi
Ba
Ci
(N, v,g(i))
|Ci|
Proof. We follow the steps from the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Uniqueness: Let Y satisfy CLBE, OO and WBLC. For i, j ∈ Ci we
have g(i) = g(j). First, by OO, we get
Yi(N, v,g) − Yi(N, v,g(i)) = Yj(N, v,g) − Yj(N, v,g(i)).
Then, summing up over j ∈ Ci and using CLBE gives
|Ci| [Yi(N, v,g) − Yi(N, v,g(i))]
=
∑
λ∈g|C
Baλ(g|C, vC) − YCi(N, v,g(i))
= piBaCi (N, v,g) − YCi(N, v,g(i)).
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Since g(i) is connected, Lemma 6.6 implies
Yi(N, v,g(i)) = piBai (N, v,g(i))
for all i ∈ N and hence we have
Yi(N, v,g) = piBai (N, v,g(i)) +
piBaCi (N, v,g) − pi
Ba
Ci
(N, v,g(i))
|Ci|
(8)
which uniquely determines Y.
Existence: It is easily shown that the value given by equation (8)
satisfies CLBE and OO (note that (g(i))(i) = g(i)). Further note that
the Banzhaf Position value satisfies WBLC by satisfying BLC and CD.
Then, by the same chain of arguments as in the corresponding part
of the proof of Theorem 6.1 and the fact that the use of CLBE instead
of CE does not change these arguments, we obtain WBLC.
We call the value given by (8) “Banzhaf-kappa-value” and denote it
by κBa. Similar as the kappa-value, the Banzhaf-kappa-value assigns
to each player in a coalition the worth of the position she would ob-
tain in the outside option graph plus an equal share of sort of the
worth players outside the actual coalition would obtain in the outside
option graph. It differs from the kappa-value in how positions are
valued: while the Shapley approach weights according to the strength
of swings, the Banzhaf approach weights equally. Recall that weight-
ing according to strength of swings (“weighted voting”) can lead to
unreasonable allocations in terms of disproportionately high relative
distances and, especially in political applications with incompatibili-
ties, is not applicable (see for example Remark 5.8 or Remark 5.15).
Lemma 6.7 (Independence of κBa-Axioms). The axioms CLBE, OO
and WBLC are independent.
Proof. Consider again the weighted voting game from the introduc-
tion (N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, w = (39, 30, 25, 6) and T = 60).
Independence 4 (CLBE+WBLC, ¬ OO). The Banzhaf Position value
satisfies CLBE and WBLC. Consider g = {12}. We have
piBa1 (N, v,g) − pi
Ba
2 (N, v,g) =
1
2
−
1
2
= 0 and
piBa1 (N, v,g(1)) − pi
Ba
2 (N, v,g(2)) =
11
32
−
9
32
6= 0
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⇒ OO is violated.
Independence 5 (CLBE+OO, ¬ WBLC). The allocation rule given by
Yi(N, v,g) :=
∑
λ∈g|Ci
Baλ(g|Ci , v
N|Ci)
|Ci|
satisfies CLBE by definition and OO as for i, j ∈ C ∈ C(N,g) we have
Ci = Cj and g(i) = g(j). Consider g = {12, 23, 34}. g is connected and
we have
∑
λ∈g1
[
Y2(N, v,g) − Y2(C(2)(N,g− λ), v|C(2)(N,g−λ),g|C(2)(N,g−λ))
]
=
5
16
− Y2({2, 3, 4}, v|{2,3,4}, {23, 34}) =
5
16
−
1
3
= −
1
48
and∑
λ∈g2
[
Y1(N, v,g) − Y1(C(1)(N,g− λ), v|C(1)(N,g−λ),g|C(1)(N,g−λ))
]
=
5
16
− Y1({1}, v|{1}, ∅) +
5
16
− Y1({1, 2}, v|{1,2}, {12})
=
5
16
− 0+
5
16
−
1
2
=
1
8
6= − 1
48
⇒WBLC is violated.
Now consider the TU-game (N, v) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and v = uN.
Independence 6 (WBLC+OO, ¬ CLBE). Yi(N, v,g) := pii(N, v,g(i))
satisfies OO by (g(i))(i) = g(i) and WBLC by Y = pi for connected
networks. Consider g = {12, 34}. We have
Yi(N, v,g) = pii(N, v,g(i)) =
1
4
and
Y{1,2} =
1
2
6= 0 =
∑
λ∈{12}
Baλ(g|C, vC)
⇒ CLBE is violated.
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6.5 outside-option-sensitivity and the kappa-values
Recall the formalization of outside options and outside-option-sensi-
tivity from Chapter 4: A coalition K ⊆ N is called outside option in
(N, v,g) for player i ∈ N if
K ⊆ N \ Ci(g) and v(K∪ {i}) − v(K) > 0
and an allocation rule for network structures Y is called outside-option-
sensitive (i.e., satisfies OOS) if
Yi(N, v,g) > Yi(N, vK˜,i,g)
for all i ∈ N such that |Ci(g)| > 1 and all K˜ being an outside option
for i in (N, v,g) where
vK˜,i(K) :=
v(K) , if K 6= K˜∪ {i}
v(K˜) , if K = K˜∪ {i}
is the outside-option-reduced game w.r.t. K˜ and i.
An allocation rule for network structures is called weakly outside-
option-sensitive if for all outside options K˜ in (N, v,g) for player i ∈ N
such that |Ci(g)| > 1 there exists a network structure (N,g ′) with K˜
also being outside option in (N, v,g ′) for player i ∈ N such that
Yi(N, v,g ′) 6= Yi(N, vK˜,i,g ′).
Analyzing outside-option-sensitivity for the kappa-values will take
quite some effort: For player-based values as the graph-χ-value it can
be clearly determined whether the effect of neutralizing an outside
option is positive or negative as marginal contributions are affected
directly (failure of whole nodes). In contrast to that, for link-based
values, we have to analyze marginal contributions of links and neu-
tralizing an outside option affects a player’s links into her outside
option in a different way from this player’s other links.
Remark 6.2 (The Kappa-values and CD). Note that the restriction of
(N, v,g) on a player’s connected component leads to the fact that the
component-restricted network is connected on the component-restricted
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set of players. In case of connected networks we know that the kappa-
values coincide with the corresponding Position values. However, we
also know that these values do not coincide in general, hence, the
kappa-values cannot be component decomposable.
We will now show that the (Shapley-) Position value becomes outsi-
de-option-sensitive w.r.t. a network g when applying the correspond-
ing LOOG g(i).
Lemma 6.8. The allocation rule given by
Yi(N, v,g) := pii(N, v,g(i))
is outside-option-sensitive.
Proof. Let (N, v,g) be a TU-game with a network structure, i ∈ N
with |Ci(g)| > 1 and let K˜ be an outside option in (N, v,g) for i. Set
α := v(K˜∪ {i}) − v(K˜) > 0 and
f(|g ′|) :=
|g ′|!(|g(i)|− |g ′|− 1)!
|g(i)|!
for all g ′ ⊆ g(i).
Note that for the arc game vN we have vN(g ′ ∪ {ij}) − vN(g ′) 6= 0 if
and only if C(g ′ ∪ {ij} 6= C(g ′). Particularly, we obtain for C(g ′ ∪ {ij} 6=
C(g ′):
vN(g ′ ∪ {ij}) − vN(g ′) = v(Ci(g ′ ∪ {ij})) − v(Ci(g ′)) − v(Cj(g ′) (9)
and, therefore, the outside-option-reduced arc-game w.r.t. K˜ and i,
vN
K˜,i, only differs from v
N if one of the connected components above
becomes K˜∪ {i}.
Due to the special form of the LOOG g(i) = g|Ci ∪ {jj ′|j ∈ Ci, j ′ ∈
N \ Ci} we have for all g ′ ⊆ g(i) that K˜ ∪ {i} ∈ C(N,g ′) if and only if
we can write g ′ = gk ∪ g˜ with gk := {ik|k ∈ K˜} and
g˜ ⊆ G˜ := {{g|Ci(g) \ gi}∪ {jj ′|j ∈ Ci \ {i}, j ′ ∈ N \ {Ci(g)∪ K˜}}}
For all k˜ ∈ K˜ we have gk 6⊆ g ′ for all g ′ ⊆ g(i) \ {ik˜}, that is
K˜∪ {i} /∈ C(N,g ′) ∀g ′ ⊆ g(i) \ {ik˜}.
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On the other hand we have
K˜∪ {i} ∈ C(N,g ′ ∪ {ik˜}) ∀g ′ = gk \ {ik˜}∪ g˜, g˜ ∈ G˜
and we obtain
Shik˜(g(i), v
N
K˜,i) = Shik˜(g(i), v
N) +
∑
g˜⊆G˜
f(|g˜∪ gk \ {ik˜}|)
[
vN
K˜,i(g˜∪ gk)
− vN
K˜,i(g˜∪ gk \ {ik˜})︸ ︷︷ ︸
=vN(g˜∪gk\{ik˜})
−vN(g˜∪ gk) + vN(g˜∪ gk \ {ik˜})
]
=Shik˜(g(i), v
N) +
∑
g˜⊆G˜
f(|g˜|+ |K˜|− 1)
[
vN
K˜,i(g˜∪ gk) − vN(g˜∪ gk)
]
Equ. 9
= Shik˜(g(i), v
N) +
∑
g˜⊆G˜
f(|g˜|+ |K˜|− 1)
[
vK˜,i(K˜∪ {i}) − v(K˜∪ {i})
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−α
=Shik˜(g(i), v
N) −α
|G˜|∑
|g˜|=0
(
|G˜|
|g˜|
)
f(|g˜|+ |K˜|− 1)
where the last equality follows from the fact that f is a function of the
number of links of g˜ only (and not of the actual structure of g˜), hence,
we only need to account for subsets of G˜ with the same number of
links.
Consider any j ∈ N \ K˜∪ {i} such that ij ∈ g(i). Here we have
K˜∪ {i} /∈ C(N,g ′ ∪ {ij}) ∀g ′ ⊆ g(i) \ {ij}.
Note that this affects the opposite part of the marginal contributions
as before and we obtain
Shij(g(i), vNK˜,i) = Shij(g(i), v
N) +
∑
g˜⊆G˜
f(|g˜∪ gk|)
[
vN
K˜,i(g˜∪ gk ∪ {ij})︸ ︷︷ ︸
=vN(g˜∪gk∪{ij})
−vN
K˜,i(g˜∪ gk) − vN(g˜∪ gk ∪ {ij}) + vN(g˜∪ gk)
]
=Shij(g(i), vN) +
∑
g˜⊆G˜
f(|g˜|+ |K˜|)
[
− vN
K˜,i(g˜∪ gk) + vN(g˜∪ gk)
]
Equ. 9
= Shij(g(i), vN) +
∑
g˜⊆G˜
f(|g˜|+ |K˜|)
[
v(K˜∪ {i}) − vK˜,i(K˜∪ {i})
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=α
=Shij(g(i), vN) +α
|G˜|∑
|g˜|=0
(
|G˜|
|g˜|
)
f(|g˜|+ |K˜|)
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Note that there are (|gi|+ |N|− |Ci|− |K˜|) such j.
Using the formulas we derived above we obtain for Y(N,K˜,i ,g) =
pii(N, vK˜,i,g(i))
pii(N, vK˜,i,g(i)) =pii(N, v,g(i)) −
α
2
|K˜|
|G˜|∑
|g˜|=0
(
|G˜|
|g˜|
)
f(|g˜|+ |K˜|− 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=B1
+
α
2
(|gi|+ |N|− |Ci|− |K˜|)
|G˜|∑
|g˜|=0
(
|G˜|
|g˜|
)
f(|g˜|+ |K˜|)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=B2
⇒ pii(N, vK˜,i,g(i)) =pii(N, v,g(i)) +
α
2
(−B1 +B2) (10)
We now show that B := −B1 +B2 is strictly negative. Note that
|G˜| = |g|Ci |− |gi|+ (|Ci|− 1)(|N|− |Ci)|− |K˜|)
and |g(i)| = |g|Ci |+ |Ci|(|N|− |Ci|)
leading to |G˜| = |g(i)| −A with A := |gi| + |Ci| · |K˜| + |N| − |Ci| − |K˜|.
Rearranging terms and because Ci contains at least 2 players6 we get
A− (|gi|+ |N|− |Ci|) = |K˜| (|Ci|− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
(11)
⇒A− (|gi|+ |N|− |Ci|)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> |K˜| (12)
From Equ. 12 we get A > |K˜| which allows us to apply the following
combinatorical finding7: For all k < A 6 G we have
G−A∑
l=0
(
G−A
l
)
(k+ l)!(|G|− 1− (k+ l))!
|G|!
=
k!(A− 1− k)!
A!
(13)
Using this we get
|G˜|∑
|g˜|=0
(
|G˜|
|g˜|
)
f(|g˜|+ |K˜|− 1) =
|g(i)|−A∑
l=0
(
|g(i)|−A
l
)
f(l+ |K˜|− 1)
Equ. 13
=
(|K˜|− 1)!(A− 1− (K˜− 1))!
A!
6 |Ci| > 1, that is, |Ci| > 2 by requirement of OOS.
7 The proof follows by the same steps as in van den Nouweland [1993], page 29-30.
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⇒B1 = |K˜|(|K˜|− 1)!(A− K˜)!
A!
= (A− K˜)
|K˜|!(A− 1− K˜)!
A!
(14)
|G˜|∑
|g˜|=0
(
|G˜|
|g˜|
)
f(|g˜|+ |K˜|) =
|g(i)|−A∑
l=0
(
|g(i)|−A
l
)
f(l+ |K˜|)
Equ. 13
=
|K˜|!(A− 1− K˜)!
A!
⇒B2 = (|gi|+ |N|− |Ci|− |K˜|) |K˜|!(A− 1− K˜)!
A!
(15)
By Equ. 14 and Equ. 15 we get for B = B2−B1:
B =
|K˜|!(A− 1− K˜)!
A!
[
(|gi|+ |N|− |Ci|− |K˜|− (A− K˜))
]
=
|K˜|!(A− 1− K˜)!
A!
[|gi|+ |N|− |Ci|−A]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−|K˜|(|Ci|−1) by Equ. 11
=− |K˜| (|Ci|− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
|K˜|!(A− 1− K˜)!
A!︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0
Using this in Equ. 10, we finally get OOS:
Yi(N, vK˜,i,g) = pii(N, vK˜,i,g(i)) < pii(N, v,g(i)) = Yi(N, v,g)
Lemma 6.9 (Outside-Option-Sensitivity of the Kappa-value). The kappa-
value is outside-option-sensitive.
Proof. Let (N, v,g) be a TU-game with a network structure, i ∈ Nwith
|Ci(g)| > 1 and let K˜ be an outside option in (N, v,g) for i. Consider
j /∈ K˜∪ {i}. For all jj ′ ∈ g(i) we have
Cj(g
′ ∪ {jj ′}) 6=⊆ K˜ ∀g ′ ⊆ g(i) \ {jj ′}
and hence
vN(g ′ ∪ {jj ′}) − vN(g ′) 6 vN
K˜,i(g
′ ∪ {jj ′}) − vN
K˜,i(g
′) ∀g ′ ⊆ g(i) \ {jj ′}
(16)
which leads to
Shjj ′(g(i), vNK˜,i) > Shjj ′(g(i), v
N) ∀ jj ′ ∈ g(i) : j /∈ K˜∪ {i}. (17)
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We obtain strict inequality in Equ. 16 for example for g ′ = {ik|k ∈ K˜}
and therefore, since for j ∈ Ci \ {i} we have that jk ∈ g(i) for all k ∈ K˜,
we obtain strict inequality in Equ. 17 for all jk, k ∈ K˜ which leads to
pij(N, vK˜,i,g(i)) > pij(N, v,g(i)) ∀ j ∈ Ci \ {i}.
Using this and by Lemma 6.8 we get OOS for the kappa-value:
κi(N,vK˜,i,g) = pii(N, vK˜,i,g(i)) +
vK˜,i(Ci(g)) −
∑
j∈Ci(g)
pij(N, vK˜,i,g(i))
|Ci(g)|
=
(
1−
1
|Ci(g)|
)
pii(N, vK˜,i,g(i))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<pii(N,v,g(i))
by Lemma 6.8
+
v(Ci(g)) −
∑
j∈Ci(g)
j6=i
>pij(N,v,g(i))︷ ︸︸ ︷
pij(N, vK˜,i,g(i))
|Ci(g)|
<
(
1−
1
|Ci(g)|
)
pii(N, v,g(i)) +
v(Ci(g)) −
∑
j∈Ci(g)
j6=i
pij(N, v,g(i))
|Ci(g)|
=κi(N, v,g)
The result itself that the Position value of the LOOG (w.r.t. to the
original network) and the kappa-value are indeed outside-option-sen-
sitive seems not very surprising at first glance by the intuition of the
LOOG. Also, we have already discussed in Remark 4.6, that in pres-
ence of outside-option-sensitivity and and component efficiency the
loss player i experiences by neutralizing her outside option is dis-
tributed as a surplus among the other players in i’s connected com-
ponent. However, some notable finding occured within the proof of
Lemma 6.8: We obtained that not the whole loss player i experienced
has been distributed among the other players: Player i experienced a
loss due to her links into her outside option, but this loss was partly
redistributed onto player i’s other links. Hence, not the whole loss
caused by neutralization is shifted as a surplus towards the other
players anymore. This difference occurs as we do not analyze contri-
butions of whole nodes, but rather links.
This brings us back to the discussion and investigation in Chapter
5 about consequences of failure: Intuitively, the neutralization of i’s
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outside option reduces overall failure consequences of player i (i.e.,
the payoff decreases). However, only consequences of the failure of
player i’s links into the outside option decrease as only these links
actually connect player i to the outside option. The other links indeed
become more important as the overall value does not change.
Note that this sheds some light on the difference between the weak
axiom WOOS and OOS and why OOS is indeed sort of “strong”.
When we argued that OOS is not a very strong axiom, we analyzed
failure consequences of whole nodes (i.e., player-based values) and
only considered an increase of importance of other nodes. We did
not take into account the aforementioned redistribution: neutralizing
i’s outside option leads to an increase of importance of i’s other links
and this effect could possibly overcompensate the loss of importance
of links into the outside option. We have seen that this problem did
not occur for the link-based values that used Shapley’s weighted vot-
ing approach. However, this effect has an impact for equal voting:
Remember that the Shapley weights might be seen as disproportion-
ately and we argued in Remark 5.15 that Banzhaf’s equal voting ap-
proach might be seen as more moderate. We will now see that this
difference in weighting indeed might change the sign of the overall
effect of neutralizing an outside option.
Lemma 6.10 (Weak Outside-Option-Sensitivity of the Banzhaf-Kap-
pa-value). The Banzhaf-kappa-value is weakly outside-option-sensitive.
Proof. Let (N, v,g) be a TU-game with a network structure, i ∈ Nwith
|Ci(g)| > 1 and let K˜ be an outside option in (N, v,g) for i. We proceed
as in the proof of Lemma 6.8 and Lemma 6.9. Note that the Banzhaf
approach does not use the weighting factor which we defined by the
funtion f(|g ′|) but a scalar only depending on |g(i)|. Following the
same steps as in the proof of Lemma 6.8 we get for k ∈ K˜ and j /∈
K˜∪ {i}
Baik˜(g(i), v
N
K˜,i) = Baik˜(g(i), v
N) −α
|G˜|∑
|g˜|=0
(
|G˜|
|g˜|
)
1
2|g(i)|−1
and
Baij(g(i), vNK˜,i) = Baij(g(i), v
N) +α
|G˜|∑
|g˜|=0
(
|G˜|
|g˜|
)
1
2|g(i)|−1
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which, after some calculations, leads to
piBai (N, vK˜,i,g(i)) = pi
Ba
i (N, v,g(i)) +
α2|G˜|
2|g(i)|
(
|gi|+ |N|− |Ci|− 2|K˜|
)
which does not always have to be smaller than piBai (N, v,g(i)), hence,
we cannot proceed as for the (Shapley-) kappa-value.
Analogue to how we calculated piBai (N, v,g(i)), one can show that
for j ∈ Ci \ {i} we have
piBaj (N, vK˜,i,g(i)) = pi
Ba
j (N, v,g(i)) +

α2|G˜|
2|g(i)|
(
|K˜|+ 1
)
, if ij ∈ g
α2|G˜|
2|g(i)|
(
|K˜|
)
, if ij /∈ g
which is always greater than piBaj (N, v,g(i)). We get
κBai (N, vK˜,i,g) = κ
Ba
i (N, v,g) +
α2|G˜|
2|g(i)|︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=β
(
|gi|+ |N|− |Ci|− 2|K˜|
)
−
α2|G˜|
2|g(i)|︸ ︷︷ ︸
=β
1
|Ci|
(
2|gi|+ |N|− |Ci|− 2|K˜|+ (|Ci|− 1)|K˜|
)
(18)
To prove WOOS we have to find a network onN under which outside
option K˜ occurs and for which the part behind κBai (N, v,g) will be
different from zero. Consider network g¯ such that C(N, g¯) = {{K˜}, {N \
K˜}} and |g¯i| = 1 (i.e., i is connected to only one other player and all
players either are in i’s connected component or in the outside option
K˜. Obviously, if K˜ is an outside option for i in (N, v,g), it is an outside
option in (N, v, g¯). Using |K˜| = |N|− |Ci(g¯)| we obtain
κBai (N, vK˜,i, g¯) = κ
Ba
i (N, v, g¯) +β
(
1+ |N|− |Ci|− 2(|N|− Ci)
)
−
β
|Ci|
(2+ |N|− |Ci|− 2(|N|− Ci) + (|Ci|− 1)(|N|− Ci))
=κBai (N, v, g¯) +
β
|Ci|
(
|Ci|− |Ci|(|N|− |Ci|) − 2− (|Ci|− 2)(|N|− Ci)
)
=κBai (N, v, g¯) +
β
|Ci|︸︷︷︸
>0
(
|Ci|− 2
(
(|Ci|− 1)(|N|− Ci) + 1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=F(c,n) with c:=|Ci|,n:=|N|
)
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Analyzing roots of the function F(n, c) we obtain that any solution is
of the form
c− 1 6= 0 and n = 2c
2 − c− 2
2(c− 1)
where the only integer solutions (remember that c and n are cardinal-
ities) are
c = 0,n = 1 and c = 2,n = 2
which both will not occur since |Ci| > 1 (first solution impossible) and
|N|− |Ci| = |K˜| > 0 (second solution impossible), hence we have
κBai (N, vK˜,i, g¯) 6= κBai (N, v, g¯)
which provides WOOS.
Lemma 6.11. The Banzhaf-kappa-value is not (strongly) outside-option-
sensitive.
Proof. From Equ. 18 in the previous proof we know that
κBai (N, vK˜,i,g) = κ
Ba
i (N, v,g) +
β
c
F(n, c,g,k)
with F(n, c,g,k) := c(g+n− c− 2k) − (2g+n− c− 2k+ (c− 1)k)
and n := |N|, c := |Ci|,g := |gi|,k := |K˜|
and we have F(n, c,g,k) = 0 for example for
n = 5, c = 2,g = 1 and k = 1
which contradicts OOS as in this case we have
κBai (N, vK˜,i,g) = κ
Ba
i (N, v,g)
that is, neutralizing K˜ does not change payoffs as the negative effect
player i experiences by neutralizing K˜ (power of links into K˜decrease)
equalizes the positive effect player i experiences by neutralizing K˜
(power of other links increase).
Remark 6.3 (Strength of OOS). Note that the Banzhaf-kappa-value,
even though it does not satisfy OOS, can still be seen as being affected
by outside options in a very general sense. Neutralizing any outside
option always negatively affects a player’s Banzhaf-kappa-value as ev-
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ery player’s link (of the LOOG) into the outside option decrease in its
importance by α2
|G˜|
2|g(i)|−1
> 0. However, due to the link-based-approach,
the player’s other links increase in their power by the same factor. This
fact causes a positive effect. Clearly, the overall effect can be positive,
negative or even zero, depending on the number of links into the out-
side option (which is the size of the outside option itself) and the num-
ber of other links the player has in the LOOG. However, there will
always be an inner effect. This is why one could argue that OOS actu-
ally is a strong axiom as it ignores these inner effects.
6.6 conclusion
Motivated by the analysis of weighted voting games, we analyzed
the Position value, which takes into account the position of a player
within the network, and the graph-χ-value, which takes into account
outside options. We found that, for this class of games, the graph-χ-
value does not differ within networks referring to the same coalititon,
hence does not take into account the position an agent has within
the network. This motivated the use of the Position value in order
to capture the fact that the position within the network/the path of
information flow matters. But the Position value does generally not
take into account outside options. We defined and characterized a
new allocation rule for networks which combines outside option sen-
sitivity and sensitivity to the position of an agent within the network:
the kappa-value. The kappa-value provides an elegant use of the in-
tuitive concept of the Position value, lacking its drawbacks by using
the outside option graph used for the concept of the graph-χ-value.
There is no need for new characterizing axioms, only known and ap-
proved ones (or weakened versions of them) are used. As a variant
of the kappa-value, we further introduced the Banzhaf-kappa-value
which might be more applicable especially for political applications
and/or incompatibilities.
This chapter provided an extension of the approaches presented in
Chapter 5, now applicable if outside options are of interest. Hence, for
forecasting issues, the approaches from Chapter 5 can be used if out-
side options are absent while the extensions of this chapter solve the
problem whenever outside options are relevant. Furthermore, dur-
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ing the analysis of outside-option-sensitivity of the new link-based
values we found that outside options actually have a more complex
effect than discussed in Chapter 4. This led to the finding that the
suggested “weak” axiom indeed is not that weak while the “normal”
axiom indeed is sort of strong. By this we extended of the discussion
of outside-option-sensitivity in Chapter 4 and can now understand
the effect of outside options in a highly detailed sense.

7
C O N C L U S I O N A N D O U T L O O K
7.1 closing the circle : summary
In this thesis we have analyzed outside options from various perspec-
tives to understand their effects and formal construction, especially
in the framework of networks. We started the analysis with a pilot
experiment where we investigated the effect of outside options on ne-
gotiation in double auction markets. We found evidence that outside
options do affect negotiation which shed some first light on the effect
and importance of outside options. Analyzing a probabilistic fore-
casting model theoretically supported the importance of outside op-
tions, therefore, we explicitly formalized outside options and outside-
option-sensitivity axioms to understand how to formally differenti-
ate between outside-option-sensitive and -insensitive allocation rules.
Applying these axioms shed some further light on the structural ef-
fects of outside options on allocation. During this analysis, we found
that there is only one outside-option-sensitive allocation rule in the
framework of network structures and also further issues ocurred that
motivated a deeper analysis of network structures in general. First fo-
cussing on situations where outside options are absent, we provided
a new (axiomatically characterized) allocation rule based on central-
ity analysis. We discussed its performance in application on political
networks as a power index and in application as centrality measure
for indetifying top key nodes. Beside discussions on moderate rel-
ative proportions (“Banzhaf vs. Shapley”) we found that accounting
for consequences of link failure rather than node failure leads to more
convincing and appropriate performances in applications for measur-
ing political power or centrality which emphazised the drawbacks of
player-based values and the advantages of link-based values. Finally,
we derived and characterized link-based allocation rules that account
for centrality within networks and are outside-option-sensitive. By the
analysis of the effect of outside options on these allocation rules we
found that this effect is actually more complex in the link-based set-
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ting as outside options actually affect structurally different links in
a different way. This finally provided an understanding of the effect
of outside options in a highly detailed sense. This basically not only
completes our “golden thread”, it indeed even closes a circle by the
discussion in the end of Chapter 6 leading back to a deeper under-
standing of the axioms suggested in Chapter 4.
7.2 further research : outlook
We have raised issues that could be of interest for further research
in the conlusion parts of the previous chapters as for example a
deeper analysis of learning effects and the relation to the ultimatum
game for Chapter 3, a further analysis of the explicit structural effects
of outside options on allocation for Chapter 4, a deeper analysis of
the eigenvector centrality approach or applications for weighted net-
works for Chapter 5 or applications of the kappa-values from Chapter
6 for unconnected political networks.
Moreover, there is another issue that is connected to the analysis
of the probabilistic forecasting model in Chapter 4 which fits in the
“golden thread” of this thesis and seems appealing: Recall the dif-
ference between the cooperative and the non-cooperative approach
pointed out by Robert Aumann:
Perhaps a better name for cooperative would be “outcome
oriented” [..] and for noncooperative “strategically oriented”.
[In: Damme, 1998, p. 196]
In this thesis, we analyzed networks and outside options from the
“outcome oriented” perspective only. We discussed the need of allo-
cation rules to be outside-option-sensitive and provided such rules.
However, the existence of outside options of an agent might bear a
certain risk for the other agents involved. Recall von Neumann and Mor-
genstern [1944] (p. 36): “Even if [...] one particular alliance is actually
formed, the others are present in virtual existence [...].” While we
considered and analyzed the presence of this virtual existence and
suggested to provide higher payoffs to agents that obtain bargaining
power due to virtually existing alternatives, we did not consider that
these agents might actually deviate from the materialized situation to
one of the situations that virtually exist. We did not analyze how the
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other agents should account for that from a strategic point of view, that
is, taking into account the risk that arises due to outside options.
When networks are of interest, sooner or later the question of sta-
bility arises: stable networks can be seen as an equilibrium of a strate-
gic game, can be used as a proxy for forecasting issues and it might
be reasonable that an evolutionary process converges to a stable net-
work. In contrast to the generalized models discussed in Chapter 4
that took into account the likelihood of possible structures, one alter-
natively could analyze a formation process and arising equilibria. In
most stability concepts, a network is said to be stable if there are no
beneficial deviations, where the sort of deviation differs corresponding
to the stability concept. However, existing stability concepts analyze
outcomes of networks as if these networks have already materialized
(“outcome oriented”). Doing so, the existence of alternatives that are
present before the actual formation of a network (more precisely, in-
difference of agents due to outside options), is ignored. This obvi-
ously becomes problematic if the analysis of stability is for example
used for forecasting issues: the ignorance of existing alternatives can
lead to an overestimation of the evaluation of a network and hence, a
network is classified as being stable while it is not likely to actually
occur from a strategic point of view.
For further research we will take an allocation rule as given (used
as a payoff punction) and analyze the impact of outside options on
stability. Hence, we will shift our point of view a bit more to the
“strategically oriented” perspective.
For motivating issues, consider the following example: There are 3
parties in a government with the following seat shares after an elec-
tion:
party 1 2 3
seat share 50 25 25
To pass a bill, a threshold of 75% is needed. Now, parties have to si-
multaneously build bilateral binding agreements with each other and
only after these agreements have been build, the resulting coalitions
are formed. Let (relative) political power (i. e., payoffs) of parties in
the winning coalition strictly decrease in the number of parties in
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the winning coalition1. Existing stability concepts as pairwise stabil-
ity (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) suggest agreements between parties
1 and 2 or parties 1 and 3 or between all parties as being stable, while
the latter is not stable under coalitional deviations (strong stability,
cf. Jackson and van den Nouweland, 2005). Considering the refine-
ment of strongly stable agreements (party 1 with either party 2 or 3)
suggests that an agreement between parties 2 and 3 is unstable.
In these network stability concepts, parties 2 and 3 evaluate their
outcome of building agreements comparing payoffs of materialized
coalitions. In fact, party 1 is indifferent between building an agree-
ment with 2 or 3 (but not with both of them due to strictly decreasing
power) and will do one or the other while her final choice is unknown
by 2 and 3. Following this, one could argue that parties 2 and 3 should
evaluate their outcomes as an expected payoff of realizations of the
indifferent actions of party 1 according to their beliefs of what party 1
will do. In the end, it is quite likely that parties 2 and 3 build an agree-
ment in order to lower their risk. Hence, the structures suggested to
be strongly stable might not be likely to actually occur.
Interpreting proposals of building agreements as strategies, we can
model the situation by a coordination game: For simplicity, assume
party 3 would build all agreements proposed to her (which is a priori
fixed). For party i (i = 1, 2) let xi and yi with 0 < yi < xi denote
party i’s relative political power in a coalition with two parties and
three parties, respectively. Consider the (simplified) payoff matrix of
parties 1 and 2 according to their strategies:
Party 1
choose 2 choose 3
Pa
rt
y
2
choose
only 1
x1, x2 x1, 0
choose
1& 3
y1,y2 y1,y2
We see that both {choose 2, choose only 1} and {choose 3, choose 1 & 3}
are Nash equilibria of the simplified game (if we take party 3’s strat-
egy as a priori fixed). While the first one (no agreement between 2
1 If a party joins the winning coalition, it obtains a payoff strictly greater than zero.
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and 3) provides a higher payoff for party 2 and the latter (where 2
and 3 build an agreement) is less risky for party 2.
This difference is related to the idea behind the two equilibrium
selection possibilities of Harsanyi and Selten [1988]: selection by pay-
off dominance, that is, providing the highest payoff for all agents, and
risk dominance, that is, minimizing deviation losses of all agents (risk
averse selection). If we only consider party 2’s strategies, the strategy
”choose only 1” payoff dominates ”choose 1 & 3” while the strategy
”choose 1 & 3” risk dominates ”choose only 1”. While the equilib-
rium in which there is no agreement between 2 and 3 is indeed pay-
off dominant (also player 1 obtains a higher payoff), the one with the
agreement is not risk dominant as player 1’s deviation losses of both
equilibria are equal due to indifference of player 1.
Schmidt et al. [2003] find in their experimental study on payoff
and risk dominance, that changes in the level of risk dominance sig-
nificantly affects behavior while changes in the level of payoff domi-
nance does not. Hence, accounting for risk of agents seems favorable.
Note that the concept of risk dominance is not clearly determined for
games with more than two players and also, indifference as in the
example above cannot be valued properly.
For further research, we will follow Dutta et al. [1998] and Myerson
[1991] who model the process of network formation via a strategic
form game in which payoffs are determined by a cooperative alloca-
tion rule (which is exogenously given). Taking this game as a basis,
we will define a transformed game which uses beliefs over classes of
payoff equivalent strategies in terms of materialized outcomes (i. e.,
outside options with the same impact/value). This will be used to
define indifference-proof stable networks following the idea behind
the concepts of Nash equilibria (Nash, 1951), pairwise stability (Jack-
son and Wolinsky, 1996) and strong stability (Jackson and van den
Nouweland, 2005). One could interpret this kind of stability concepts
as concepts where agents aim to lower their risk, that is, as risk averse
stability concepts.

Part IV
A P P E N D I X

AA P P E N D I X C H A P T E R 3
a.1 computational effort analysis
Corollary A.1. Computational effort of
Shi(N, vgg) =

1
2 +
W−S
2·S
S∑
k=1
W!S!
(W+k)!(S−k)! , if i is strong player
1
2 −
W−S
2·W
S∑
k=0
W!S!
(W+k)!(S−k)! , if i is weak player
is of polynomial order.
Proof. First of all, one only needs to compute 2 expressions and not
an expression for every i ∈ N individually. The summation can be
approximated from above by S− 1 times computing the expressions
(|N|− S)! and S! in the nominator and again (|N|− S)! and S! in the
denominator. Hence, computational effort can be approximated by
O((|N|− S)4 · S4 · (S− 1) · log2(|N|− S) · log2(S)) (and computing the
fraction in front of the sum, but this will not change the polynomial
order).
Remark A.1. Computational effort of the originalAD-value as well as
the modified version for glove games and minimal winning coalitions
is negligible. However, imbalancedness of the market is underestimat-
ed/ignored.
Corollary A.2. Computational complexity of the general formula of
the χ value is at least of order O
(
2n logn
)
while computational com-
plexity of the special case of glove games for efficient coalition struc-
tures is of polynomial order.
Proof. Follows from the findings for the Shapley formula.
Lemma A.1. Consider a glove game (N, vgg,P) and let P be efficient
with S > 0. While computational complexity of the general Owen for-
mula is higher than polynomial order, computational complexity of
the special case of glove games for efficient coalition structures is of
polynomial order.
Proof. Consider the general formula of the Owen value:.
Owi(N, v,P) :=
1
|Σ(N,P)|
∑
σ∈Σ(N,P)
[v(Ki(σ)) − v(Ki(σ) \ {i})]
Approximating computational effort of the marginal contribution by
1 for each σ ∈ Σ(N,P), computational effort of the sum can be ap-
proximated from below by |Σ(N,P)| computations. This has to be
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multiplied by |N| (calculation has to be done for each agent i ∈ N).
Additionally, Σ(N,P) has to be computed. In case of efficient coalition
structures and S > 0, |Σ(N,P)| can be approximated from below by⌊
|N|
2
⌋
!: there are W components in P and, hence, W! permutations of
components and for every of the S pairs, there are two inner permu-
tations. Now neglect multiplicity due to inner permutations and use
that W 6 |N|2 .
To compute Σ(N,P), one has to check for each possible order σ over
N whether σ ∈ Σ(N,P). As P is efficient, this is checking whether
|σ(i) − σ(j)| = 1 for each pair (i, j) in P. There are |N|! possible orders
over N and S pairs.
Hence, computational complexity is, approximated from below, at
least of order
O
(⌊
|N|
2
⌋
! · |N|+ |N|! · S
)
> O
(⌊
|N|
2
⌋
! · |N|+ |N|!
)
Now consider the new formula given in Equation (4). Following Corol-
lary A.1, the expression is of polynomial order.
a.2 supplementary : instructions and screens
The following instructions are translated from the original German
instructions.
instructions
preliminary remark . You are participating at a study of deci-
sion making behavior in the context of experimental economics.
During the study you and the other participants will be asked
to make decisions. You can earn money with this study. How
much money you earn is depending on your decisions. Directly
after the experiment you are paid in cash. The experiment lasts
approximately 60 minutes. All participants receive exactly the
same instructions and orders. No participant will receive any in-
formation about the identity of the other participants during the
experiment. This experiment consists of two parts. After part 1
you will receive the instructions for part 2.
instructions part 1
notes on reading . Please read the following instructions. Approx-
imately five minutes after you received the instructions, we will
come to you and answer open questions. Please note that dur-
ing the first part of the experiment, no further questions can be
answered anymore.
the experiment. You play in a group of in total 6 participants, the
composition of the group stays unchanged over the whole ex-
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periment. There will be two (imaginary) left gloves and four
(imaginary) right gloves randomly distributed in your group,
this means you are either a left-glove holder or a right-glove
holder. A matching pair consists of exactely one right and one
left glove. You can try to find a partner in order to build such a
matching pair. Please note that there are more right gloves than
left gloves, hence, not every participant in your group will be
able to find a partner. In total two matching pairs can be built
in your group.
process of building a matching pair . A matching pair has a
value of 100 tokens (where 1 token is 12.5 Euro-Cents, that is,
100 tokens are EUR 12.50). A matching pair is built if a left-
glove holder and a right-glove holder agree on a distribution of
these 100 tokens. You can make offers by inserting your share
of the 100 tokens in the window “Your offer”. Your offer will,
visible for all participants in your group, appear on the screen
an can be taken by any holder of a matching glove. By this, a
matching pair is built. The other participants can also make of-
fers and you can take offers from holders of a matching glove.
To take an offer, select with your mouse the desired offer from
the list and confirm with “Accept bindingly”. Taken offers will
disappear from the list of offers and will appear in the overly-
ing list “Accepted offers”. As soon as a player enters into any
agreement, all not-accepted offers of this player will disappear
from the screen.
Please note that, as soon as you made an offer, you cannot take
it back. If another participant takes this offer, it will be binding
and the matching pair is built. You can make as many offers as
you like, however, all of your offers will remain in the offers-list
and all of your offers can be taken. If you accept an offer of an-
other participant, it will also be binding.
Part 1 is finished as soon as two matching pairs have been built
or if the playing time of 2 minutes (120 seconds) has expired,
even if no two matching pairs have been built until then.
Please find examplary screens on the next pages.
your payoff from part 1 . If you were able to find a partner, you
earned your share of the distribution of tokens. Your payoff
from part 1 are the tokens, converted to EUR, you earned.
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comprehension questions part 1
Please evaluate the below-mentioned statement for understanding of
the experiment. Your answers will have no consequences for your
payoff or the sequel of the experiment.
1. There can be built 3 pairs.
Dialogue-box for wrong answer: Your answer is not correct.
There can be built at most 2 matching pairs, since there are ex-
actely 2 left gloves available. Please read again the correspond-
ing part of the instructions if necessary.
2. There are less left gloves than right gloves.
Dialogue-box for wrong answer: Your answer is not correct.
Please read again the corresponding part of the instructions if
necessary.
3. If I took an offer, I can change my mind and take another one.
Dialogue-box for wrong answer: Your answer is not correct. If
you take an offer, it will be binding. Please read again the corre-
sponding part of the intructions if necessary.
4. I can make as many offers as I wish.
Dialogue-box for wrong answer: Your answer is not correct.
Please read again the corresponding part of the instructions if
necessary.
5. If I make a new offer, all my previous offers expire and cannot
be accepted by the other participants anymore.
Dialogue-box for wrong answer: Your answer is not correct.
Each offer you made can be accepted. Please read again the
corresponding part of the instructions if necessary.
6. If I did not find a partner after expiration of the 120 seconds, I
earned 0 tokens.
Dialogue-box for wrong answer: Your answer is not correct.
Please read again the corresponding part of the instructions if
necessary.
instructions part 2
notes on reading . Please read the following instructions. Approx-
imately five minutes after you received the instructions, we will
come to you and answer open questions. Please note that after
the part 2 of the experiment started, no further questions can be
answered anymore.
the experiment. This part of the experiment is identical to the
first part, just that you play multiple rounds now. In each round,
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the two (imaginary) left and four (imaginary) right gloves will
be randomly distributed. In total, two matching pairs can be
build per round in your group and the round is finished as
soon as two matching pairs have been built or if the round
time of 2 minutes has expired, even if no two matching pairs
have been built until then. The process of the single rounds is
the same as in the first part of the experiment.
your overall payoff . If you were able to find a partner, you earned
your share of the distribution of tokens. There will be played
multiple rounds. After each round, you can see how many to-
kens you earned in the previous rounds. Please note that part
2 starts with round 2, since you played round 1 already in the
part 1. After the last round, there will be randomly drawn one
payment-relevant round additionally to round 1. Your overall
payoff is the sum of tokens, converted to EUR, you earned in
this round and round 1 plus a fixed show-up fee of EUR 4.
end of the experiment. After all rounds are finished, the payment-
relevant part of the experiment is over. It follows a short not-
payment-relevant part. You will find the instructions for that on
screen. Afterwards you will be asked a few questions about per-
sonal details, they will of course be treated confidentially and
anonymously.
thank you for participating at the experiment!
comprehension questions part 2
Please evaluate the below-mentioned statement for understanding of
the experiment. Your answers will have no consequences for your
payoff or the sequel of the experiment.
1. My position (right- or left-glove holder) was fixed in round 1
and will not change anymore.
Dialogue-box for wrong answer: Your answer is not correct. In
each round the gloves will newly be assigned. Please read again
the corresponding part of the instructions if necessary.
2. 2 matching pairs can be built in each round.
Dialogue-box for wrong answer: Your answer is not correct. 2
matching pairs can be built in each round since there are ex-
actely two left gloves available. Please read again the corre-
sponding part of the instructions if necessary.
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screens
The following screens are from the translation of the original German
program.
Figure 9: Examples Comprehension Questions
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Figure 10: Results Screen and Splitting Screen
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a.3 supplementary : results
Table 20: Results for Left-glove Holders of all Rounds
Round Group 1st Pair 2nd Pair Round Group 1st Pair 2nd Pair
1 1 65 66 1 7 75 75
2 1 66 66 2 7 80 30
3 1 66 10 3 7 80 90
4 1 65 2 4 7 90 90
5 1 65 65 5 7 90 95
6 1 90 99 6 7 95 95
1 2 80 79 1 8 80 80
2 2 90 80 2 8 80 80
3 2 88 10 3 8 80 90
4 2 90 85 4 8 80 98
5 2 90 95 5 8 90 98
6 2 95 90 6 8 98 98
1 3 50 55 1 9 70 70
2 3 65 80 2 9 75 80
3 3 50 80 3 9 80 75
4 3 70 60 4 9 85 80
5 3 65 70 5 9 90 70
6 3 70 70 6 9 75 10
1 4 75 73 1 10 80 51
2 4 82 78 2 10 80 90
3 4 78 80 3 10 55 90
4 4 80 80 4 10 66 80
5 4 20 81 5 10 57 90
6 4 84 20 6 10 90 99
1 5 50 80 1 11 60 70
2 5 50 10 2 11 70 60
3 5 55 90 3 11 60 75
4 5 10 70 4 11 30 70
5 5 90 80 5 11 70 85
6 5 90 87 6 11 90 95
1 6 60 90 1 12 70 90
2 6 90 92 2 12 40 90
3 6 90 92 3 12 70 80
4 6 80 95 4 12 70 80
5 6 95 1 5 12 60 70
6 6 50 99 6 12 60 70
Mean 1st Pair: 72.50; Mean 2nd Pair: 73.60
BA P P E N D I X C H A P T E R 4
b.1 the probabilistic forecasting model - an example1
As an example of how the probabilistic forecasting model can be used,
consider the glove game from Chapter 2.4 with four right-glove hold-
ers r1 , . . . , r4 and two left-glove holders l1 , l2 . Instead of assuming
that coalitions have already been built, we now consider the situ-
ation before any coalitions have been established. Assume that the
glove holders have the following (common) knowledge: r1 and r3
are known to be more attractive to the left-glove holder l1 while l2
is known to prefer r2 and r4 . This (certain) knowledge leads to the
following set of possible coalition structures that might occur:
P1 = {{l1, r1}, {l2, r2}, {r3}, {r4}}, P2 = {{l1, r1}, {l2, r4}, {r3}, {r2}}
P3 = {{l1, r3}, {l2, r2}, {r1}, {r4}}, P4 = {{l1, r3}, {l2, r4}, {r1}, {r2}}
Beside this knowledge, the right-glove holders have some further be-
liefs: l1 is supposed to prefer r1 over r3 while l2 is supposed not to dis-
tinguish between r2 and r4. Let p(Pi) be the probability that the coali-
tion structure Pi occurs. The beliefs lead to p(P1) = p(P3) ∧ p(P2) =
p(P4) (preference/indifference of l1) and p(P1) = p(P2) ∧ p(P3) =
p(P4) (preference/indifference of l2). Assume that we have
p(P1) = p(P2) = 0.3, p(P3) = p(P4) = 0.2.
For this situation, the values for the probabilistic AD-value, the
probabilistic χ-value and the probabilistic Owen value are given in
Table 21.
Table 21: Expected ex ante Payoffs for the Glove Game
glove holder prob. AD-value prob χ-value prob. Owen value
l1, l2 0.5 0.8 0.833
r1 0.3 0.12 0.1
r2 0.25 0.1 0.083
r3 0.2 0.08 0.067
r4 0.25 0.1 0.083
Source: Belau [2010] and own calculations
The values can be interpreted as the expected ex ante payoffs of
the right-glove holders (the left-glove holders will obtain their share
of the worth for sure).
1 based on Belau [2010]
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b.2 networks vs . partitions
For m = 2 and m = 1, the inner grouping corresponds to a finer
grouping with respect to the robustness of the network, that is, the
number of links within a coalition
Figure 11: Possible Networks for m = 4, m = 3 and m = 2
m = 4 : P = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}}
1 2
3 4
m = 3:
P = {{1,2}, {3}, {4}} P = {{1,3}, {2}, {4}} P = {{1,4}, {2}, {3}}
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
P = {{2,3}, {1}, {4}} P = {{2,4}, {1}, {3}} P = {{3,4}, {1}, {2}}
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
m = 2:
P = {{1,2}, {3,4}} P = {{1,3}, {2,4}} P = {{1,4}, {2,3}}
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
P = {{1}, {2,3,4}} :
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
P = {{2}, {1,3,4}} :
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
P = {{3}, {1,2,4}} :
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
P = {{4}, {1,2,3}} :
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Figure 12: Possible Networks for m = 1
P = {{1,2,3,4}}
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CA P P E N D I X C H A P T E R 5
c.1 a communication network - example
For a more detailed analysis of the classic centralities due to Freeman
[1978]’s degree, closeness and betweenness measures or Bonacich
[1972]’s eigenvector centrality consider the following communication
network: Imagine there are three chairholders (3, 3 ′ and 3 ′′), each
having two phd students (1/2, 1 ′/2 ′ and 1 ′′/2 ′′). The three chairhold-
ers do not know each other personally, but have a common friend (4)
through which they can get in contact to each other. The communica-
tion network is presented in Figure 13. Now, we are interested in the
Figure 13: Communication Network
1
2
3
4
1 ′
2 ′3 ′
1 ′′2 ′′
3 ′′
relative power of each participant in the network. Centrality accord-
ing to Bonacich’s or Freeman’s approaches (normalized for compara-
bility issues) is presented in Table 22.
Table 22: Normalized Classic Centralities
Participant 1,2 3 4
Degree 8.33 12.50 12.50
Closeness 8.45 11.56 14.64
Betweenness 0 21.21 36.36
Eigenvector 8.10 12.26 14.63
Recall that, while having the advantage of very low computational
complexity, the degree measure only considers the direct links of a
node and not the whole network, that is, generally lacks to take into
account importance for connectedness of the whole network. In the
example we see that there is no difference between the centrality of
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the chairholders and the common friend who is connecting the whole
network as they all have the same number of connections.
For the closeness, betweenness and eigenvector measure we ob-
tain for the communication network the same problems as in the
train example from the introduction in Chapter 5: For closeness and
eigenvector centrality, the relative distance of centrality between the
chairholders and the common friend is very small and the bound-
ary nodes (phd students) still obtain a relatively high centrality. For
betweenness, the boundary nodes obtain a betweenness-centrality of
zero while their existence actually “creates” the power of the other
nodes: if a boundary node fails, the betweenness measure of the cor-
responding chairholder decrases. Also for Freeman et al. [1991]’s be-
tweenness measure based on network flow all boundary nodes would
obtain a centrality of zero in the communication example.
Centrality according to the Position value and the new approaches
from Chapter 5 are represented in Table 23. As we are interested in
cohesion of the whole communication network, the unanimity game
of the grand coalition is used as the underlying game.
Table 23: Normalized Position Centralities
Participant 1,2 3 4
(Shapley-) Position value 4.24 14.55 30.91
Banzhaf-Position value 6.67 13.33 20
Shapley-Eigenvector-value 2.41 18.19 30.99
Banzhaf-Eigenvector-value 5.285 14.96 23.41
In contrast to the classic centrality measures, relative distances are
more plausible and also, boundary nodes do not obtain a centrality of
zero. Note that the Shapley approaches yield much higher outcomes
for the hub which is due to the ”weighted voting”.
c.2 closeness-, betweenness- and eigenvector-values
This section covers formal definitions of Freeman [1978]’s closeness
and betweenness as well as Bonacich [1972]’s eigenvector measure
and the transformation of these measures due to the procedure in
Chapter 5.
Closeness and betweenness are designed by so-called shortest paths:
Definition C.1 ((Binary) Shortest Path). A (binary) shortest path be-
tween node i and j is defined by
d(i, j) := min(xih1 + ...+ xhkj)
where h1, ...,hk are the intermediate nodes that have to passed be-
tween i and j.
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Closeness is measured by the lengths of the shortest paths from a
node to all other nodes (closeness to other nodes) while betweenness
counts how often a node lies on a shortest paths between two other
nodes (betweenness of nodes) relative to all shortest paths. Dijkstra
[1959] suggests an algorithm to find shortest paths in weighted net-
works where weights are transmission costs. To implement this in a
general weighted network where a “good” link usually has a high
weight instead of low costs, Brandes [2001] and Newman [2001] in-
vert weights to interpret them as costs:
Definition C.2 (Fastest Path or Weighted Shortest Path). A shortest
path between two nodes in a weighted network is given by
dw(i, j) = min(
1
wih1
+ ...+
1
whkj
),
which can be interpreted as the fastest path between two nodes if
weights represent the speed of for example information flow or pass-
ing speed in road networks.
Brandes and Newman use this to extend the Closeness and Between-
ness measures for weighted networks:
Definition C.3 ((generalized) Closeness and Betweenness Measure).
The (generalized) closeness measureCc and the (generalized) between-
ness measure Cb for weighted network g(N,w) are for every i ∈ N
given by
Cci (g(N,w)) =
 ∑
j∈N\{i}
dw(i, j)
−1
Cbi (g(N,w)) =
∑
(j,k)∈N\{i}×N\{i},j6=k
|dw(j,k)(i)|
|dw(j,k)|
where |dw(j,k)| is the number of (weighted) shortest paths between
j and k and |dw(j,k)(i)| the number of those of them passing i. For
notational reasons we will write
N∑
j6=i 6=k
:=
∑
(j,k)∈N\{i}×N\{i},j6=k
Beside Freeman’s centrality measures, Bonacich [1972] introduces
the Eigenvetor centrality:
Definition C.4 ((generalized) Eigenvector Centrality). Consider the
adjacency matrix A(g)ij := (wij)ij corresonding to network g. Then,
the Eigenvector centrality CEVi (g) of node i in network g is given by
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the ith entry of the eigenvector corresonding to the largest eigenvalue
of A, that is, the unique nonnegative solution1 of
A ·CEV = λ ·CEV .
The idea of this approach is that the centrality of a node should be
proportional to the centralities of the node’s neighbors.
Analogously to the definition of the Shapley/Banzhaf-Degree-value
we define:
Definition C.5 (Shapley/Banzhaf-Closeness- and -Betweenness-value).
For every network g, the Shapley-Closeness-valueCCSh and the Banz-
haf-Closeness-value CCBa are given by
CCYi (g, v) : = C
c
i (g(N, w˜(v, Y))) =
 ∑
j∈N\{i}
dw˜(v,Y)(i, j)
−1
where Y = Sh or Y = Ba, respectively.
whereas the Shapley-Betweenness-value CBSh and the Banzhaf-Be-
tweenness-value CBBa are given by
CBYi (N, v,g) : = C
b
i (g(N, w˜(v, Y))) =
N∑
j6=i 6=k
|dw˜(v,Y)(j,k)(i)|
|dw˜(v,Y)(j,k)|
where Y = Sh or Y = Ba, respectively.
Normalization can again be done by the multiplicative approach.
Definition C.6 (Shapley/Banzhaf-Eigenvector-value). For every net-
work g, the Shapley-Eigenvector-valueCEVSh and the Banzhaf-Eigen-
vector-value CEVBa are given by
CEVYi (N, v,g) : = C
EV
i (g(N, w˜(v, Y)))
where Y = Sh or Y = Ba, respectively.
That is, CEVY is given by the unique nonnegative solution of
(w˜(v, Y)ij)ij ·CEVY = λ ·CEVY .
As before, normalization can be done by the multiplicative ap-
proach.
1 In general, a matrix has several eigenvalues but one can show that only the largest
one yields to a corresponding eigenvector consisting of non-negative components
only.
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Table 24: Swings & Banzhaf values for Parties & Connections
(less restrictive case in parantheses)
For parties (nodes)
party i swings for i # of swings Bai (to 100%)
1 {2}, {3}, {2, 3}, {2, 5}, {3, 5}, {4, 5} 6 40.00
2 {1}, {1, 5}, {3, 5} 3 20.00
3 {1}, {1, 5}, {2, 5} 3 20.00
4 {1, 5} 1 6.67
5 {1, 4}, {2, 3} 2 13.33
For connections (links)
link λ swings for λ # of swings Baλ (to 100%)
12 ∅, {15}, {23}, {25}, {35}, {15, 23} 6 20.00
[+{45}, {23, 45}] [8] [17.39]
13 ∅, {15}, {23}, {25}, {35}, {15, 23} 6 20.00
[+{45}, {23, 45}] [8] [17.39]
14 {15}, {45} 2 6.67
[+{15, 23}, {23, 45}] [4] [8.70]
15 {14}, {45}, {25}, {35} 4 13.33
[+{14, 23}, {23, 45}] [6] [13.04]
23 {25}, {35} 2 6.67
[+{14, 25}, {14, 35}] [4] [8.70]
25 {15}, {23}, {35}, {15, 23} 4 13.33
[+{14, 23}, {14, 35}] [6] [13.04]
35 {15}, {23}, {25}, {15, 23} 4 13.33
[+{14, 23}, {14, 25}] [6] [13.04]
14 {14}, {15} 2 6.67
[+{14, 23}, {15, 23}] [4] [8.70]
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Table 25: Classic Centrality Approaches
Distribution of Power (normalized to 100 %)
party 1 2 3 4 5
Cdi 25.00 18.75 18.75 12.50 25.00
Cci 23.44 18.75 18.75 15.62 23.44
Cbi 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00
CEVi 23.13 19.91 19.91 13.92 23.13
Resulting Coalitional Power
coalition {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4, 5} {2, 3, 4} {2, 3, 5}∑
Cdi 43.75 43.75 62.50 - 62.50∑
Cci 42.19 42.19 62.50 - 60.94∑
Cbi 50.00 50.00 100.00 - 50.00∑
CEVi 43.04 43.04 60.18 - 62.95
(Highest individual and coalitional power are bolt face.)
Table 26: Banzhaf-Centrality Approaches, less restrictive case
Distribution of Power (normalized to 100 %)
party 1 2 3 4 5
piBai 28.26 19.57 19.57 8.70 23.91
CEVBai 25.62 21.21 21.21 9.60 22.35
Resulting Coalitional Power
coalition {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4, 5} {2, 3, 4} {2, 3, 5}∑
piBai 47.83 47.83 60.87 - 63.05∑
CEVBai 46.83 46.83 57.57 - 64.77
(Highest individual and coalitional power are bolt face.)
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